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Cognitive Ecologies on the Early Modern Stage 
 
In the Induction to John Marston’s The Malcontent, Will Sly stages a complex 
meditation on the relationship between memory and space within early modern 
performance.1 Posing as a playgoer, Sly refutes the stagehand’s complaint that one cannot sit 
onstage at the Globe, arguing that “We may sit upon the stage at the private house,” and he 
further justifies his tactical displacement of performance space by claiming that he must aid 
the playgoers: “I am one that hath seen this play often and can give them intelligence for 
their action.”2 The Malcontent was first performed by the boy actors at Blackfriars, and Sly 
implies that his memory of this previous performance will enable him to correct whatever 
discrepancies appear when Burbage’s company enacts it within the Globe.3 Suggestively, he 
claims to supplement his memory with two forms of cognitive scaffolding, the one an object, 
the other a practice. “I have most of the jests [performed at Blackfriars] here in my table-
                                                
1 Of the three quarto versions of The Malcontent to appear in 1604, the first two list John Marston as the sole 
author, with the third including John Webster and noting that augmentations have been made. The Induction 
only appears in this third quarto, and although there have been questions regarding its authorship, Charles 
Cathcart notes that “a certain consensus has been reached” favoring Webster as the author of the Induction. 
See Cathcart, “John Marston, The Malcontent, and the King’s Men” The Review of English Studies, New Series, 
57.228 (2006): 43. Nevertheless, I follow convention in using Marston’s name when speaking of the play.  
2 John Marston, The Malcontent in English Renaissance Drama, David Bevington, Lars Engle, Katharine Eisaman 
Maus, Eric Rasmussen, eds. (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002), Induction.2, 14-5. All further references are 
from the Induction and will be cited parenthetically. 
3 Sly and the actors – Richard Burbage, John Lowin, and Henry Condell – comment explicitly on this 
appropriation of The Malcontent. When Sly asks with regard to Marston’s play, “I wonder you would play it, 
another company having interest in it,” Condell figures it as recompense for the boy actors’ theft of The Spanish 
Tragedy, correlating an actor’s age and height with the size of a page: “Why not Malevole in folio with us, as 
Jeronimo in decimo-sexto with them? They taught us a name for our play; we call it One for Another” (75-9).  
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book,” Sly states in reference to his writing-tables, and he later adds that, “for one that never 
studied the art of memory,” he can nevertheless perform feats indebted to this technique: 
“I’ll lay a hundred pound I’ll walk but once down by the Goldsmith’s Row in Cheap, take 
notice of the signs, and tell you them with a breath instantly” (15-6, 101-6). In short, Sly 
gestures to two ways in which his mind becomes spatialized, claiming that this distribution 
of thought, and the feats of memory that it enables, will be partially constitutive of the 
performance. 
Although Sly’s intervention is ultimately rejected – the actor John Lowin guides him 
offstage “to a private room,” at which point the Italianate revenge tragedy begins – his 
comments gesture to a foundational premise of early modern performance (124-125). That is, 
without suggesting that early modern playgoers were aided by table-books and the memory 
arts, I want to argue that Sly’s staging of remembrance is symptomatic of cognitive 
experience in early modern playhouses, in that it suggests that cognition must be distributed 
across space for the performance to succeed. As Evelyn Tribble has argued, “our 
understanding of the playing system, particularly of the mnemonic demands that the 
repertory system made on its participants, has been consistently distorted by a tendency to 
view cognition as individual rather than social,” to the degree that we have obscured “the 
effects of cognitively rich environments on the actor operating within that system.”4 To 
overcome such limitation, the theory of cognitive ecology locates thinking in the extension 
of the mind into the environment, following Andy Clark’s assertion that cognition has never 
been bound within “the ancient fortress of skin and skull.”5 Rather, according to the theory 
                                                
4 Evelyn Tribble, “Distributing Cognition in the Globe” Shakespeare Quarterly 56.2 (Summer 2005): 135, 142. 
5 Andy Clark, Natural-Born Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies, and the Future of Human Intelligence (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), 5. Building upon Clark’s claim, John Sutton has argued that “We are cyborgs by nature,” 
suggesting the possibility of historicizing distributed cognition. See “Exograms and Interdisciplinarity: history, 
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of cognitive ecology, one must locate thought in the interplay between internal and external 
mechanisms, between the constitutive elements of the self and those of the environment.  
Within the early modern playhouse, cognition was both distributed and localizable. 
Thought extended across a vast system that included the space of the performance, the 
material artifacts of the playing company (the costumes, the stage properties, and so forth), 
and the bodies of the actors and playgoers alike. Together, these elements bear witness to 
the fact that cognitive ecologies are historically and geographically specific. As John Sutton 
has argued, “The cognitive skills which individuals roam round with, more or less 
successfully, have histories which are just as much cultural and developmental as biological,” 
a point that Sutton develops in reading the arts of memory as a form of distributed 
cognition.6 Indeed, the materials of Renaissance drama, and of early modern culture more 
broadly, might be usefully reinterpreted in light of the theory of cognitive ecology, as Tribble 
and Sutton have recently demonstrated.7  
But whereas Tribble considers the significance of distributed cognition within the 
“playing system,” using the double sense of actor as player and as agent in a cognitive 
network, I argue that cognitive ecology can deepen our understanding of the relationship 
between environment and embodiment within early modern drama. That is to say, cognitive 
                                                                                                                                            
the extended mind, and the civilizing process” in The Extended Mind, ed. Richard Menary (Cambridge: The MIT 
Press, 2010), 192. 
6 Ibid., 209. 
7 Evelyn Tribble and John Sutton, “Cognitive Ecology as a Framework for Shakespearean Studies,” Shakespeare 
Studies 39 (2011): 94-103. For examples of such application, see in particular Sutton, “Body, Mind, and Order: 
Local Memory and the Control of Mental Representations in Medieval and Renaissance Sciences of Self” in 
1543 and All That: Image and Word, Change and Continuity in the Proto-Scientific Revolution, ed. Guy Freeland and 
Anthony Corones (Dordrecht and Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000), 117-50; Sutton, “Spongy 
Brains and Material Memories” in Environment and Embodiment in Early Modern England, ed. Mary Floyd-Wilson 
and Garrett A. Sullivan, Jr. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007) 14-34; Tribble, Cognition in the Globe: Attention 
and Memory in Shakespeare’s Theatre (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Tribble and Nicholas Keene, Cognitive 
Ecologies and the History of Remembering: Religion, Education and Memory in Early Modern England (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011). In Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008), Clark also cites Tribble’s “Distributing Cognition in the Globe” as an example of how cognitive 
extension can change our understanding of the past (63-64).  
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ecology offers a theoretical model for interpreting the ways that characters think through the 
spaces around them. By shedding light on this phenomenon, I hope to accomplish two 
goals: one, to foreground the experiential quality of place within early modern drama, a 
relationality between embodied thought and the environment that recent criticism has often 
overlooked; and two, to argue that, as plays stage the mutual reconstitution of selves and 
spaces, they become a kind of cognitive technology for remapping, reimagining, and 
resignifying the various topographies of early modern England. 
The turn towards cognitive ecology in early modern studies has foregrounded 
questions of historicity, in part because the appropriation of cognitive science as cultural 
theory risks a number of anachronisms.8 But within this discussion, the topic of space has 
ultimately been overlooked. Although Tribble and Sutton suggest that cognitive ecology has 
the potential to transform our understanding of space, noting that “Bodies, spaces, artifacts, 
and environments are all coordinated in a cognitive ecological model,” their conclusion 
reduces the environment to a topography of objects, an inert collection of things, as they add 
that “agents both shape and are in turned shaped by their manipulation of objects” within 
this coordinated domain.9 Indeed, for Tribble and Sutton, cognitive ecology implies “a 
system-level mode of analysis,” wherein the system is “dynamic, material, and non-
                                                
8 For an example of such anachronism, see Arthur F. Kinney’s Shakespeare and Cognition: Aristotle’s Legacy and 
Shakespearean Drama (New York: Routledge, 2006), where Kinney uses John J. Ratey’s discussion of the 
amygdala to explain “what is happening” when Shylock learns of Jessica’s departure (54). In Shakespeare’s Brain: 
Reading with Cognitive Theory (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), Mary Thomas Crane offers a more 
historically rigorous account of early modern drama than Kinney’s, but her interest lies in the relationship 
between cognition and metaphor, rather than in deploying cognitive theory to offer a historicized 
reinterpretation of Shakespearean drama. In her account, contemporary cognitive theory may shed light on the 
early modern period – “These cognitive theories of meaning may, in fact, accord with early modern linguistic 
understanding and practice more closely that does a Saussurean model, much as the cognitive concept of an 
embodied mind seems closer to early modern humoral physiology than the radically dualistic post-Cartesian 
paradigm” – but such illumination is ultimately supplemental to Crane’s project (14). Finally, Amy Cook’s 
Shakespearean Neuroplay: Reinvigorating the Study of Dramatic Texts and Performance through Cognitive Science (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) uses cognitive theory to offer an ahistorical account of Shakespearean drama. 
9 Tribble and Sutton, “Cognitive Ecology,” 99. 
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localizable,” a claim that further displaces cognition at the moment that it is distributed.10 In 
contrast, I use cognitive ecology to foreground the spatiality of thought on the early modern 
stage. Not only are the cognitive ecologies of the early modern period spatially specific in 
their reliance upon particular sites, but they also intervene within the construction and 
imaginative reconstitution of other environments across Renaissance England. 
During the height of early modern drama, London was itself undergoing a series of 
profound transformations. As Karen Newman has noted, “London may have quadrupled its 
population between 1550 and 1650, from more than 80,000 to some 400,000 or more; by 
1700 its population was well over half a million.”11 As a result of this demographic shift, the 
urban fabric was continually being reconstituted, with incursions upon open space being 
increasingly necessary to accommodate the influx of new arrivals from the countryside and 
abroad.12 Early modern drama played an important role in mapping this increasingly 
unfamiliar space, a point that Jean Howard has developed in exploring the relationship 
between city comedy and urban practice. In Theater of a City, she argues that the plays were 
partially constitutive of early modern London: “in invoking the places of the city and filling 
them with action, the plays also construct the city and make it intelligible for those unfamiliar 
with its places or the uses to which they can be put, and they parse the permissible and 
impermissible actions attendant on those places.”13 In describing the ways that early modern 
                                                
10 Ibid., 95. 
11 Karen Newman, Cultural Capitals: Early Modern London and Paris (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 
2. 
12 For critical accounts of these transformations, see John Schofield, “The Topography and Buildings of 
London, ca. 1600” in Material London, ca. 1600, ed. Lena Cowen Orlin (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2000), 296-321; Laura Williams, “‘To recreate and refresh their dulled spirites in the sweet and 
wholesome ayre’: Green Space and the Growth of the City,” in Imagining Early Modern London: Perceptions and 
portrayals of London 1598-1720, ed. J.F. Merritt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 185-213; and 
Rachel Ramsey, “The Language of Urbanization in John Stow’s Survey of London” Philological Quarterly 3.4 (2006): 
247-70. 
13 Jean E. Howard, Theater of a City: The Places of London Comedy, 1598-1642 (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 23.  
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drama resignifies space, I share Howard’s belief that the plays were partially constitutive of 
London’s topography. But her account places considerable emphasis on the relationship 
between narrative and social practice, evidenced in part by her claim that, “Through their 
place-based dramatic narratives, playwrights helped representationally to construct the 
practices associated within specific urban spaces, directing audiences to the uses to which 
city spaces could be put and to the privileged modes of conduct and the cultural 
competencies associated with each.”14 Howard’s account thereby alludes to the particularities 
of performance, to the way that certain practices might be staged, but the focus of her 
analysis is primarily discursive. It overlooks the degree to which perception, cognition, and 
affect – brought together within the framework of cognitive ecology – defined the contours 
of space. Environments are experienced before they are described, and one of the essential 
features of early modern drama is that it remains, in Steven Mullaney’s apt characterization, 
“a form of embodied social thought.”15 To fully understand how drama altered the spaces of 
early modern England, we must also examine moments of emplacement within dramatic 
literature. These instances in which the embodied mind apprehends and resignifies the 
environment function both discursively and metatheatrically. They theorize the relationship 
between space and subjectivity in ways that are often unprecedented in early modern culture, 
and they suggest how performance harnesses the intimacy between these two entities in its 
efforts to conjure forth the dramatic fiction.  
Indeed, I situate this discussion upon the early modern stage precisely because drama 
relies upon a complex resignification of elements within and beyond the playhouse to realize 
                                                
14 Ibid., 3. 
15 Steven Mullaney, “Affective Technologies: Toward an Emotional Logic of the Elizabethan Stage,” in 
Environment and Embodiment in Early Modern England, ed. Mary Floyd-Wilson and Garrett A. Sullivan, Jr. (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 73. 
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a fictional topography. That is to say, playgoers became aware of the drama’s location only 
by translating what was readily apparent to their senses into something grounded in the 
imagination. The performances themselves presumed a vast cognitive ecology, insofar as 
playgoers were required to grasp both the few material signifiers of space – stage props, 
suggestive costumes, occasional furniture – and the language that supplements these 
signifiers to recognize the setting of the drama.  
But this process of conceptual and perceptual translation, I argue, is also the way that 
subjects apprehend non-dramatic space. To return to The Malcontent, Sly gestures to a 
particular, if often implicit, relationship between theatrical space and the spaces of early 
modern London, a relationship mediated through cognitive ecology. Although Sly presents 
himself as “one that never studied the art of memory,” his ability to “walk but once down by 
the Goldsmiths’ Row in Cheap, take notice of the signs, and tell you them with a breath 
instantly” attests to his indebtedness to that very art. Specifically, it recalls the architectural 
model of memory, a practice that I discuss at length in chapter two. But whereas 
practitioners of the memory arts often emphasize the alteration of remembered spaces, 
transforming the memorial topography so as to facilitate memory in other forms, Sly implies 
that his memory is exceptional in its fidelity to the remembered space. Specifically, Sly relies 
upon a cognitive ecology that binds the practice of the arts of memory together with the 
space of Goldsmiths’ Row, wherein signifying images have a peculiar and pronounced force.  
 In the street as onstage, these images bring space into being and ensure its 
preservation in memory. Michael Camille has argued that signs, both those marking houses 
and those announcing businesses, participated in the production and navigation of 
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premodern urban space, insofar as these signs help to differentiate one street from another.16 
Offering a casual reference to the signs of Goldsmiths’ Row, Sly implies that they are indeed 
the signs of businesses, with his claim that “They begin as the world did, with Adam and 
Eve” playing upon an image of the prelapsarian couple that advertised a tavern (108-9). The 
emergence of space through signs was not particular to early modern cities, however; it 
distinctly echoes the signification of space onstage. As Philip Sidney complains that playing 
violates the Aristotelian unity of place, he laments that it is on the basis on signifiers – verbal 
and visual – that a playgoer must recognize the place invoked by the performance: “Now 
you shall have three ladies walk to gather flowers, and then we must believe the stage to be a 
garden. By and by we hear news of shipwreck in the same place, and then we are to blame if 
we accept it not for a rock.”17 For Sidney, the signification of theatrical space relies upon 
particular artifacts, upon pieces that function synecdochically to translate the stage into the 
place of performance. Through its reference to a similar translation, Sly’s claim to a spatial 
literacy of the urban street implies his cognitive capacity to recognize and remember 
performance space.18  
Indeed, Sly associates the practice of the memory arts with his playgoing experience, 
implying that it supplements his skill in remembering performances. Immediately after 
asserting his knowledge of signs in Cheapside, he states by way of addition, “I do use to 
meditate much when I come to plays, too” (109-110). With “use” implying habit, “meditate” 
in this context stands for Sly’s reliance upon cognitive scaffolding to apprehend the 
                                                
16 Michael Camille, “Signs of the City: Place, Power, and Public Fantasy in Medieval Paris” in Medieval Practices of 
Space, ed. Barbara A. Hanawalt and Michael Kobialka (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 1-36. 
17 Philip Sidney, An Apology for Poetry, ed. Peter C. Herman (Glen Allen: College Publishing, 2001), 114. 
18 For the term “spatial literacy,” I am indebted to Steven Mullaney, “What’s Hamlet to Habermas? Spatial 
Literacy, Theatrical Publication and the Publics of the Early Modern Public Stage,” in Making Space Public in 
Early Modern England: Performance, Geography, Privacy, ed. Angela Vanhaelen and Joseph P. Ward (New York: 
Routledge, 2013), 17-40.  
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performance, to do at “plays, too” what he does in the Goldsmiths’ Row. To a degree, the 
structure of the Globe was analogous to a memory theater, a point that Frances Yates 
develops in her influential study of the memory arts. There, Yates suggests the Globe 
provided the model for Robert Fludd’s memory theater, given that Fludd wanted his 
conceptual topography “to be based on a real stage.”19 More recently, however, Lina Perkins 
Wilder has critiqued the immobility that Yates assigns to the Globe stage in aligning it with a 
memory theater: “Early modern memory theaters seem to have more in common with 
tableaux than they do with plays,” insofar as the images placed within them do not “develop 
into narrative.”20 Wilder adds, “Shakespeare’s memory theater, in contrast, places memory in 
a narrative context,” suggesting an important point in the way that performance harnesses 
embodied thought.21  
In what follows, I use cognitive ecology to examine moments of emplacement within 
early modern drama, to suggest the way that theater functions as a kind of medium for 
reimagining space. But I also invoke this method to foreground a historically nuanced 
understanding of space within the early modern period. The definitions of “space” and 
“place” were being reconceptualized in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, owing to a 
series of transformations that have been amply documented by the historian Edward Grant 
and by the philosopher of physics Max Jammer.22 Within this intellectual genealogy, the early 
modern period represents the moment in which theories of an a priori and infinite 
                                                
19 Frances Yates, The Art of Memory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), 348. 
20 Lina Perkins Wilder, “Toward a Shakespearean ‘Memory Theater’: Romeo, the Apothecary, and the 
Performance of Memory” Shakespeare Quarterly 56.2 (Summer 2005): 162. Wilder continues her analysis of the 
relationship between the memory arts and Shakespeare’s theater in Shakespeare’s Memory Theatre: Recollection, 
Properties, and Character (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
21 Wilder, “Toward a Shakespearean ‘Memory Theater’,” 162. 
22 Edward Grant, Much Ado About Nothing: Theories of Space and Vacuum from the Middle Ages to the Scientific 
Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). Max Jammer, Concepts of Space: The History of Theories of 
Space in Physics, third edition (New York: Dover Publications, 1993). 
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dimensionality, the domain that we define as “space,” ultimately supplanted a more ancient 
understanding of place as the intersection of bodies and locations. In Grant’s words, “the 
idea that an infinite void space existed beyond our spherical, finite cosmos took hold in the 
fourteenth century and, by the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, won widespread 
acceptance,” as philosophers and theologians came to align the idea of infinite space with 
God’s immensity, the one being a correlative of the other.23 But whereas Grant’s and 
Jammer’s narratives foreground what might be called the early modern invention of space, 
Edward Casey has more recently drawn our attention to another aspect of this process, 
specifically the contested status of place within Renaissance discourse. For Casey, 
modernity’s investment in the idea of space has obscured both the historical and 
phenomenological primacy of place. In a strange and suggestive set of pairings, he notes: 
“Both Archytas and Aristotle proclaimed that place is prior to space, and, more recently, 
Bachelard and Heidegger have reembraced that conviction. All four thinkers subscribe to 
what could be called the Archytian Axiom: ‘Place is the first of all things,’” suggesting that 
contemporary theory may shed light on a pre-Cartesian understanding of the environment.24 
Indeed, my hope for this project is that, by bringing contemporary theory into dialogue with 
early modern culture, it allows us to recover a more historically robust understanding of 
space in early modern England. 
Two methodological questions stem from this effort, the one historiographical and 
the other philosophical. First, if the early modern period witnessed a shift in the 
conceptualization of space, where the idea of an infinite and expansive dimension gradually 
                                                
23 Grant, Much Ado About Nothing, 260.  
24 Edward S. Casey, “How to Get from Space to Place in a Fairly Short Stretch of Time: Phenomenological 
Prolegomena” in Senses of Place, ed. Steven Feld and Keith H. Basso (Santa Fe: School of American Research 
Press, 1996), 16. 
 11 
supplanted a belief in the primacy of place, how should we interpret this transformation in 
relationship to early modern culture? As Grant suggests, arguments in favor of the existence 
of space developed unevenly, across a vast archipelago of academic sites and philosophical 
schools, and they were most often articulated at great remove from the spaces of the early 
modern stage.25 How, then, do we write a genealogy of place, in the Foucauldian sense of the 
word, that acknowledges the significant lag between Renaissance theories of location and 
their eruption within early modern culture?26 In The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History, Casey 
undertakes precisely such a genealogy as it pertains to philosophical discourse. But Casey’s 
work, as it moves from the classical period through poststructuralist thought, ultimately 
reinforces the isolation of these concepts, suggesting their remove from other, non-
philosophical domains.27 In contrast, one of my aims in this dissertation is to suggest how 
untimely theories of place and of embodied location emerge within early modern culture, 
where culture is less a site for receiving philosophical ideas than a domain wherein these 
ideas are tested, transformed, or rejected in favor of more organic claims. In other words, 
my hope is that this project adds nuance and depth to our understanding of space in the 
early modern period, in part by foregrounding the role of drama as a site for thinking 
through the paradoxes of embodied location. 
                                                
25 There are a few intriguing exceptions to this distance, most notably in the fact that Ben Jonson owned a copy 
of Lucretius’s De Rerum Natura. In The Swerve: How the World Became Modern (New York: Norton, 2011), Stephen 
Greenblatt speculates that Shakespeare may also have been familiar with Lucretius, either through Jonson or 
through Montaigne’s Essais (243-244).  
26 It is worth noting that Foucault gestures to the history of space in his essay, “Of Other Spaces,” translated by 
Jay Miskowiec and published in Diacritics 16, no. 1 (Spring 1986): 22-27. Foucault argues “that in the Middle 
Ages there is a hierarchic ensemble of places: sacred places and profane places; protected places and open, 
exposed places; urban places and rural places,” and he contrasts this episteme, dominated by “the space of 
emplacement,” with early modern theories of “an infinite, and infinitely open space” (22-23). In short, for 
Foucault, “starting with Galileo and the seventeenth century, extension was substituted for localization” (23).  
27 Casey, The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997). 
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Second, with regard to the phenomenological primacy of place, how do we account 
for its presence and its constitutive force within an episteme that continually seeks to 
obscure the significance of the concept of place? In the Discours de la Méthode, for example, 
René Descartes lays the foundation for the cogito by separating the mind from its immediate 
environment, diminishing the importance of place in determining: “that I was a substance, 
whose whole essence or nature was only in thinking, and which, in order to be, has no need of 
any place, nor is dependent upon any material thing.”28 For phenomenologists and 
contemporary theorists alike, Descartes’s assertion misrepresents the relationship between 
embodied thought and the environment.29 Rather than acknowledging the constitutive role 
of place in providing the grounds of personhood, Descartes’s account of being articulates a 
fantasy of a disembodied, and thus displaced, subjectivity. It is, in Slavoj Zizek’s apt 
characterization, a form of madness.30 Although Descartes himself does not fully succeed in 
realizing this fantasy, even within the limited space of his own philosophical project, this 
account is symptomatic of certain trends within early modern thought, specifically of a desire 
to view the self as separate from its elemental and environmental foundations.31 Thus, it 
                                                
28 René Descartes, Discours de la Méthode, in Oeuvres de Descartes VI, publiées par Charles Adam & Paul Tannery 
(Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1965), 33. Both the translation and the emphasis are my own. 
29 See, for example, Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, trans. David 
Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), and Casey, Getting Back into Place: Toward a Renewed 
Understanding of the Place-World (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993). 
30 In The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology, 2nd ed. (New York: Verso, 2008), Zizek 
characterizes Descartes’s retreat into the cogito as a form of madness; he attributes this formulation to Derrida, 
but Zizek himself usefully suggests that the cogito is a form of madness because it removes the subject from the 
environment (figured here as the Umwelt): “Does not this withdrawal, on the contrary, designate the severing of 
the links with the Umwelt, the end of the subject’s immersion in its immediate natural surroundings, and is it not, 
as such, the founding gesture of ‘humanization’? Was not this withdrawal-into-self accomplished by Descartes 
in his universal doubt and reduction to cogito, which, as Derrida pointed out in his ‘Cogito and the History of 
Madness’, also involves a passage through the moment of radical madness?” (36).   
31 In Philosophy and Memory Traces: Descartes to Connectionism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 
Sutton establishes a relationship between Descartes’s conception of the soul and early modern theories of 
animal spirits and the humors, suggesting the difficulty of fully achieving a disembodied subjectivity within the 
Cartesian system. Timothy J. Reiss, in Mirages of the Selfe: Patterns of Personhood in Ancient and Early Modern Europe 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), also argues that the Cartesian cogito was less displaced than 
Descartes himself claims; indeed, for Reiss, the cogito is itself a space: “Neither ego and its cognates nor res 
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becomes essential to ask how we understand and engage this tension between space and 
place, between an imperceptible domain of ideas and the more immediate realm of 
sensations, within the early modern period, existing at once on the discursive level of the 
history of ideas and in the more localized sphere of human subjectivity. 
To address these interpretative problems, I use the concept of emplacement. 
Emplacement foregrounds both the experiential quality of being-within-a-location and the 
temporal drag of that quality, the fact that feelings of emplacement are formed through the 
gradual accumulation of different sensations.32 In this sense, emplacement relies upon a 
particular cognitive ecology. Again, as a framework, cognitive ecology foregrounds “the rich 
interconnectivity of the brain, body, and world,” as Edwin Hutchins describes it in his 
seminal work on the concept, encompassing “the multidimensional contexts in which we 
remember, feel, think, sense, communicate, imagine, and act, often collaboratively, on the fly, 
and in rich ongoing interaction with our environments.”33 In this way, cognitive ecology 
provides a theoretical framework for interpreting the way that disparate elements – from 
embodied sensations to the qualia of an ambient environment – conjoin to form a sense of 
place. As I deploy the concept here, cognitive ecology restores our understanding of the 
historical particularity of early modern spaces, in part by suggesting that experiences of 
                                                                                                                                            
cogitans were at this stage [of the second Meditation] any sort of agent. They were names given to the ‘place’ 
where thinking (as any form of mental activity) went on or, better yet, they were simply the referents subjected to 
that thinking process” (482). 
32 My conceptualization of emplacement owes a great deal to Casey’s theory of implacement, a term that he 
deploys in Getting Back into Place in order to foreground the phenomenological and experiential quality of being 
within a particular location.  
33 Edwin Hutchins, “Cognitive Ecology,” Topics in Cognitive Science, 2 (2010): 711; Tribble and Sutton, “Cognitive 
Ecologies,” 94. In Being There: Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1997), 
Clark also invokes cognitive extension as a means of relocalizing the embodied mind within a larger 
environment. Moreover, Clark returns to this idea in Supersizing the Mind, where he elaborates on the concept of 
a “cognitive niche construction” within space by citing David Kirsch’s “The Intelligent Use of Space,” Artificial 
Intelligence 73 (1995): 31-68 (64). 
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emplacement, more so than the concept of expansive space, defined the environments of 
Renaissance England.  
As a theoretical model, cognitive ecology is deeply capacious. Its virtue is tied to its 
ability to bring together disparate elements from different ontological categories – material 
and immaterial, sentient and insentient, real and imagined – within a larger system of thought. 
But for this reason, I often supplement the theory of cognitive ecology with other theoretical 
and philosophical models, from phenomenology and performativity to theories of 
emergence and captivation, in order to address the constitutive forces of a particular 
cognitive ecology. In chapter one, for example, I rely upon an early version of the theory of 
cognitive ecology – that of cognitive extension – to trace the relationship between desire and 
the shape of the cosmos in John Lyly’s Endymion. Because desire, like thought, extends 
beyond the self, entering into a complex circuit with bodies and artifacts within the world, it 
is deeply productive to think of this drive in terms of cognitive ecology.34 The 
reconceptualization of what I call amatory cognition – that is, a form of contemplative 
thought deeply inflected by yearning – foregrounds the relationship between desire and 
space in Endymion and within the discursive realm of Neoplatonism. These approaches allow 
me to develop and add nuance to the insights of cognitive ecology, particularly as I endeavor 
to historicize these claims and to make their implications specific to early modern drama. 
The purpose is, on the one hand, to foreground the historical particularity of early modern 
cognitive ecologies and to suggest how this historical awareness can guide new 
interpretations of Renaissance drama. But it is also to develop the theory of cognitive 
ecology, to suggest that the distribution of thought across space does not simply transform 
                                                
34 See, for example, Jacques Lacan’s discussion of the partial circuit of the drive in The Four Fundamental Concepts 
of Psychoanalysis, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Norton, 1998), 174-186. 
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our understanding of the mind, but that it must also change the way that we interpret that 
environment. 
Indeed, one of the central arguments of Ecologies of Thought is that cognitive ecology 
reframes our understanding of the ontology of early modern space. Specifically, it draws our 
attention to what might be called the micro-territorialities of early modern culture. I have 
adapted the term “micro-territorialities” from the work of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, 
who posit the territory as the organization of disparate flows, rhythms, and affects within a 
particular domain: “The territory is in fact an act that affects milieus and rhythms, that 
‘territorializes’ them. The territory is the product of a territorialization of milieus and 
rhythms.’”35 Animals produce their own territories in resignifying the environment around 
them, by signaling a kind of possessiveness over the space and thus making themselves 
consubstantial with it: “Bird songs: the bird sings to mark its territory,” but humans are 
territorial as well: “Radios and television sets are like sound walls around every household 
and mark territories (the neighbor complains when it gets too loud).”36 In this sense, the 
territory is an environment known only through emplacement; it is a space that emerges 
when the feelings and signifying forces of the Umwelt or milieu have been grasped, 
apprehended, or transformed by the organism.37 
Defined in this way, territories appear to lack the ideological significance of larger 
political entities, such as states and empires, even as they recall the environments posited by 
                                                
35 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 314. 
36 Ibid., 313, 311. 
37 This figuration of the territory anticipates Deleuze and Guattari’s later discussion of the difference between 
smooth and striated space. Ventriloquizing the composer Pierre Boulez, they argue: “in a smooth space-time 
one occupies without counting, whereas in a striated space-time one counts in order to occupy” (Ibid., 477). In 
other words, smooth space, like the territory, is known only by being embedded within it, by occupying the 
space; in contrast, striated space is mapped, or counted, from a distance or from a position of exteriority. I 
discuss the concept of the Umwelt and its relationship to space at greater length in chapter four.  
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cognitive ecology. But, as Deleuze and Guattari suggest, these molar aggregates of political 
organization come into being through the reorganization of smaller spaces, including that of 
the territory. In this sense, “every politics is simultaneously a macropolitics and a micropolitics,” 
insofar as one must attend to both the existence of a particular political entity, on the macro-
level of the state, and the minor, even molecular, shifts that subtend and support the 
formation of that entity.38 In the two volumes of Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Deleuze and 
Guattari regularly use this distinction between macropolitics and micropolitics to examine 
the relationship between fascism and the desires subtending that ideology.39 But one might 
easily appropriate these terms to examine the flows of energy and affect that support early 
modern political formations. For example, to understand the political organization of 
Elizabeth’s court, one might examine the structural contours of the early modern monarchy, 
its relationship to the aristocracy and to Parliament, as well as the social and economic 
conditions that gave shape to the second half of the sixteenth century. But, in a 
micropolitical approach, it would also be necessary to consider a discursive entity like 
Neoplatonism, which aided in the construction of Elizabeth’s court by locating her courtiers 
within a schema of contemplative desire. 
Thus, I invoke these concepts in order to foreground the critical, and perhaps 
political, significance of examining the spaces produced through cognitive ecology. Within 
                                                
38 Ibid., 213. Significantly for my work, Deleuze and Guattari argue that micropolitics concerns the perceptual, 
the affective, and the unconscious, each a particular domain that cognitive ecology helps us to theorize: “Take 
aggregates of the perception or feeling type: their molar organization, their rigid segmentarity, does not 
preclude the existence of an entire world of unconscious micropercepts, unconscious affects, fine 
segmentations that grasp or experience different things, are distributed and operate differently. There is a 
micropolitics of perception, affection, and conversation, and so forth” (213). 
39 Indeed, in his preface to Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and 
Helen R. Lane (New York: Penguin, 1977), Foucault argues: “the major enemy, the strategic adversary,” for 
Deleuze and Guattari, “is fascism. ... And not only historical fascism, the fascism of Hitler and Mussolini – 
which was able to mobilize and use the desire of the masses so effectively – but also the fascism in us all, in our 
heads and in our everyday behavior, the fascism that causes us to love power, to desire the very thing that 
dominates and exploits us” (xiii).  
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early modern studies, larger topographies of nation and empire have been subjected to 
rigorous ideological critique, in part because specific historical forces – whether in 
Elizabeth’s efforts to colonize Ireland, in the tenuous unification of England and Scotland 
under James, or in the expansion of England’s naval and imperial power over the course of 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries – have foregrounded the contingent nature of these 
entities at the very moment that Shakespeare and his contemporaries staged their 
constitution and dissolution.40 But the questions that Deleuze and Guattari pose – how do 
territories become absorbed within states, and how do states sustain themselves through the 
production and transformation of territories – require further consideration. Within early 
modern England, how can imagined topographies and cognitive maps deepen our sense of 
fictional and physical environments staged by Shakespeare and his contemporaries? 
The works that I consider – Lyly’s Endymion, Christopher Marlowe’s Dido, Queen of 
Carthage, William Shakespeare’s King Lear, and Ben Jonson’s Bartholomew Fair – each concern 
themselves with a political and geographic entity, whether as enclosed as Elizabeth’s court or 
as expansive as the British empire. Because these larger topographies have often already 
received considerable critical attention, I focus instead on the more intimate spaces of the 
plays, seeking to foreground the relationship between embodied thought and the 
environment within each work.  
                                                
40 For a few representative examples, see Richard Helgerson, “The Land Speaks: Cartography, Chorography, 
and Subversion in Renaissance England,” Representations 16 (Autumn 1986): 50-85; John Gillies, Shakespeare and 
the Geography of Difference (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); and Bernhard Klein, Maps and the 
Writing of Space in Early Modern England and Ireland (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001). For accounts that 
situate the spaces of nation and empire in relation to early modern drama, see in particular Stephen Greenblatt, 
Renaissance Self-Fashioning (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), Emily C. Bartels, Spectacles of Strangeness: 
Imperialism, Alienation, and Marlowe (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993), and Jean E. Howard 




The first chapters of the dissertation examine the representation of the ecological 
mind in early modern drama. John Lyly’s Endymion (chapter one) stages the Ovidian myth of 
a shepherd’s infatuation with the moon, theorizing a relationship between the cosmos and 
contemplative desire. When, late in the play, the moon abruptly metamorphoses into a 
human monarch, Endymion’s experience of contemplative desire changes in its significance. 
The cognitive ecology that once tied his thoughts to the cosmos, I argue, now signals his 
embeddedness within the early modern court, effectively politicizing the contemplative 
desire envisioned in Neoplatonism. Christopher Marlowe’s Dido (chapter two) stages the 
intersection of urban space and affective memory. Aeneas experiences memory as a 
profoundly spatial phenomenon, shown both in his complex narration of the fall of Troy 
and his brief hallucination of Priam before the walls of Carthage. I argue that the deeply 
parodic tone of Dido empties Aeneas’s ecological memory of significance. Diminishing the 
importance of the remembered Troy, the play severs the connection between the city that 
Aeneas has lost and the imperial center that he intends to found, while simultaneously 
mocking London for figuring itself as “Troynovant.” 
Later chapters trace the processual nature of space on the early modern stage, as they 
show how drama attempts to manage the experience of embodied cognition in creating a 
sense of place within the playhouse. Shakespeare’s King Lear (chapter three) stages a 
performative constitution of space, where perception and cognition gradually reshape the 
contours of a place, and the play uses Gloucester’s blindness and Lear’s madness to make 
the disruption of this phenomenology the foundation of its tragedy. Jonson’s Bartholomew 
Fair (chapter four) locates this performative constitution in an urban context, staging the fair 
and its ability to alter the space of northern London. At the same time that the Induction 
allows Bartholomew Fair to theorize the relationship between theater and the production of 
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space, the play mocks those characters, like Busy, who assume a clear separation of 
embodiment and environment. 
 By excavating the relationship of place to personhood in early modern drama, 
Ecologies of Thought provides a new template for reading the work of Shakespeare and his 
contemporaries. It advances a historically sensitive methodology for interpreting the 
representation of thought on the early modern stage. More specifically, in drawing attention 
to crises of emplacement on the early modern stage, this project argues that these moments 
of disorientation enable drama to reveal the transactional and mutually constitutive 
relationship between environment and embodied thought. Indeed, through its ability to 
represent and to manipulate the ecological nature of cognition, early modern drama became 





Amatory Cognition and the Shape of Cosmos 
in John Lyly’s Endymion 
“My thoughts, Eumenides, are stitched to the stars, which, being as high as I can see, 
thou mayest imagine how much higher they are than I can reach.”41 With this utterance, 
Endymion explains to Eumenides the reason for his love-melancholy, the early modern 
disease that takes unrequited love as the cause of sighs, sweating, and other physiological 
signs of desire’s discontents. But rather than draw attention to the humors that were 
believed to cause the symptoms of melancholy, Endymion turns from the body to the soul. 
He suggests that he suffers because his cognition, comprised of both his “thoughts” and the 
erotic charge attached to them, is distended, in a sense. Endymion’s soul becomes located in 
the cosmos at the moment that it fixates upon the stars, apprehending those celestial bodies 
in the same manner as his eyes do; but, in another sense, his soul remains within his body, 
animating the flesh that looks upon what it cannot “reach.” Endymion plays upon the dual 
significance of the soul as both the collection of sensory faculties and the seat of reason, 
imagination, and memory, suggesting that one remains within his body while the other 
moves beyond it as a result of his erotic ardor. While Endymion remains on the ground and 
                                                
41 John Lyly, Endymion, in English Renaissance Drama, ed. David Bevington, Lars Engle, Katharine Eisaman Maus, 
and Eric Rasmussen (New York: Norton, 2002), 1.1.4-7. All further citations are from this edition. 
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his thoughts move into the cosmos, his soul becomes elongated, stretched across the 
universe, in an extreme form of cognitive extension.  
In contemporary neurophilosophy, cognitive extension typically denotes the mind’s 
ability to attach itself to objects, to couple with things and with places that provide a 
foundation for thinking. As Andy Clark puts it, cognition has never been bound within “the 
ancient fortress of skin and skull,” but rather the mind takes the world as its structural 
foundation.42 In a seminal essay on the extended mind, Clark and David Chalmers use the 
example of a notebook to suggest how our memories become located beyond our bodies 
and how our ability to interface with prostheses like notebooks renders cognition a complex 
circuit, interlacing embodiment with environment.43 Notebooks do less to store memories 
than to provide the foundation for remembering as a process, as quite literally a re-
membering of scattered fragments. Because some of those traces lie within the brain, while 
others are located in the notebook, recollection does not happen in isolation; rather, it 
emerges when the embodied subject couples with the prosthetic device, and the disparate 
traces are at last conjoined. We rely upon objects and spaces as the scaffolding for higher 
level processing, whether in remembering past experiences or in longing towards futurity, 
and Clark has speculated that even more rudimentary processes depend upon the mind’s 
ability to move beyond the body.44 Even when we are not thinking about our world, then, we 
are thinking through it. 
                                                
42 Andy Clark, Natural-Born Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies, and the Future of Human Intelligence (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), 5.  
43 Clark and David Chalmers. “The Extended Mind” Analysis 58.1 (January 1998): 7-19. 
44 Where thought appears to be bound within the brain, it is often the result of complex processes that were 
once external and have since been internalized, like the effort to think through language. In Being There: Putting 
Brain, Body, and World Together Again (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1997), Clark theorizes language as a form of 
cognitive scaffolding. Whatever innate structures of language cognitive linguists have located within the brain, 
the assumption of a particular system of words requires the mind to internalize grammatical systems, sets of 
definitions, and idioms before the subject can think through words; even after this internalization, language 
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The conceptual effort to extend the mind across its environment was already at work 
in the early modern period, as John Sutton notes in asserting that the theory of animal spirits 
figures a distribution of cognition within and beyond the body.45 Indeed, in terms remarkably 
similar to Clark’s model of an intersection of embodiment and environment, Sutton argues: 
“If there are multiple channels by which brain, body, and world interact and dynamically 
couple – material and bodily, cognitive and informational, emotional and phenomenological, 
interpersonal and cultural – then in early modern England these channels were unusually 
open, at an unusually high bandwidth.”46 This distribution occurred both within the body, as 
animal spirits and humoral fluids would circulate thought throughout the flesh, and beyond 
the somatic, insofar the elemental sympathy between the body and its environment ensured 
further distribution. In another sense, however, distributed cognition was already a part of 
early modern culture, not because the discourse of humoral theory posited the mind’s 
extension but because theatrical practice depended upon it. As Evelyn Tribble has shown, 
actors in the Globe theater used a system of distributed cognition that included “the 
playhouse, the plots, actors’ roles, the plays’ verbal structures, and the apprentice system and 
the organizational practices of the companies,” as well as the players’ own embodiment to 
ensure that repertoire texts were retained in memory.47 Insofar as cognitive extension was 
                                                                                                                                            
remains uneasily poised within and beyond us, as its status as a collective medium ensures that it is always, to 
some extent, outside the individual who uses it. 
45 Cf. John Sutton, Philosophy and Memory Traces: Descartes to Connectionism (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), especially the claim: “Animal spirits theory, like possible dynamical cognitive models, fits Tim van 
Gelder’s description of a class of possible dynamical cognitive models, in which cognitive systems are 
‘complexes of continuous, simultaneous, and mutually determining change’ (1995: 373):  
the cognitive system is not just the encapsulated brain; rather, since the nervous system, body, and environment 
are all constantly changing and simultaneously influencing each other, the true cognitive system is a single 
unified system embracing all three … interaction between the inner and the outer is … a matter of coupling, 
such that both sets of processes continually influence each other’s direction of change.” (5). 
46 John Sutton, “Spongy Brains and Material Memories” in Environment and Embodiment in Early Modern England, 
ed. Mary Floyd-Wilson and Garrett A. Sullivan, Jr. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 15 
47 Evelyn Tribble, “Distributing Cognition in the Globe” Shakespeare Quarterly 56.2 (Summer 2005): 142. 
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operative in the early modern period, both its discursive circulation and its proximity to 
theatrical practice would, I suggest, have enabled its eruption within a play like Lyly’s.  
Endymion’s experience of cognitive extension fascinates in part because of the way 
that it thematizes this act of thinking through the world. Endymion’s desire locates his 
thoughts amid the stars, making the cosmos a scaffold for the shepherd’s mind as it extends 
from his body. But, as Endymion explains, his desire also takes the cosmos as its object in 
the shepherd’s longing for the moon. This suggestion confuses Eumenides, who counsels 
Endymion: “If you be enamoured of anything above the moon, your thoughts are ridiculous, 
for that things immortal are not subject to affections; if allured or enchanted with these 
transitory things under the moon, you show yourself senseless to attribute such lofty titles to 
such lows trifles” (1.1.7-12). Either Endymion desires an impossible object in the form of a 
celestial body, or he improperly elevates a terrestrial being to heavenly status. But Eumenides 
ignores the possibility that Endymion could love the very object that he uses to distinguish 
the sub- and superlunary: the moon itself. When Endymion responds affirmatively to 
Eumenides’ question, “Do you love the moon, Endymion?” and names that celestial body as 
the object of his affection, he foregrounds the cosmological investment of the play (1.1.20). 
Endymion’s statement limits the possibility of a purely metaphorical reading of his claim that 
his thoughts are among the stars and suggests instead that the shepherd quite literally locates 
his cognition in the cosmos.  
In Lyly’s Endymion, love takes one to the moon and back. Or, rather, it brings the 
moon closer to those who love that lunar body, translating the heavenly reflector into 
human flesh. For Endymion himself, the shepherd who loves this celestial body in the form 
of Cynthia, such desire risks madness, even as it enables an ecstatic flight of the soul from 
the body. His longing locates his thoughts and his affections beyond their material 
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foundations in the elements of the flesh and of the world. In this regard, his erotic fixation 
on the moon quickly acquires the contours of philosophical contemplation, with 
Endymion’s ardor dimly representing his desire to move beyond what is immediately present 
to him. Erotic ambition, in other words, takes the place of philosophical rigor in the play, in 
a move that owes much to Neoplatonic thinking. In both Endymion and in the Neoplatonism 
from which it draws, the coupling of desire with contemplative thought represents a kind of 
hybridization of the soul’s disparate functions, an overlap that I call amatory cognition. But 
the cosmological stakes of Endymion’s desire become even more apparent when the play 
sets his longing for Cynthia in contrast with his former love for Tellus, a woman whose 
name of “Earth” suggestively renders her a planetary competitor with the moon. 
Endymion’s repudiation of Tellus in favor of Cynthia thereby concerns much more than 
triangulated desire; it suggests a rejection of the Earth in preference for the Moon. 
Endymion’s love for Cynthia would be largely unremarkable within the history of early 
modern eroticism, were it not for the fact that the play grafts this desire onto the cosmos 
and uses it to position the human subject midway between heaven and earth. 
Endymion’s love hovers between the celestial and the terrestrial, making its status as 
a political emotion late in the play both surprising and discursively disruptive. Cynthia does 
not remain an embodiment of the moon for the entirety of Endymion; rather, in the midst of 
the action, she transforms from that lunar body into a monarchical figure, gracing the stage 
with her corporeal presence. Cynthia’s alteration transforms Endymion’s relationship to her: 
he ceases to contemplate her philosophically and becomes instead her courtier. But this shift 
also implicates the nature of Endymion’s desire, which once signified a longing to participate 
in the heavenly spheres and now demonstrates his embeddedness within an earthly court. 
The play effectively transfers the locus of Endymion’s desire, divesting that love of its 
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previous, cosmological potential and rendering it instead an effect of political organization. 
Thus, Cynthia’s transformation recasts the thematic investment of the play and alters the 
relationship of each character to one another; it is surprising, then, that not one of them 
comments on the fact that the moon has come down to earth.  
 As Robert S. Knapp has asserted, the play represents “a notorious enigma” in its 
efforts to stage a philosophical allegory in the context of a commentary on early modern 
court culture.48 Flattery was by no means uncommon in court performances, but Endymion 
struggles to the degree that its figures are overdetermined, existing simultaneously and to 
that extent uneasily in their transcendent and terrestrial spaces. Most critics accept as 
axiomatic that Cynthia allegorically “figures both Elizabeth and some aspect of divine 
virtue,”49 but they are at a loss as to the identity of the drama’s other, equally allegorical and 
yet suggestively topical, figures.50 Endymion may represent a soul in contemplation, a kind of 
Neoplatonic Everyman, as Joseph Da Crema suggests,51 but the shepherd’s eventual 
subjection to Cynthia makes him a courtier in equal measure. If Cynthia represents Elizabeth, 
does this make Endymion the Earl of Oxford, as Josephine Bennett has asserted,52 or 
perhaps the Earl of Leicester, as in David Bevington’s reading?53 Or, following Michael 
                                                
48 Robert S. Knapp, “The Monarchy of Love in Lyly’s ‘Endymion,’” Modern Philology 73, no. 4 (May 1976): 353. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Derek B. Alwes, in “‘I would faine serve’: John Lyly’s Career at Court” Comparative Drama 34, no. 4 (Winter 
2000/2001), makes a similar point: “That Cynthia (“the myracle of Nature, of tyme, of Fortune” [1.4.36-37]) in 
many ways represents Elizabeth is indisputable, but efforts to identify other characters in the play with real 
persons have inspired some rather elaborate mental gymnastics” (410). Whereas Alwes gestures towards the 
problems of topicality in order to interpret the play through Lyly’s career, I note these problems to emphasize 
the play’s discursive work in theorizing an epistemology of space. 
51 Joseph J. Da Crema, “The Neoplatonic Element in John Lyly” (doctoral dissertation, Temple University, 
1968), 20. 
52 Josephine Waters Bennett, “Oxford and Endimion,” PMLA 57, no. 2 (June 1942): 354-69. 
53 David Bevington, in Tudor Drama and Politics: A Critical Approach to Topical Meaning (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1968), notes the possibility of this identification, while asserting that because “Elizabeth did 
not like to be reminded of that disloyalty” that lay within Leicester’s secret marriage, it is unlikely that the play 
actively engages this topicality (178). 
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Pincombe, might we read Endymion as Lyly himself?54 For that matter, does Tellus 
adequately assume the qualities of her name to signify “Earth,” or does her subject position 
draw her, like Endymion, from the allegorical to the historical? Is she a dim cipher of 
Oxford’s paramour, Lady Anne Vavasour, as Bennett would have it?55 Or is she the more 
political than erotic rival of Elizabeth, Mary Queen of Scots?56 As should be clear from these 
efforts to “apply” the matter of play in topical readings, a move that works against the 
prologue’s recommendation, critics have largely assumed the predominance of one mode of 
discourse within the play, to the exclusion of other tropes and signifying processes 
(Prologue.8).57 Most often, this assumption means taking the end of Endymion as its 
culmination and interpreting Cynthia’s monarchical presence as inevitable, rather than as 
something that emerges as a result of dramatic action. In doing so, these critics have tacitly 
ignored the play’s enactment of a tension between philosophical transcendence and the 
immanence of political order.  
Of course, it may be extreme to suggest such tension between the conceptual ascent 
that allegory enables and the embeddedness of historical application. Both, as Peter Weltner 
points out, work to displace meaning from an apparent signifier onto the real of the signified, 
                                                
54 Michael Pincombe, The plays of John Lyly: Eros and Eliza (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), 82. 
55 Bennett, “Oxford and Endimion,” 361. In John Lyly: The Humanist as Courtier (London: Routledge, 1962), 
however, G. K. Hunter suggests that the scandal of Vavasour’s marriage would have been addressed in 1583, 
when “Oxford is climbing back into royal favour, and is no doubt anxious to do all he can to win back again 
the lost ground” (73). 
56 David Bevington, “Lyly’s Endymion and Midas: The Catholic Question in England” Comparative Drama 32:1 
(Spring 1998): 34. 
57 Moreover, it is worth noting the unlikelihood that Endymion gestures toward a single courtier. As Hunter 
notes, the Master of Revels, responsible for selecting the plays to be performed at the court, would have been 
inclined to avoid the topical specificity that such an allusion would required, if for no other reason than 
political safety: “On what artistic grounds did the Office of the Revels select and reject? No doubt the danger 
of offence to her Majesty or other powerful persons was always present” (91). Bevington, too, asserts that it is 
difficult to read Endymion as pleading the case of a particular courtier; see Tudor Drama and Politics, 10. 
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“whether that ‘real’ be considered an historical individual, say, or an ideal.”58 Endymion’s 
desire is not necessarily antinomian, but in its potential to draw the soul from the body, it 
risks taking political subjects out of the court wherein they should reside, to place them in 
the cosmos. The paradox then lies not in the proximity of these two strands – the one 
ascending toward the spheres, the other embracing an earthly monarchy – but in the nature 
of their relation.  
To privilege either the play’s investment in Neoplatonism or in political organization 
is to ignore the complex negotiation of space, place, and cognition that conjoin these dual 
concerns. For although, as I argue, the Neoplatonic and the political elements of Endymion 
parallel one another in theorizing a contemplative constitution of space, they remain 
divergent in the places taken under consideration. Neoplatonism envisions a universe in 
which the contemplative soul may throw off its embodiment and ascend, through a kind of 
cognitive extension, towards the divine mind that animates the cosmos; in this regard, 
thought has the potential to locate the mind beyond the world as well as the body, in what 
Edward Grant has termed the “extracosmic” space lying outside the firmament.59 Here, we 
find a set of terms for conceptualizing Endymion’s soul and its expansion into a circuit 
linking the earth-bound body to cosmological cognition. In contradistinction to the 
Neoplatonic ascent, the positioning of subjects with regard to the monarch occurs within 
worldly or “intramundane” place.60 The political ecology of the early modern court was such 
that it was defined by the presence of the monarch. “The Court was a movable institution,” 
E. K. Chambers notes, “constituted by the actual presence of the sovereign,” rather than 
                                                
58 Peter Weltner, “The Antinomic Vision of Lyly’s Endymion,” English Literary Renaissance 3, no. 1 (Winter 1973): 
6. 
59 Edward Grant, Much Ado About Nothing: Theories of Space and Vacuum from the Middle Ages to the Scientific 
Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). The distinction between extracosmic and 
intramundane spaces, and their relationship to both Ficino and Endymion, will be further theorized below. 
60 Ibid. 
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delimited through an architectural site or with reference to a national space.61 Because the 
court exists through the monarchical body, it remains within the only realm that human 
bodies can inhabit, the intramundane collection of places that is the world. Despite Cynthia’s 
initial appearance as the moon itself, in other words, her gradual transformation into a 
monarch signifies her management of Endymion and others as strictly sublunary. Whereas 
Neoplatonism treats the movement of a soul through the cosmos, the court of Endymion 
exists only among the microcosms of ensouled corporealities, those “little worlds” that are a 
monarch’s subjects.62 Implicit in the invocation of these discourses, then, is a question of the 
relation between cosmic and courtly space, the crux of which is the place of the soul within 
those particular spheres.  
In suggesting this tension between the play’s dominant discourses, I acknowledge 
that the early modern period theorized a relation between the microcosm of the human 
subject and the macrocosm of the universe on multiple registers and that these registers 
should reduce the apparent paradoxes governing Endymion’s experience.63 But each of these 
models presumes a particular means of interlacing the corporeal with the cosmic, none of 
                                                
61 E. K. Chambers, The Elizabethan Stage, vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1923), 7. 
62 The trope of the human body as a little world circulates widely in the early modern period but is perhaps 
rendered most literal in the title of Helkiah Crooke’s anatomical treatise, Mikrokosmographia: A Description of the 
Body of Man. Together with the Controversies Thereto Belonging. Collected and Translated out of all the Best Authors of 
Anatomy, Especially out of Gasper Bauhinus and Andreas Laurentius (London: William Iaggard, 1615). In the preface 
to the work, Crooke figures the human as “The little world. For his body is, at it were, a Magazine or Store-house 
of all the vertues and efficacies of all bodies, and in his soule is the power and force of all liuing and sensible 
things” (3). 
63 In Nature’s Work of Art: The Human Body as Image of the World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), 
Leonard Barkan lists four models that thread the macrocosm of the universe through the microcosm of the 
human body, each indebted to Plato: “the chemical geocosm, envisaging a world composed of the four 
elements; the astral geocosm, presupposing a heavenly cosmos that is both physical and spiritual; a numerical 
geocosm made up of abstract mathematical relations; and a natural geocosm comprised of the objects of this 
world as immediately beheld by the senses” (14). Of these models, only the first has implications for Endymion. 
The play does not represent a connection between Endymion and the cosmos through elemental sympathy as 
such, but the fact that his cognition is embodied at the same time that it extends into the cosmos means that 
his thoughts substantiate a connection between the two spheres and that they are subtended by the same 
elements in both locations. The second model obtains for Ficino, as Thomas Moore suggests in The Planets 
Within: Marsilio Ficino’s Astrological Psychology (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1982), but not for Endymion. 
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which adequately explains the play’s efforts to move Endymion between contemplative 
space and the court. Foucault famously theorizes this interlacement through an analogical 
system, noting that the assumption of resemblance worked both as “a category of thought” and 
as “a general configuration of nature,” as a conceptual model that assumed continual sympathy 
between elements of the microcosm and of the macrocosm and as a practical limit on such 
sympathy.64 For Foucault, this system of analogy obtains largely on a discursive level; insofar 
as his work here concerns the rise of the human sciences, the emphasis lies on the epistemic 
changes that serve to differentiate the early modern period from the centuries that follow. 
Of course, as Gail Kern Paster has noted, analogy finds a material foundation in the belief 
that the human body and the natural world were composed of the same elements.65 
Beginning with a recapitulation of the Foucauldian position, Paster quickly turns to the 
humoral and elemental foundation of early modern embodiment to suggest that the passions 
enact this very interlacing of microcosm and macrocosm: “the passions actually were liquid 
forces of nature, because, in this cosmology, the stuff of the outside world and the stuff of 
the body were composed of the same elemental materials.”66 In addition to the discursive 
and affective means of aligning the body’s materiality with the world, there was also a 
political unification of the microcosm and the macrocosm in the figure of the monarch, 
                                                
64 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (New York: Vintage, 1994), 31. 
65 Gail Kern Paster, Humoring the Body: Emotions and the Shakespearean Stage (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2004). Paster, Katherine Rowe, and Floyd-Wilson also note that affect establishes a connection between the 
body and its environment in their introduction to Reading the Early Modern Passions: Essays in the Cultural History of 
Emotion (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 15-18. In English Ethnicity and Race in Early 
Modern Drama (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), Mary Floyd-Wilson also notes that elemental 
sympathy enabled the environment to influence embodiment in what she terms geohumoralism. But whereas 
Paster gestures towards elemental sympathy to argue for “a premodern ecology of the passions,” Floyd-Wilson 
traces the disruption of another ecology, in which the body’s permeability in geohumoralism is closed in the 
service of racialized discourse: the emerging “rift between sexual passion and physiology perversely anticipates 
the Cartesian split between the mind and body, for it is a disavowal of both environmental and somatic 
influences on the mind that will allow for the formation of the autonomous – and white – subject. Indeed, I am 
suggesting that the construction of bounded selves goes hand in hand with the construction of racial 
boundaries” (47). 
66 Paster, Humoring the Body, 4. 
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whose two bodies effectively intertwined the courtly with the cosmic. Kantorowicz notes 
that there was a drive to render the king an instantiation of a connection between the earthly 
and the heavenly in an early theorization of the King’s two bodies: “the yoking of two 
seemingly heterogeneous spheres had a peculiar attraction from an age eager to reconcile the 
duality of this world and the other, of things temporal and eternal, secular and spiritual.”67 
Although the concept of the monarch’s two bodies was by no means static, this ability to 
manage the distance between the here and now and the transcendent remained an important, 
if occasionally tacit, function. The microcosm and the macrocosm were therefore connected 
in multiple, often overlapping means, such that the space that separates embodiment from 
its larger environment could be traversed in a number of ways: discursively, elementally, 
affectively, and politically. Each model for connecting the microcosm to the macrocosm is, 
in effect, a means of conceptualizing and managing space in its radical indeterminacy. 
But if the cosmos and the court matter in Endymion, they matter precisely as spaces 
for cognitive extension, in that the distribution of the mind across an environment is both 
the method for constituting these spheres and for traversing them. In the instance of the 
former, Endymion becomes distributed across the universe when his soul dilates to span the 
terrestrial and the celestial, animating the earth-bound body at the same time that desire 
locates the soul among the stars. Through the elongation of his soul, in other words, 
Endymion moves through the cosmos, with his desire extending forth from his body to 
return by way of the moon. Paradoxically, I argue, this movement is not simply the act of 
passing through a preexisting space, but rather a means of constituting the cosmos through 
cognitive extension. In the Neoplatonic tradition, the amatory cognition that Endymion 
                                                
67 Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1957), 43. 
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experiences concerns a dialectic between a desiring subject and a desired body, a kind of 
reverberation of erotically-charged contemplation. As this reverberation moves from the 
divine mind to the various spheres of His creation – the Angelic Mind, the World Soul, the 
Body of the Universe – it creates the cosmos a second time; or rather, it participates in a 
continual oscillation between contemplated and contemplating bodies that gives the 
Neoplatonic universe its shape. Endymion takes part in this oscillation, as I suggest by 
reading his earliest articulations of a longing for the moon through the Neoplatonic co-text 
of Marsilio Ficino’s De Amore. Ficino theorizes amatory cognition as a means of moving 
beyond the body in ecstatic contemplation, and his arguments help to illuminate the 
particularity of Endymion’s desire, at once embodied and spatially distended. 
But because amatory cognition distributes the mind beyond the body, it also raises 
the question as to where thought becomes located when it dissevers itself from the flesh. 
Using Grant’s distinction between extracosmic space and intramundane place, I turn in the 
second section of the chapter to the question of Endymion’s location: specifically, when 
Endymion falls in his contemplative slumber and the body’s hold on the soul weakens, 
where does the shepherd’s soul become located? Does his embodiment maintain his 
presence in place, i.e., within the world, or do his thoughts enable him to move beyond the 
cosmos, into space? How, in turn, does Cynthia’s metamorphosis into a monarch implicate 
Endymion’s location, given his investment in her as the moon? Meditating upon the 
questions will, in turn, provide a foundation for considering the contours of Cynthia’s court 
in the final section of the chapter. There, I examine the stakes of awakening Endymion and 
returning him to his place within Cynthia’s court, to suggest the play’s negotiation of a 
tension between space and place. To place Endymion within Cynthia’s court requires an 
elevation of intramundane place over extracosmic and contemplative space. 
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I. Amatory Cognition and the Neoplatonic Cosmos 
 By “amatory cognition,” I mean a coupling of contemplative thought with erotic 
desire, in which the highly rational pursuit of the Good in a Neoplatonic cosmos coincides 
with one’s drive for the Beautiful. Just as the Good and the Beautiful are coterminous and 
are often used interchangeably in Platonic and Neoplatonic philosophy, the drive that orients 
the contemplative soul towards that most celebrated of Forms is a hybrid, erotic in its charge 
and intellective in its reasoning.68 Because of this hybridity, I suggest, amatory cognition 
maintains a paradoxical relationship to embodiment and to extension. In one sense, 
cognition remains rooted in the body, both as a site of resistance (the mind struggles to 
liberate itself from its fleshly prison) and a means of potentiality (the carnal appreciation of 
beauty should anticipate and dimly reflect the eros that leads one towards the Beautiful).69 In 
another sense, cognition extends beyond its somatic framework to move towards the object 
of its desire, in a kind of ecstatic flight from the flesh. Because of this movement, amatory 
cognition is also distributed, existing as a kind of circuit between contemplated and 
contemplating bodies, rather than as an experience bound within the brain of an individual 
                                                
68 In the Symposium, trans. Walter Hamilton (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1951), for example, Plato asserts that 
Love constitutes a longing for the Beautiful and the Good. This alignment appears within Socrates’s response 
to Agathon’s speech, when he asks Agathon if “what is good is the same as what is beautiful” and receives 
immediate assent (201c).  This, in turn, structures Socrates’s own speech, which begin with his corrective at the 
hands of Diotima on Love’s lack of the beautiful and the good and ends with Diotima’s assertion that both are 
achieved in the ascent of desire; when amatory cognition leads the contemplative subject from the love of 
bodies through the love of moral beauty and the beauty of knowledge, he reaches the intersection of the 
Beautiful and the Good in the divine: “Do you not see that in that region alone,” Diotima asks Socrates, 
“where he sees beauty with the faculty capable of seeing it, will he be able to bring forth not mere reflected 
images of goodness but true goodness, because he will be in contact not with a reflection but with the truth?” 
(212a). Diotima’s ladder culminates in absolute “beauty” and in “true goodness,” suggesting their ontological 
proximity.   
69 Again, in Diotima’s theory of ascent, the contemplative subject moves from adoring bodies to loving the 
beauty of morals and of knowledge. “The man who would pursue the right way to this goal [of apprehending 
absolute beauty] must begin, when he is young, by applying himself to the contemplation of physical beauty” 
(Symposium, 210e).  
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corporeality. Amatory cognition is thus of a body that it often repudiates, enamored with a 
space of belonging that it does not fully inhabit. In the section that follows, I argue that 
Endymion reproduces these tensions governing embodiment and extension in its 
representation of the shepherd’s love for the moon. Cynthia’s dual status as the moon and as 
an allegorical virtue establishes Endymion’s desire as a form of amatory cognition, as a 
longing that is both erotic and intellective. But precisely because the object of Endymion’s 
desire is cosmological, Endymion gestures to a lacuna within Neoplatonic philosophy and, 
more specifically, in Ficino’s influential commentary on Plato’s Symposium, the principle 
theorization of amatory cognition in the early modern period. When the contemplative soul 
extends in amatory cognition, and its philosophical ardor takes it beyond the world, where 
does it become located? Through its references to the moon and to the earth, Endymion 
poses this question as to the soul’s locus with greater urgency than Ficino admits into his 
discussion of contemplative desire and, in doing so, the play underscores the ontological 
ambiguity of the medium through which the soul travels in its ascent towards the divine. To 
suggest the importance of this ambiguity for Endymion, I first show that the shepherd’s 
longing for Cynthia constitutes a form of amatory cognition and carries with it the same 
multiple and intersecting tensions between embodiment and extension suggested above. 
Then, through Ficino’s De Amore, I argue that amatory cognition plays a constitutive role in 
the creation of the Neoplatonic cosmos and that the spatial implications of this erotically 
charged contemplation extend well beyond the soul’s relationship to its own body; but I also 
acknowledge that Ficino gestures towards this question of space without adequately 
addressing its implications for his argument. Because the traces of this creation can be 
glimpsed in Endymion, I return to Lyly’s play as an artifact that performs the very tensions of 
the Ficinian universe. Both Endymion’s and Tellus’s subjugation to Cynthia replicate a 
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distribution of cognition and desire through which the divine mind animates the universe, 
demonstrating the play’ discursive investment in Neoplatonism. Indeed, the eruption of 
these topoi within the first half of Endymion helps to locate that section of the play within a 
Neoplatonic universe, and it is through such localization that we begin to recognize the 
play’s invocation of the soul as the mediator between court and cosmos. 
 When Endymion locates his thoughts among the stars, he figures his erotic 
investment in Cynthia as highly contemplative and articulates a trope that will conjoin the 
qualities of amatory cognition throughout the play. Later, well after assuring Eumenides that 
he desires the moon, Endymion begins an apostrophe to Cynthia with cries reminiscent of 
his earlier assertion: “O fair Cynthia, O unfortunate Endymion! Why was not thy birth as 
high as thy thoughts, or her beauty less than heavenly? Or why are not thine honors as rare 
as her beauty? Or thy fortunes as great as thy deserts?” (2.1.1-4). Endymion continues to 
locate his thoughts beyond himself, but here he supplements his claims to Eumenides with a 
more precise articulation of Cynthia’s status with regards to him. Her beauty is “heavenly” 
and thus of the very stars that Endymion names as the scaffold for his cognition. This 
cognitive ascent towards the lunar Cynthia is both erotic and contemplative. In one instance, 
Endymion offers himself to Cynthia as an abject lover,70 the quasi-Petrarchan victim of 
unrequited love: “Desirest thou the passions of love, the sad and melancholy moods of 
perplexed minds, the not-to-be-expressed torments of racked thoughts? Behold my sad tears, 
                                                
70 I acknowledge Cynthia Marshall’s point in The Shattering of the Self: Violence, Subjectivity, and Early Modern Texts 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), that the discourse of Petrarchanism conceals a kind of 
pleasure within itself at the moment that it appears to articulate the pain of an abject lover: “We could perhaps 
understand Petrarchan poetry analogously to be the expressive form taken by more creative victims of 
lovesickness. Yet the self-defeating mechanism built into the Petrarchan structure complicates this 
interpretation, for the Petrarchan poet does not merely confess and convey pain or describe and praise a 
remote beloved. Instead, the Petrarchanist wins (poetry) by losing (the beloved)” (67). My point is not that 
Endymion is abject in his devotion to Cynthia, but rather that he presents himself as abject. 
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my deep sighs, my hollow eyes, my broken sleeps, my heavy countenance” (2.1.9-13). These 
somatic signifiers of tears and sighs further mark Endymion’s desire as being of the body, as 
a passionate, even humoral, expression of eros. The coupling of “racked thoughts” and 
“perplexed minds” to the experience of desire, however, functions as a pivot for turning 
towards the cognitive and contemplative aspects of Endymion’s longing. Almost 
immediately, he shifts from fashioning himself as an abject lover to claim his status as a 
hermetic devotee of Cynthia: “Remember my solitary life almost these seven years. Whom 
have I entertained but mine own thoughts and thy virtues? What company have I used but 
contemplation?” (2.1.15-17). In place of Cynthia’s celestial beauty, Endymion here 
emphasizes her virtuous status. The proximity does not suggest that he replaces one category 
with the other, but rather that he considers them conjoined. As before, his “thoughts” 
provide the fulcrum for moving towards the values that Cynthia embodies. His 
contemplation of Cynthia encompasses both an impassioned and acute attraction to her 
beauty and an intellective appreciation of her virtuous qualities; it constitutes, in other words, 
a form of amatory cognition. 
   For Endymion, this hybridization of erotic and contemplative potential means that 
his soul becomes distributed across two spaces simultaneously: his cognitive faculties course 
through the body at the same time that they extend into the cosmos. Endymion testifies to 
the former in his claim that he suffers from love-melancholy. Signifying himself as the victim 
of lovesickness, “settled either to die or possess the moon herself,” Endymion presents 
himself to Eumenides as vexed by a humoral imbalance. He invokes a classic trope of love-
melancholy, the localization of desire within bodily fluids, to explain why his desire must 
culminate in death if not in satisfaction: “My thoughts have no veins, and yet, unless they be 
let blood, I shall perish” (1.1.17-8, 30-1). By gesturing towards a humoral foundation for his 
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impassioned thoughts, Endymion acknowledges one of the means by which cognition could 
be said to be distributed in the early modern period: the workings of the mind, enabled by 
the animal spirits and humoral fluids, moved with those spirits and liquids throughout the 
body, extending thought at the moment that they animate the flesh.71 Indeed, because such 
physiological components constituted “the cognitive wing of the vast early modern 
pneumatic ecologies of spirit and fluids,” as Sutton puts it, the mind was not bound within 
the brain but rather was distributed across the somatic framework.72 In acknowledging that 
his melancholia may be relieved through bloodletting, Endymion seems to affirm this quasi-
humoral foundation of thought, to admit that, in his experience, amatory cognition is both 
embodied and distributed. 
But Endymion seems equally aware that such distribution implies that the mind is as 
material as the flesh within which it inheres, as corruptible as the body itself. The accusation 
is already nascent within Eumenides’ recommendation of medical attention: “That 
melancholy blood must be purged which draweth you to a dotage no less miserable than 
monstrous” (1.1.27-29). The dotage of which Eumenides speaks, what Robert Burton will 
gloss as the madness that comes “when some one principall facultie of the minde, as imagination, or 
reason is corrupted, as all Melancholy persons have,” has a humoral foundation, and the passage 
from an excess of black bile to the cognitive impairment of dotage manifests the ease with 
which physiology could alter the workings of the mind.73 For this reason, Endymion 
distinguishes between an embodied, affective cognition and the implication that 
                                                
71 Paster traces the dissemination of animal spirits through what she calls “neural pathways” as well as the veins 
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Body in Parts: Fantasies of Corporeality in Early Modern Europe, ed. David Hillman and Carla Mazzio (New York: 
Routledge, 1997): 107-125. 
72 Sutton, “Spongy Brains,” 19. 
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embodiment reifies the mind; his “thoughts have no veins,” are not of the body, even as 
embodiment yields a functional symbiosis between the flesh and the spirit: “unless” those 
thoughts “be let blood, I shall perish.” Here, Endymion affirms that the soul as a collection 
of cognitive faculties remains separate from the corporeality that that same soul animates; 
but this conceptual separation, I would venture, arises from the ontological proximity of the 
two natures of the soul. The anima becomes distributed throughout the body at the moment 
that it endows that flesh with the faculties of perception and motility, but because this 
distribution risks rendering the mind an effect of temperament, Endymion must 
apotropaically invoke the soul’s independence from the flesh to ward off the specter of a 
too-embodied mind. Notwithstanding this effort, Endymion transitions from one form of 
cognitive extension to the other, from the mind’s distribution within the body to its 
extension across the cosmos, in asserting a distinction between thoughts and veins.  
And yet, in his conversation with Eumenides, Endymion prefers to conceive of 
cognitive extension as an expansion, rather than simply a distribution, of the soul. That is, in 
contrast to his paradoxical utterance that his thoughts are not of the body, and yet course 
through it, Endymion articulates in emphatic terms the privilege that he places upon the 
soul’s flight. First, he mocks his friend for allowing desire to rest on the level of 
embodiment: “Vain Eumenides, whose thoughts never grow higher than the crown of thy 
head! Why troublest thou me, having neither head to conceive the cause of my love nor 
heart to receive the impressions? Follow thou thine own fortunes, which creep on the earth, 
and suffer me too to fly to mine, whose fall, though it be desperate, yet shall it come by 
daring” (1.1.78-84). Endymion thus begins by contrasting himself with Eumenides with 
regards to embodiment and spatial extension. Whereas the shepherd’s thoughts ascend to 
the stars, his friend’s contentment to accept a more terrestrial locus of thought condemns 
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him. In Endymion’s extended pun, that is, “Vain Eumenides” is vain because he allows his 
thoughts to reside within the “veins” of the body; he embraces a distribution of cognition 
within the body, the same distribution that Endymion accepts but ultimately supersedes in 
locating his thoughts among the stars. When he orders Eumenides to follow his “own 
fortunes, which creep on the earth,” Endymion contrasts his experience of amatory 
cognition and the cosmic flight that it enables with his friend’s more terrestrial concerns, 
distinguishing them through the motility that each possesses with regards to the universe. As 
this verbal jousting between Eumenides and Endymion suggests, the play theorizes cognitive 
distribution through a matrix that distinguishes between materiality and the mind, between 
embodiment and the soul that informs the soma. But his utterance renders on a 
cosmological level what Endymion’s other claims located on a corporeal register, affirming 
that the distinction between the shepherd and his friend Eumenides lies in the distribution 
of their desires. 
However sudden this transition from the corporeal to the cosmic may seem, it 
follows the peculiar logic of cognitive extension in the early modern period, whether that 
extension was articulated through humoral theory or through less material figurations of the 
body-soul nexus. Embodiment, for humoralists, involved the soul’s distribution across the 
somatic structure; because animal spirits served as the physiological foundation of the soul’s 
embeddedness within the body, they also worked to circulate thoughts throughout the flesh. 
Spirits functioned as the ontological connection between anima and soma, in other words, 
such that they “were requisite theoretical entities in accounts not only of muscular motion, 
but also of memory, dreaming, and imagination, and of emotion, moods, and madness.”74 
They were, in short, the conceptual apparatus through which early modern thinkers would 
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“embed cognitive function in the body.”75 Although spirits were the material means for 
extending the soul throughout the body, their fragile dependence upon the fluids of the 
humoral body also meant that they were subject to vicissitudes, that their workings 
fluctuated in tune with the world around them. “The humoral subject’s interwoven medical, 
mental, mnemonic, moral, and metaphysical plight,” Sutton argues elsewhere, “can’t be 
understood by considering the vulnerable humoral body and the fleeting spirituous brain in 
isolation from the world,” because the elemental sympathy between the body and its 
environment meant that the subject was, in a sense, always already extended.76 When 
Endymion chastises Eumenides, he appears to be cognizant of this elemental sympathy and 
its potential to distribute the mind across the cosmos as easily as within the body. His 
qualified acceptance of embodied cognition in the fact that bloodletting may ease his 
melancholy suggests his awareness of the instability of the humoral body.  
Perhaps for this reason, Endymion values Cynthia as an emblem of constancy, 
endeavoring to preserve the moon as a sign of immutability against popular perception: “O, 
fair Cynthia, why do others term thee inconstant whom I have ever found unmovable? 
Injurious time, corrupt manners, unkind men, who, finding a constancy not to be matched in 
my sweet mistress, have christened her with the name of wavering, waxing, and waning! Is 
she inconstant that keepeth a settled course, which since her first creation, altereth not one 
minute in her moving?” (1.1.34-40). Much like Spenser, who theorizes Constancy through 
Mutability’s subjugation to Nature in the “Two Cantos of Mvtabilitie,” Endymion asserts the 
moon’s sempiternal status as its management of apparent alteration. In a sense, then, 
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76 Sutton, “Spongy Brains,” 20. 
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Endymion’s movement from the corporeal to the cosmic evinces a belief in elemental 
sympathy and the distribution of cognition that it allows.  
But Endymion asserts the immateriality of thought in such a way as to admit an 
alternative to elemental sympathy: the psychic flight that characterizes Neoplatonic amatory 
cognition. Against a general understanding of Neoplatonism as a discourse invested in the 
soul’s emancipation from the body, Endymion’s citation of Neoplatonism distinguishes itself 
in postulating an intimate relationship between desire and the movement of the soul in 
contemplation: as Da Crema has noted, “Lyly’s platonism” in Endymion as in other works 
“revolves around the subject of love,” such that it stands in contrast to “the platonism of 
Spenser or Milton, for example, which is grounded in metaphysical erudition.”77 This same 
theorization of desire as a thread drawing the self out of the body, towards the forms that 
animate cognition, constitutes Ficino’s primary contribution to Neoplatonism, in that, as 
Sears Jayne asserts, “he made of Plato a philosopher of love and beauty, which he had never 
been before.”78 Endymion and Ficino’s text are thus discursively similar in their presentation 
of amatory cognition.79 Rather than postulate Lyly’s familiarly with the De Amore, I argue that 
these parallel articulations of contemplative desire enable us to use Ficino’s text to illuminate 
the status of amatory cognition in Endymion; at the same time, the play, in its displacement of 
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Ficinian concepts onto the early modern court, reveals the spatial politics implicit within 
Neoplatonism. 
In recognition of the difficulties marking any effort to establish Lyly’s familiarity with 
Ficino, I devote critical attention to Guy Le Fevre de la Boderie’s Discours de l’honneste amour 
sur le Banquet de Platon, the French translation of Ficino’s text that, Jayne notes, “was mainly 
responsible for the influence of the De amore in England,” rather than to Ficino’s original 
claims.80 The language in which Neoplatonic concepts were articulated upon their arrival in 
England would significantly influence their subsequent dissemination. 
In la Boderie’s translation of Ficino, amatory cognition distinguishes itself from 
other forms of desire through its management of embodiment and extension. Whereas 
certain drives reflect the impropriety of a “desir libideneux,” or libidinous desire, Love itself 
constitutes a longing for the Form of the Beautiful; as Ficino instructs the reader, “quand 
nous disons Amour, entendez le desir de Beauté” (“when we speak of Love, understand it as 
the desire of Beauty”).81 But the distinction between Love and libidinous desire appears not 
simply in the nature of the drive, nor in the particular object of such longing, but principally 
in the means by which the soul apprehends the object of its desire. In Ficino’s taxonomy of 
Beauty, it becomes clear that Love, as the soul’s extension towards Beauty, occurs only 
through certain channels of the body-soul nexus:  
Donques la Beauté est de trois manieres, c’est à dire, des 
ames, des corps, & des voix. Celle de l’Ame se cognoist 
seulement auecques l’entendement: Celle des corps auec les 
yeux. Celle des voix ne se comprend point auec autre chose 
qu’auec les oreilles. (24) 
 
                                                
80 Marsilio Ficino, Commentary on Plato’s Symposium on Love, trans. Sears Jayne (Dallas: Spring Publications, 1985), 
21-22. 
81 Guy le Fevre de la Boderie, Discours de l'honneste amovr svr le banqvet de Platon (Paris: Jean Macé, 1578), 25, 23. 
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Thus Beauty is in three manners, which is to say, of souls, of 
bodies, and of voices. That of the Soul is known only with 
the understanding; that of bodies with the eyes. That of 
voices is not understood at all with anything but the ears.  
 
Here, the soul’s embeddedness within the body does not signify a limit to its contemplative 
potential, in contrast to what one might expect form a Neoplatonic disquisition on 
embodied experience. Rather, as the soul animates the body, it apprehends particular 
manifestations of the Beautiful through cognition and through sensation, turning from one 
modality of experience to the other as befits the object to be apprehended. For Ficino, these 
modes of apprehension constitute the only way of experiencing Beauty, while the other 
faculties of the embodied soul lead one back to the flesh: 
On ioüit de ceste Beauté auecques celle partie seulement par 
laquelle elle est cognue: par l’entendement, par la veue, & 
l’ouye nous la cognoissons. Donques aueques ces trois nous 
en pouuons ioüir auec les autres sens, non la Beauté, laquelle 
desire Amour, mais plustost nous possedons quelque autre 
chose dont le corps a besoing. (31) 
 
One enjoys this Beauty with only that part by which she [the 
Beauty] is known: by the understanding, by sight, and by 
hearing we know her. Thus with those three other senses [of 
taste, touch, and smell] we are able to enjoy not Beauty, 
which Love desires, but rather we possess something else, of 
which the body has need.  
 
Further asserting Love as the desire for Beauty, Ficino here implies that the apprehension of 
the Beautiful depends upon the contemplative subject’s affirmation of certain senses. 
Whereas understanding, sight, and hearing constitute the faculties of Love, the remaining 
senses of taste, touch, and smell return the subject to embodiment and to libidinous desires.   
In its negotiation of embodiment, amatory cognition in the Ficinian universe moves 
towards extension; in the same way that Endymion affirmed a circulation of cognition 
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throughout the body, only to emphasize its supersession of that body at the moment that 
cognition extends into the cosmos, Ficino privileges thought that moves past the flesh. Later 
in the treatise, Ficino invokes a hierarchy of sensory experience that depends upon distance 
and extension: 
Dont aduient que le touchement, le goust, & l’odorat sentent 
seulement les choses qui leur sont fort prochaines: & en les 
sentant souffrent beaucoup. Bien que le flairement 
apprehende choses plus elongnees que le goust, ny le 
touchement. Mais l’oüye apprehende encor choses plus 
elongnees, & n’est pas tant offensee. La veuë agist & oeuure 
encor plus au loing: & fait en vn moment ce que l’oüye fait en 
temps, d’autant qu’on void premierement l’esclair qu’on oye 
le tonnerre. La raison comprehend les choses de tresloing: 
parce que non seulement elle apprehende les choses qui sont 
au monde, & presentes, comme faict le sens, mais aussi celles 
qui sont sur le ciel, & celles qui on esté, ou seront. (136-7) 
 
Thus it comes that touch, taste, and smell feel only those 
things which are very near them and, in feeling them, suffer 
greatly (although smell apprehends things more removed than 
taste or touch). But hearing apprehends things still more 
removed and is not so offended. Sight acts and works still at a 
greater length and does in a moment what hearing does in 
time, to such extent that one sees lightning before one hears 
thunder. Reason comprehends things from a great distance: 
because not only does she apprehend things which are in the 
world and present, as the senses do, but also those which are 
above the heavens, and those which have been or will be. 
 
Significantly, Ficino’s taxonomy does not rest upon a separation of mind and body, as the 
powers here are understood to be the “six puissances & facultez de l’ame” or the six powers 
and faculties of the soul, a claim that binds sensation and reason together as constitutive 
attributes of embodied subjectivity (137). Rather, these faculties distinguish themselves in 
their capacity for extension, signifying not only that distance separates the most valued 
faculties from their objects of apprehension but, more tellingly, that this distance is itself 
constitutive of the faculty’s value. Increase – the progression from “things still more 
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removed” to “at a greater length” – renders distance isomorphic with greatness, spatially as 
well as temporally. For whereas sight obtains preeminence among the senses, doing “in a 
moment what hearing does in time,” the work of the eyes remains subservient to reason, 
unable to extend its apprehension to “those [things] which have been or will be.” 
 When Endymion asserts that his thoughts are amidst the stars, he invokes a 
hierarchy of embodied experience that follows Ficino in privileging extension. Those stars, 
“which, being as high as I can see,” exist at a spatial remove from Endymion himself, who 
remains on the ground gazing upon that which is “much higher” than he “can reach” (1.1.5-
7). In other words, Endymion makes a distinction between the visual and the tactile that 
plays upon that possibility of cognitive extension; his “thoughts” move concomitantly with 
his vision to locate themselves among “the stars,” while Endymion himself remains on the 
level of an embodied subject, relegated to the sphere of touch (emphasized in his awareness 
of what he can “reach”). This distension on the level of sense experience is what leads 
Eumenides to question the nature of Endymion’s desire. Either, as his friend notes, 
Endymion desires an impossible object in the form of a celestial body or improperly elevates 
a terrestrial being to heavenly status: “If you be enamoured of anything above the moon, 
your thoughts are ridiculous, for that things immortal are not subject to affections; if allured 
or enchanted with these transitory things under the moon, you show yourself senseless to 
attribute such lofty titles to such lows trifles” (1.1.7-12). The moon that Endymion will 
shortly reveal to be the true object of his desire functions here, in Eumenides’ 
conceptualization, as a kind of median, separating the transitory from the immortal, the lofty 
from the low. Indeed, in its liminal positionality, the moon appears to partake of both sets of 
qualities, to conjoin the very categories that Eumenides believes should remain disparate. 
Strangely, however, the crossing of this median – that which signifies Endymion’s failure to 
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desire properly – is not cosmological in its nature but rather must be traced through the 
faculties of an embodied subject; the “thoughts” that appear “ridiculous” in cathecting desire 
upon an entity “not subject to affections” demonstrate a longing that, in turn, reveals 
Endymion to be “senseless.” These multiple failings of perception, affect, and their synthesis 
in cognition ultimately lead Eumenides to conclude that Endymion suffers from a profound 
disturbance: “Is Endymion mad, or do I mistake? Do you love the moon, Endymion?,” to 
which Endymion can only respond in affirmation, “Eumenides, the moon” (1.1.19-20). But 
Eumenides’ critique ignores the privilege placed upon extension in the Neoplatonic tradition, 
and in doing so, it ignores what matters to Endymion. The distance of the object ensures 
that, as the soul extends beyond the body to apprehend its love, it relies upon senses (like 
vision, in contrast to touch) that sever the anima from its somatic foundation. Far from a 
demonstration of the shepherd’s folly (as Eumenides would have it), Cynthia’s distance from 
Endymion is what bestows value upon his desire in the Neoplatonic schema from which his 
longing for transcendence derives. 
 Given that Endymion’s experience of amatory cognition parallels Neoplatonism in 
its negotiation of embodiment and extension, a return to Ficino via la Boderie reveals the 
degree to which the spatial contours of Endymion’s desire implicate our understanding of 
the soul’s location in the cosmos. For Ficino, Beauty is woven into the fabric of the universe 
as a constitutive force, such that when amatory cognition apprehends Beauty, it causes the 
contemplative soul to retrace God’s first emanation through the cosmos. Ficino asserts that 
Beauty represents an emanation of divine form through the four concentric circles of the 
Neoplatonic universe:  
La Beauté est le Rayon de Dieu infus en ces quartre Cercles, 
qui enuiron Dieu se retournent. Ce Rayon depeint en tous ces 
quatre Cercles toutes les especes de toutes les choses: & nous 
nommons ces especes en la Pensee Angelique, Idees: en 
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l’Ame, raisons: en la Nature, semences: & formes en la 
Matiere. (47) 
 
Beauty is the Ray of God infused into the four Circles, which, 
surrounding God, return to Him. This Ray is painted in all of 
the four Circles, in all types of all things, & we call these types 
in the Angelic Mind [the First Circle], Ideas: in the Soul [the 
Second Circle], reasons: in Nature [the Third Circle], seeds: 
and forms in Matter [the Fourth Circle]. 
 
Beauty manifests itself as the substance of the cosmos through this emanation or infusion. 
By “substance,” I mean to suggest that, for Ficino, Beauty represents a hybridity of Form 
and Matter, in a Neoplatonic citation of Aristotelian tradition. In the last stage of Ficino’s 
emanation, the painting of forms within the fourth circle of Matter acts as an explicit citation 
of Aristotle and effectively reproduces the hylomorphic schema in which the impression of 
Form upon the substrate of Matter brings a body into being. This model clarifies the kind of 
constitution that Ficino envisions here. The emanation of Beauty manifests itself as the 
impression of an immaterial form – Ideas, reasons, seeds, or forms – upon an inferior and, 
occasionally, material substrate.  
Theorizing this processual construction, Ficino develops the implicit sense of 
emanation, of the dissemination of form through the universe, to articulate a constitution of 
space through cognition. In the first stage of emanation, God extends Himself in creating 
the Angelic Mind, itself a manifestation of divine cognition that, although immaterial, is 
substantive:  
Au commencement Dieu crea la substance de la Pensee 
Angelique, laquelle nous aussi appellons essence. Ceste-cy au 




In the beginning, God created the substance of the Angelic 
Mind, which we also call essence. This, in the first moment of 
its creation, is without form and dark. 
 
For Ficino, divine cognition distributes itself across God and the Angelic Mind, initiating a 
process of spatialization that will result in the cosmos. In this regard, Neoplatonic 
conceptualization locates God in the space beyond the cosmos – that is, in the extracosmic 
void – although the nature of that space (its ontological reality, its dimensions, and so forth) 
was continually retheorized over the course of the late medieval and early modern periods.  
Putting aside this question of extracosmic space for the moment, however, we see that 
Ficino further theorizes the distribution that results in cosmic construction, to illuminate the 
means by which form extends into the universe. This extension is necessitated by the fact 
that the initial construction of the Angelic Mind leaves it “without form and dark.” As the 
Angelic Mind awaits a concomitant process of informing and illumination, it becomes the 
inaugural site of the desire that will animate the Ficinian universe: 
mais d’autant que elle est née de Dieu, par vn certain appetit 
enné, elle se retrourne & employe à Dieu son principe: se 
retournant à Dieu, elle est illustree de son rayon, & par la 
splendeur de tel rayon s’embrase son appetit: embrasé, il 
s’approche tout de Dieu: approché, il prend les formes. (15-6) 
 
but to the extent that she [the Angelic Mind] is born of God, 
infused with a certain appetite, she turns and devotes herself 
to God, her origin; turning to God, she is illuminated by His 
ray, and by the splendor of that ray, embraces her desire; 
embraced, he [the desire itself] approaches God; approached, 
he takes the forms. 
 
Here, the impression of forms within the Angelic Mind proceeds from, and in turn parallels, 
an instantiation of desire. This desire, lodged within the Mind at the moment of its birth, 
functions as a kind of mechanism for turning this extension of divine cognition back upon 
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its origin; peculiarly, that is, Ficino figures the Mind as a substance turned away from God, 
requiring an infusion of “appetite” to be subjected to His command. Perhaps more 
peculiarly, this infusion extends desire between the Angelic Mind and God in such a way as 
to spatialize it, as the gendered pronouns of la Boderie’s translation attest. Desire, the 
masculine antecedent of il, moves toward God to receive the forms, while the feminine 
referent of elle – the Angelic Mind or la Pensée Angelique – retains a proprietary relationship to 
that desire. Concomitant with the extension of the divine mind across the universe, then, the 
desire lodged within the Angelic Mind becomes distributed between that Mind and its divine 
origin. In Ficino’s consideration of amatory cognition, in other words, desire acquires a 
peculiar ontological foundation, one that grafts it onto the cosmos as both a sign and a 
reiteration of an originary oscillation between contemplated and contemplative bodies. 
At the same time that the emanation of Beauty creates desire within the universe, this 
distribution of divine power enables cognition within subsequent layers of creation. 
Reiterating his claim that Beauty impresses itself upon a series of concentric circles much 
later in the treatise, Ficino supplements his initial assertion with a claim regarding human 
cognition, suggesting the emanation of Beauty entails an impression of precepts within the 
human subject, against which the world is to be judged. 
La diuine Puissance surparoissante à l’Vniuers, aux Anges, & 
aux ames d’elle creez, benignement infond, ainsi qu’à ses 
enfans, ce sien rayon, dans lequel est la vertu, feconde à creer 
quelconque chose. Ce ray diuin en ceux-cy, comme plus 
prochains à Dieu, depeint l’ordre de tout le monde beaucoup 
plus expressement qu’en la matiere mondaine. Pour laqeulle 
chose ceste peinture du monde laquelle nous voyons toutes és 
Anges, & és Ames, est plus expresse, que on pas deuant les 
yeux. … Ces Peintures se nomment és Anges exemplaires & 
Idees: és ames, raison & notices: en la matiere du monde, 
images & formes. (149-50) 
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Divine power, most powerful in the universe, benignantly 
infuses within the Angels and the souls of its creation (as 
though into its children) its own ray, in which there is a virtue, 
fecund for creating whatever thing. This divine ray paints the 
order of the entire world in these [the Angels and the souls], 
as those nearest to God, more expressively than in worldly 
material. For this reason, this picture of the world which we 
see in Angels and in Souls is more expressive than that which 
passes before the eyes. … These paintings in Angels are 
called exemplars and Ideas; in souls, reason and notions; in 
the matter of the world, images and forms. 
 
Through the emanation of divine power, the soul receives a “picture of the world” that 
makes itself “more expressive than that which passes before the eyes.” This ensouled image, 
established through the “reasons and notions” that reside within the embodied soul, may not 
accurately correspond to what the eye apprehends, but for this reason cognition takes the 
form of a judgment, comparing the mind’s understanding with the body’s perceptions. 
Ficino grounds this assertion in his explanation of human beauty; the fact that cognition 
constitutes a comparison between what lies within the in-formed soul and what it perceives: 
C’est pourquoy l’image de l’homme exterieure prinse par les 
sens, passant en l’ame, s’elle discorde de la figure de l’homme, 
laquelle l’ame de son origine possede, soudain elle se deplaist: 
& comme laide & deforme engendre haine. Si elle s’y 
concorde, elle plaist en effect, & comme belle s’aime (157). 
 
It’s why if the image of the external man, taken by the senses, 
passing into the soul, exists in discord with the figure of Man, 
of which the soul possesses from its origin, suddenly she [the 
soul] is displeased: & as though ugly & deformed, engenders 
hate [within the soul]. If she [the image of the external man] 
accords with it [the form within the soul], it pleases in effect, 
& is liked as beautiful. 
 
Insofar as cognition is an act of comparison in the Neoplatonic schema, it depends upon the 
Forms that God’s emanation infuses within the soul and which the soul, in turn, uses to 
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evaluate its perceptions. Cognition is thus always inflected through Beauty, and the erotic 
charge that accompanies the impression of Forms lays the foundation for amatory cognition. 
In Ficino’s theorization of amatory cognition, contemplative desire traces a 
distribution of the ensouled self across a cognitive and perceptual environment – at once 
proximate and distant, depending upon the apprehended object – and thereby retraces the 
emanation of the divine mind as it informs the embodied subject. There is, in other words, a 
return to the divine mind through amatory cognition:  
Pourautant que les formes des corpes se reduysent à Dieu par 
les semences: les semences par les Raisons: les Raisons par les 
Idees: & aueques les mesmes degrez de Dieu se produisent" 
(50).  
 
Nevertheless, that the forms of bodies return themselves to 
God by the seeds [that are located in Nature, in the Second 
Circle]: the seeds, by Reasons: Reasons, by Ideas, and with 
the same degree that God produced them. 
 
Ficinian Neoplatonism thereby offers an ontological foundation for the relationship of 
cognitive extension to space in Endymion. Through Ficino’s definition of Love as the desire 
for Beauty, we find a model of desire that orients the contemplative subject towards an 
aesthetic object. The feeling at the root of this aesthesis combines an erotic drive with an 
intellective investment in the divine power that animates the cosmos; it leads one towards 
the Beautiful as well as the Good, and in so doing it manages an ascent through the spheres. 
The emanation of Beauty instantiates the cosmos as such. It constitutes the universe through 
a series of concentric circles, spatializing the human self as a soul embedded within a body, 
and lodges within those spheres a desire that continually turns creation back upon its creator 
in contemplative ardor.  
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 Admittedly, because Endymion begins the play already enamored with Cynthia, there 
is little evidence to suggest that the shepherd became fully constituted through his desire for 
the moon, that he existed, formless and void, in anticipation of her beauty. Certainly, 
Endymion figures himself as transformed through his devotion, but the claims that he makes 
to Cynthia emphasize a continual, atemporal ardor and, at the same time, the gradual 
manifestation of that ardor within the world. Neither, in short, invokes the sudden turn that 
Ficino locates in the constitution of the cosmos through desire:  
I am that Endymion, sweet Cynthia, that have carried my 
thoughts in equal balance with my actions, being always as 
free from imagining ill as enterprising; that Endymion whose 
eyes never esteemed anything fair but thy face, … yea, that 
Endymion who, divorcing himself from the amiableness of all 
ladies, the bravery of all courts, the company of all men, hath 
chosen in a solitary cell to live only by feeding on thy favor, 
accounting in the world (but thyself) nothing excellent, 
nothing immortal. (2.1.36-46) 
 
Endymion previously figures this retreat into contemplative solitude as having occurred 
almost seven years ago, standing in sharp contrast to his assertion that he has “always” 
retained a purity of devotion to Cynthia, that he “never” glimpsed beauty beyond her visage. 
The temporal paradoxes that govern these utterances disrupt the possibility that Endymion 
was brought into being through his longing for Cynthia. In a reading that seeks to recover 
Endymion in his constancy for Cynthia, one might suggest his claim represents devotion as a 
continual process of desiring, in which Endymion’s contemplative ardor for the moon is 
always already renewed, as fresh as it is constant. But Endymion’s own admission that he 
desired Tellus before Cynthia complicates that reading and gives his cries to Cynthia a more 
desperate tone. Still addressing Cynthia, he attempts to excuse himself by claiming that: 
“With Tellus, fair Tellus, have I dissembled, using her but as a cloak for mine affections, that 
others, seeing my mangled and disordered mind, might think it were for one that loveth me, 
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not for Cynthia, whose perfection alloweth no companion nor comparison” (2.1.24-28). 
Thus Endymion, far from staging the constitutive turn towards the divine in his desire for 
Cynthia, appears as the potential effect of such a turn. The distribution of cognition and 
desire across the cosmos offers a parallel to Ficino’s theorization of the universe, but the 
constitution itself, if it occurs, remains unseen.  
Endymion’s experience of amatory cognition does not manifest an ontological 
foundation for the relationship of extension and embodiment that we see in Ficino’s text; 
but with this turn to Tellus, Endymion reasserts this ontology. Cynthia’s power as a 
distributed and constitutive force, an emanation of Beauty throughout the cosmos, lies in her 
dominion over the earth, represented by Tellus. Early in the play, Tellus signifies herself as 
an allegorical embodiment of that terrestrial sphere, noting: “Is not my beauty divine, whose 
body is decked with fair flowers, and veins are vines, yielding sweet liquor to the dullest 
spirits, whose ears are corn to bring strength, and whose hairs are grass to bring abundance?” 
(1.2.20-4). Tellus eroticizes herself by figuring her corporeality through the plenitude of an 
herbaceous land; her rhetoric, however, contains within it the misprision of taking the 
elements of that corporeality as the source of her ostensibly divine beauty. For Ficino, 
however, beauty is indeed divine, in the sense that it originates with God and follows the 
emanation of cognition to extend across the World: 
Et ceste espece diuine, c’est à dire la Beaulté, a procreé en 
toutes choses l’Amour, c’est a dire, desir de soy. Parce que si 
Dieu rauit le Monde, & le Monde est rauy de luy, il y a vn 
certain continuel attrait entre Dieu, & le monde: qui 
commence de Dieu, & passe par le monde, & finalement se 
termine en Dieu & comme par vn certain Cercle retourne 
d’où il est party (35). 
 
And this divine being, which is to say Beauty, has created 
within all things Love, which is to say a desire for itself. 
Because if God ravishes the World, and the World is ravished 
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by Him, there is a certain continual attraction between God 
and the World – which begins with God and passes through 
the World and finally terminates in God – that as by a certain 
Circle returns to where it left. 
 
Following the same emanation that binds the Angelic Mind to divine cognition, this desire 
moves along a circuit, lodging within the World a desire for divine beauty (the antecedent of 
“itself” in the above quotation) that returns the World to God through longing. In Endymion, 
both Tellus’ name and self-identification figure her as the earth, against which Cynthia 
emerges as the representation of the divine; Floscula suggests as much in correcting Tellus’s 
misprision: “Your grapes would be but dry husks, your corn but chaff, and all your virtues 
vain, were it not Cynthia that preserveth the one in the bud and nourisheth the other in the 
blade, and by her influence both comforteth all things and by her authority commandeth all 
creatures” (1.2.29-33). Floscula underscores the degree to which Tellus depends upon 
Cynthia, in such language as to implicitly theorize the World’s indebtedness to God. Both 
Cynthia’s influence and her authority stand as immaterial disseminations, extensions that 
mirror the Neoplatonic emanation of the divine mind, that are constitutive of the realm of 
her dominion. Like the extension that Ficino theorizes, in other words, Cynthia’s power is 
the supplement that renders Tellus desirable. Thus, while Tellus glorifies her materiality, 
translating her veins into vines, Floscula reminds her that these boasts are indeed “vain,” or 
at least that they would be so in the absence of Cynthia’s puissance. Glimpsed through 
Tellus’s beauty, then, Cynthia’s dominion is both ontological, in its ability to bring the earth’s 
defining characteristics into being, and inchoately political. As Floscula pithily asks of Tellus, 
in a harbinger of the decrees to come when Cynthia manifests herself as a human monarch, 
“know you not, fair lady, that Cynthia governeth all things?” (1.2.28).  
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 Because Tellus figures an embodiment of the Earth and helps to represent Cynthia’s 
emanation through the cosmos, her status as another of Endymion’s erotic objects further 
locates the opening of the play in a Neoplatonic universe. Through Endymion’s 
displacement of his desire from Tellus onto Cynthia, from the earth onto the moon, the play 
metonymically figures the soul’s ecstatic flight into the cosmos. But Endymion’s repudiation 
of Tellus is hardly perfect. Shortly after claiming that he dissembles with Tellus, concealing 
his adoration of Cynthia through her, Endymion performs this deception onstage by stating: 
“You know, fair Tellus, that the sweet remembrance of your love is the only companion of 
my life, and thy presence my paradise, so that I am not alone when nobody is with me, and 
in heaven itself when thou art with me” (2.1.58-62). The rhetoric through which Endymion 
endeavors to persuade Tellus of his affection functions on the same spatial register as 
Endymion’s prior articulation of his desire for Cynthia. Where his thoughts once located 
themselves among the stars, proximate to Cynthia’s heavenly beauty, Endymion now finds 
himself through Tellus: her presence places him “in heaven itself.” The irony, of course, is 
that Tellus represents the least heavenly of all the planetary bodies.  
Throughout her dialogue with Endymion, in which she endeavors to force him to 
admit his affections for the moon, Tellus finds herself unable to persuade the shepherd to 
name the true object of his desire. When she chastises him, as Eumenides once did, against 
the ambitiousness of his desire, Tellus warns the shepherd: “Take heed, Endymion, lest, like 
the wrestler in Olympia that, striving to lift an impossible weight, catched an incurable strain, 
thou, by fixing thy thoughts above thy reach, fall into a disease without all recure. But I see 
thou art now in love with Cynthia” (2.1.97-101). Endymion, in turn, denies the accusation 
and figures his desire through a series of organic metaphors for the space separating him 
from Cynthia:  
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No, Tellus. Thou knowest that the stately cedar, whose top 
reacheth unto the clouds, never boweth his head to the 
shrubs that grow in the valley; nor ivy that climbeth up by the 
elm can ever get hold of the beams of the sun. Cynthia I 
honor in all humility, whom none ought or dare adventure to 
love, whose affections are immortal and virtues infinite. 
Suffer me therefore to gaze on the moon, at whom, were it 
not for thyself, I would die with wondering. (2.1.102-109) 
 
Endymion’s response effectively reverses the terms of Tellus’s reproach. Whereas she 
invokes the image of a human subject grounded upon the earth, injuring himself in the effort 
to lift his thoughts into the cosmos, Endymion envisions the impossibility of union from 
Cynthia’s perspective, claiming that “the stately cedar” would not reach so low as to 
acknowledge the shrubs. The directionality is inverted, tracing a movement from Cynthia to 
Endymion, rather than from the shepherd to the moon. But Endymion’s second image more 
pointedly suggests his plight: if the “ivy” represents his thoughts, extending towards the 
heavens by means of the “elm” that is his body, they will nevertheless fail to apprehend the 
celestial body that represents the object of their desire. Endymion, for all his dissembling in 
this moment, gestures to an ontological fact when he affirms the importance of Tellus in 
anchoring his contemplation of Cynthia. Because Tellus represents the earth, Endymion’s 
desire remains grounded upon her, even as it navigates beyond her in its imperfect ascent 
towards the heavens. Endymion’s entanglement with Tellus locates on an erotic register the 
cosmic ontology that undergirds Neoplatonic contemplation: howsoever the shepherd may 
endeavor to ascend through amatory cognition, his embodiment maintains his presence 
upon that last of the concentric circles, the world itself.  
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 Endymion’s erotic entanglement thereby stages his imperfect placement between the 
terrestrial and celestial spheres.82 When alone, Endymion confesses to finding some 
attraction to Tellus, and it is only through recourse to supplementarity that he finds a means 
of distinguishing her from Cynthia: 
O Endymion, Tellus was fair! But what availeth beauty 
without wisdom? Nay, Endymion, she was wise. But what 
availeth wisdom without honor? She was honorable, 
Endymion, belie her not. Ay, but how obscure is honor 
without fortune? Was she not fortunate, whom so many 
followed? Yes, yes, but base is fortune without majesty. Thy 
majesty, Cynthia, all the world knoweth and wondereth at, 
but not one in the world can imitate it or comprehend it. 
(2.3.12-19) 
 
Notably, Endymion first praises Tellus’s beauty as that which attracts him, citing the 
Neoplatonic virtue that Tellus herself has already thematized within the play. Perhaps 
unconsciously, Endymion’s progression through this list of attributes functions as a means 
of progressing towards the source of the beauty he locates within Tellus, which Floscula has 
already named as Cynthia. Certainly, he reaches the same conclusion as Floscula, that 
Cynthia possesses a kind of “majesty” that gives her dominion over the world. For precisely 
this reason, Endymion oscillates in his location: fixated upon Tellus, grounded on the earth 
through his embodiment, while amatory cognition locates his thoughts among the stars. 
Aptly, Endymion appears to acknowledge this spatial ambiguity in locating himself: “On 
yonder bank never grew anything but lunary, and hereafter I will never have any bed but that 
                                                
82 It is something of a critical commonplace that Endymion’s bifurcated desire stages a Neoplatonic distinction 
between earthly and divine love, but the implications of this desire for Endymion’s location have been 
overlooked. Da Crema, in “The Neoplatonic Element in John Lyly,” notes that Endymion and Eumenides 
articulate this distinction in the first moments of the play, but he does not dwell on Cynthia’s status as a lunar 
body, located in the space of the cosmos (20-21). Knapp maps the split between earthly and divine love onto 
Tellus and Cynthia in “The Monarchy of Love,” but he views Endymion’s investment in Tellus as “part fault 
and part inevitable condition of fallen humanity,” rather than as an affect with spatial implications (360). Finally, 
in “Allegory of Love,” Huppé assumes that both forms of desire are bound within Endymion and thereby 
overlooks the interplay between earth and moon entirely (103).  
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bank” (2.3.10-11). The lunary to which Endymion refers is either the biennial Lunaria biennis, 
a plant that grows leaves the first year and flowers the second, or more likely Botrychium 
Lunaria, the fern popularly called moonwort and understood to have magical powers.83 
Regardless of the particular species, the plant metonymically locates the moon upon the 
earth, perhaps through a kind of astral infusion, by which the moon bestows its powers 
upon the plant. This eruption of Cynthia’s influence within the place that Tellus represents 
suggests the ambiguous positioning of Endymion at the moment: physically present, while 
through a quasi-occult transference, psychically absent. Moreover, Endymion’s words 
function as the first signifiers to define the performance space of Endymion. Whereas the 
exchange between Endymion and Eumenides introduces cosmic space, a vastness further 
thematized through Tellus’s presence, this gesture to the lunary bank constitutes the first 
effort within Endymion to signify the stage upon which the play is performed. Through this 
signification, the gesture aptly locates the drama within the discursive paradigm that has 
hitherto been articulated: upon an earth that also appears onstage (in the form of Tellus), 
partly extended into the cosmos (unrepresented onstage, save for the lunary bank).  
In Endymion’s adoration of Cynthia, then, amatory cognition functions as both an 
embodied and a distributed means of thinking. It is rooted in the body at the same time that 
it extends beyond the somatic framework in its apprehension of the object of its desire. In 
this regard, amatory cognition involves a kind of expansiveness, on the level of the senses as 
well as in the experience of thought. But when the object of desire is the moon rather than 
another human body, the spatial qualities of such desire are brought to the fore. Endymion’s 
                                                
83 “lunary, n.1”. OED Online. June 2011. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/view/Entry/111173?rskey=SHCW8D&result=1&isAdvanced=fals
e (accessed July 07, 2011). The editors of English Renaissance Drama gloss this as “Lunary (‘of or having to do 
with the moon’) is moonwort or some such fern, popularly supposed to embody magical properties. Here it 
symbolizes Endymion’s constancy toward Cynthia” (95, n.1).  
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desire spatializes the body-soul nexus in ways that parallel Ficino’s conceptions of the mind-
body relation. Furthermore, such spatialization participates in the construction of the 
Neoplatonic universe, where contemplative desire functions as the pivot that turns bodies 
towards divine power and that thereby establishes the cosmos in its ontological fixity. Finally, 
the emanation of Cynthia’s power and its distribution across the world within Endymion helps 
to articulate the spatial uncertainty that undergirds the opening of the play. Certainly, Lyly’s 
play reproduces the schema of the Neoplatonic universe, awarding an ontological dominion 
to Cynthia by rendering her the originary site of beauty, a site that Endymion, in his longing, 
seeks to possess. But Tellus’s presence onstage and Endymion’s erotic attachment to her 
forestall any effort to locate the play precisely within that universe. Because this uncertainty 
owes much to Endymion’s (in)ability to extend fully into the cosmos, to his ambiguous 
location within and beyond his body, the play registers the spatial paradoxes governing 
cognitive extension and renders them in the circuit connecting the moon to the earth. That 
is, as Endymion moves between Tellus and Cynthia in his experience of amatory cognition, 
the play performs a tension between embodied cognition and its extension in erotic 
investment. 
 
II. The Displaced Soul and Endymion’s Place in the Universe 
 As we have seen, cognitive extension locates the soul at once within the body and 
beyond it, creating a distribution of the self that acquires cosmological importance in Lyly’s 
play. Endymion adheres within his flesh and remains thus grounded upon the earth, both 
through the facticity of embodiment and his imperfectly realized desire for Tellus. But as his 
thoughts ascend into the stars, Endymion also becomes displaced as a result of amatory 
cognition, located somewhere between earth and moon in his desire for Cynthia. This 
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displacement becomes exacerbated when Endymion falls under Dipsas’s curse and slumbers 
for forty years, during which time his soul’s relationship to his body is altered. Sleep entails a 
diminution of the body’s abilities, though whether this attenuation means that the soul is 
effectively sealed within the slumbering somatic structure or liberated from its embodiment 
depended upon which theorist one read in the early modern period. If sleep suspends the 
soul’s perceptive faculties, as Aristotle suggests, then one must wonder whether slumber, in 
effect, contains the soul within the body, binding Enydmion within embodiment. Or, in 
keeping with the play’s initial Neoplatonic investment, does sleep loosen the ties of the 
body-soul nexus and enable a disembodied Endymion to ascend more freely towards the 
moon? The irreducibility that governs Endymion’s slumber threatens to displace his soul by 
simultaneously positing its being lodged deep within the body and unmoored into the 
cosmos. Whereas cognitive extension once ensured that Endymion’s soul was distributed 
across both places concomitantly, his slumber makes his dwelling in either rather tenuous; 
insofar as the play hesitates to reveal where precisely Endymion’s soul lies, sleep moves it 
from the places of the body and the moon and disgorges it into an unknown space. By 
effecting such displacement, the forty-year slumber that befalls Endymion in the midst of his 
devotion for Cynthia deepens the question of the play’s location. If Endymion’s soul moves 
the play from Tellus to Cynthia, from earth to moon, its expansion in cognitive extension 
can be said to locate the events of the drama. To become uncertain as to the place of 
Endymion’s soul, ultimately, is to lose the play’s orientation within the cosmos, since in 
deracinating Endymion’s soul from its somatic foundation, the play disrupts that very entity 
through which it locates itself between terrestrial and celestial spaces.  
 But Endymion’s slumber is not the only event that exacerbates the spatial 
ambiguities of the play. Cynthia, as we have seen, initially defines the space of the play as 
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structurally similar to the Neoplatonic universe. As the moon, she offers a planetary 
counterpart to Tellus and thereby establishes the cosmological contours of the play’s events. 
Located beyond the world, Cynthia emanates through it in the form of divine Beauty, and 
her ability to infuse Tellus with this virtue suggests both the immanence of her influence and 
the transcendence of her being; she constitutes the world in its substance, while crucially 
remaining apart from it. These qualities, of course, illuminate the contemplative ambition of 
Endymion’s desire for Cynthia, at the same time that they establish Cynthia as otherworldly 
in her lunar status. As Eumenides puts it, in chiding Endymion: “There was never any so 
peevish to imagine the moon either capable of affection or shape of a mistress” (1.1.22-24). 
Thus, when Cynthia enters the play immediately following Endymion’s collapse into sleep, 
her transformation represents a stunning reversal of the play’s logic; but it also redefines the 
space within which the events of Endymion unfold. She is no longer beyond the world, 
animating the earth through an infusion of beauty, but rather located upon it as a human 
monarch. This transformation implicates the definition of place within Endymion to the same 
degree that Endymion’s psychic flight invokes an uncertainty with regards to the possibility 
of space. If Endymion’s somnambulism of the soul raises the question of spaces beyond 
cosmos, then Cynthia’s transformation articulates with greater precision the places that exist 
within the world. 
Before suggesting more precisely the effects of Endymion’s slumber and Cynthia’s 
transformation for the location of the play, I want to return to the distinction between 
extracosmic space and intramundane place that I put forth in the introduction to this chapter. 
Intracosmic or intramundane space refers to the dimensionality of the world as well as the 
firmament surrounding the earth; in contrast, extracosmic space signifies the void that exists 
beyond the firmament, what supersedes the utmost limit of the universe. In the late medieval 
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and early modern periods, this distinction enabled natural philosophers to theorize extension 
and dimensionality as attributes of the cosmos alone, laying the conceptual foundation of a 
theory of a priori space. Within the earlier episteme, however, extension was defined solely in 
terms of material bodies. According to Grant, Aristotle’s theory of place implies that “spatial 
modes are restricted to differentiations of a plenum filled everywhere with extended material 
bodies,” in the sense that every place is defined through the body that occupies it.84 To grasp 
the influence of this alignment on the history of the concept of space, we might consider the 
paradox that the philosopher Archytas articulates in attempting to conceptualize a space 
beyond the cosmos. In an ancient thought experiment, he asks: “If I am at the extremity of 
the heaven of the fixed stars, can I stretch out my hand or staff? It is absurd to suppose that 
I could not; and if I can, what is outside must be either body or space.”85 For Archytas, the 
problem hinges upon the relationship between bodies and places; if “place” is “anywhere a 
body can be,” then the threshold of the firmament must also represent the limit of place, 
unless it is possible to extend a material body beyond the edge of cosmos. Premodern 
philosophers often invoked a version of Arychtas’ problem in their attempts to theorize 
extracosmic space, suggesting that the ancient alignment of bodies and places was 
profoundly influential upon later thought.86 Indeed, on a theoretical level, this formulation 
anticipates phenomenology and cognitive ecology in making embodiment coterminous with 
                                                
84 Grant, Much Ado about Nothing, 4.  
85 Translated by F. M. Cornford, “The Invention of Space,” in Essays in Honor of Gilbert Murray (London: Allen 
& Unwin, 1936), 233, quoted in Grant, Much Ado about Nothing, 106. With regard to the passage, Grant notes: 
“Because the works of Archytas have not survived, the translation was made from fragment 30 of Eudemus, 
presumably as quoted by Simplicius in the latter’s commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, 108a” (322, n. 10). 
86 In his history, Grant discusses John Buridan’s version of the problem, describing it as “a version of the old 
Stoic argument derived from Simplicius” (122). He also offers a brief commentary of the place of the paradox 
within Stoic thought (322, n. 12). In Concepts of Space: The History of Theories of Space in Physics, third edition (New 
York: Dover Publications, 1993), Max Jammer also cites Archytas’ articulation of this problem. With regard to 
Lucretius’s innovation upon the paradox, Jammer adds: “This argument, and in particular the idea of a man 
placed at the supposed boundary of space stretching out his hand or throwing a spear, is a recurrent idea in the 
history of natural philsophy” (13).  
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emplacement, wherein there is a kind of homology between the habitus of the body and its 
habitat.87  
But if, in the early modern period, “place” retains its status as an intramundance 
locale, “space” represents a posited entity, an effect of the mind’s extension into the world. 
Because the void was defined through its inability to admit bodies, it was initially theorized 
as an “imaginary space,” constituted through as a kind of thought experiment: “even though 
on other grounds we are convinced that no place, void space, or body lies beyond [the 
firmament], yet by extrapolation from mundane experience we can imagine spatial 
dimensions extending ad indefinitum beyond the world, or imagine bodies, and therefore 
places, beyond the last sphere.”88 The extracosmic void is thus imaginary space in the sense 
that it comes into being through the imaginative faculty. At the same time, this sense of 
space anticipates the more contemporary formulation of cognitive extension, wherein mental 
activity reconstitutes space. When cognition becomes distributed across a thinking subject 
and that subject’s environment, it moves beyond embodiment and, in turn, beyond the place 
that immediately surrounds the soma.89 Cognitive extension thereby posits thinking between 
two places in such a way that what matters is not the emplacement that emerges through 
embodiment so much as the space that the mind traverses in connecting these sites. In 
amatory cognition, when contemplation takes a subject like Endymion beyond all 
                                                
87 Casey suggests this intersection of habitus and habitat in Getting Back into Place: Toward a Renewed Understanding 
of the Place-World (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 292, but his emphasis lies on the instantiation 
of a connection at the end of a journey. The arrival re-places one within an environment and, in Casey’s 
phenomenological reading, the pleasure at such embeddedness encodes the habitat within one’s habitus. For 
my purposes, however, a relationality between the habitus and the habitat need not depend upon a return home. 
88 Grant, Much Ado About Nothing, 119. 
89 Casey distinguishes among the various senses of place that emerge through one’s embodiment, including the 
Here of my body proper that constitutes the embeddedness of my entire body within a place and the Regional here 
that represents the multiplicity of places through which I might move. Casey also notes that the body can give 
rise to a sense of being Here in part in one’s sense of specific corporeal locations, the Here of my by-body when the 
body is used instrumentally, and an Interpersonal here when I sense another body entering my space. See Getting 
Back into Place, 52-4. Cognitive extension admits another sense of place, one that is perhaps less 
phenomenological than the senses that Casey lists, but which nevertheless emerges in relation to embodiment.  
 63 
intramundane objects of devotion, this space finds its analogue in the extracosmic void 
beyond the firmament. The tensions between embodiment and extension that we saw in 
amatory cognition thereby acquire an ontological foundation in the distinction between 
intramundane place and extracosmic space; these concepts help to establish the means by 
which early modern cognition extended beyond the body by theorizing the medium through 
which that thought moved.  
This distinction between intramundane place and extracosmic space illuminates the 
spatial implications of cognitive extension in Endymion, suggesting how our sense of the 
play’s location shifts with Endymion’s contemplative potential. Given that Endymion’s 
initial experience of amatory cognition depended upon his investment in Cynthia, I first 
consider her transformation, showing how the object of Endymion’s desire redefines the 
space of the play when she metamorphoses into a human monarch. Her presence upon the 
earth and her metonymic management of it through the figure of Tellus deepens the 
specificity of intramundane places within Endymion. But because Cynthia functions as the 
object of Endymion’s desire and the prompt for his extension into the cosmos, her 
transformation also resignifies Endymion’s movement in amatory cognition. In contrast to 
Cynthia’s deepening of intramundane place, Endymion’s slumber gestures towards the 
existence of extracosmic space in posing the question of the dimension through which the 
soul moves in its extension beyond the body. In reconstituting the place and the space of 
Endymion respectively, the dual events of Cynthia’s transformation and Endymion’s slumber 
not only exacerbate the spatial ambiguities of the play, but they also ensure the processual 
constitution of these spheres through amatory cognition. 
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i. Endymion in Extracosmic Space 
When Endymion falls asleep for the span of forty years, his body remains upon the 
lunary bank, but the location of his soul remains unclear. Tophas, whose own slumber offers 
a pastiche of Endymion’s experience, aptly asserts that “Sleep is a binding of the senses, love 
a loosing,” suggesting that while sleep and desire alter the body’s sensations in disparate ways, 
they parallel one another in disrupting the function of those senses (3.3.134-5). Here, 
sensation functions as a corollary to embodied cognition, as the same soul that bestows the 
faculties of perception upon the somatic structure distributes thought through that flesh as 
well. Binding these sensations in sleep thereby effects a partial disruption of the soul from 
the body, halting its animation of the flesh and thus enabling the anima’s flight through the 
Neoplatonic cosmos. Amatory cognition, on the other hand, invokes affect in such a way as 
to distribute the soul through the body and, indeed, beyond it, “loosing” the senses to the 
extent that they extend the anima into the beloved. Slumber thereby parallels amatory 
cognition in effecting an attenuation of the body’s power over the soul, but whether this 
weakening works to entrap Endymion’s anima within the soma or to liberate it remains 
uncertain. 
When Dipsas casts Endymion into slumber, she figures her curse as binding the 
shepherd in death-like sleep. The lunary bank upon which he lies becomes akin to a tomb, 
from which Endymion may never rise: “Little dost thou know, Endymion, when thou shalt 
wake; for hadst thou placed thy heart as low in love as thy head lieth now in sleep, thou 
mightest have commanded Tellus, whom now instead of a mistress thou shalt find a tomb” 
(2.3.26-30). Dipsas’s curse works explicitly to counter Endymion’s ascent in amatory 
cognition. When Dipsas asserts that this punishment could have been avoided had his “heart” 
remained “as low in love” as his sleeping form, she gestures suggestively to the earth upon 
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which Endymion sleeps; the gesture invokes Tellus as the former object of Endymion’s 
affection, reminding the sleeping shepherd of where his affections should lie, but it also 
works to rearticulate the cosmological quality of Endymion’s longing. His desire, Dipsas 
suggests, should have remained within the world, not among the stars towards which his 
head and thoughts once moved. Finally, Dipsas’s claim reiterates Tellus’s status as the earth 
in subtly moving between her status as an erotic object and her allegorical figuration as a 
planet. She converts Tellus, once a “mistress,” into the “tomb” upon which Endymion 
languishes in his death-like slumber and thus introduces her curse through a rearticulation of 
Tellus’s platial importance. Dipsas therefore claims to relocate Endymion within his body 
and upon the earth, but with such force that his experience of being re-embodied in sleep 
resembles disembodiment in death. 
Dipsas’s claim proves to be more than rhetorical, as subsequent encounters with 
Endymion’s sleeping form reiterate the suggestion that his body’s lack of animation recalls 
death. Cynthia, in her first words of the play, asks: “Is the report true that Endymion is 
stricken into such a dead sleep that nothing can either wake him or move him?” (3.1.1-3). 
Beyond the reference to “a dead sleep,” Cynthia’s inquiry gestures towards Endymion’s 
possible disembodiment in emphasizing his lack of motility. In addition to bestowing the 
faculties of perception and cognition upon the body, the soul ensures that the flesh has the 
ability to move, and Endymion’s slumber has so compromised his capacity to do so that no 
one can move his sleeping form. Indeed, Tellus plays upon this impossibility as a means of 
managing Corsites’s affections for her; in response to his overtures, she instructs: “If you 
will remove him from that place [Endymion from the lunary bank] by force, and convey him 
into some obscure cave by policy, I give you here the faith of an unspotted virgin that you 
only shall possess me as a lover” (4.1.60-63). Tellus articulates this demand for a further 
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displacement of Endymion with full knowledge of its impossibility, and Corsites’s failure to 
move the shepherd a few scenes later offers confirmation of both Endymion’s profound 
lack of animation and the resulting emplacement of his body. Corsites’s confusion at his 
inability to move Endymion – “What, stone-still? Turned, I think, to earth, with lying so long 
on the earth” – contains within itself the humorous and yet troubling suggestion that 
Endymion’s insentient flesh has fused with the very place his thoughts once strove to 
transcend (4.3.12-13).  
The repeated assertion that Endymion’s body remains upon the earth, however, does 
little to suggest whether the shepherd’s soul has been bound within that flesh or liberated 
from it with the diminution of somatic function. In its theorization of erotic displacement, 
Castiglione’s The Covrtyer offers a possible answer to this question of the locus of the 
slumbering, contemplative soul. As Da Crema has noted, The Covrtyer remained a key text for 
theorizing desire in early modern Neoplatonism; indeed, Hoby’s translation of Castiglione 
may help to explain the presence of a Neoplatonic theory of amatory cognition in England, 
beyond the limited circulation of la Boderie’s translation of Ficino.90 With regards to Ficino’s 
theory of amatory cognition, Hoby’s translation extends the circuit along which the soul 
must move in order to access the celestial sphere, further expanding the space of the soul’s 
motility, and thus helps to resolve the uncertainty of a soul within or beyond the body. 
Whereas Ficino renders the heavens a sphere beyond the body, Castiglione appears to invert 
this relationship by locating it deep within the self. Contemplative introjection, in contrast to 
cognitive extension, removes the thinking self from the terrestrial plane: “instead of goinge 
                                                
90 Da Crema notes in “The Neoplatonic Element in John Lyly” that “Bembo’s speech in Book IV of the 
Courtier” is one of the texts that “undoubtedly represent to the generality of students of Renaissance literature 
the standard treatment of Italian Renaissance neoplatonism. Indeed, these writings, along with Ficino’s 
commentary on the Symposium, contain virtually every neoplatonic motif which all but the most determinedly 
metaphysical of later writers, both continental and English, were to employ” (6).  
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out of his witt with thought, as he must do that will consider the bodilye beawty, he may 
come into his witt, to behoulde the beawty that is seene with the eyes of the minde, which 
then begin to be sharpe and thorough seeinge, whan the eyes of the body lose the floure of 
their sightiynesse.”91 Fixation upon “bodilye beawty” draws the subject from itself and into 
the world, a movement marked by madness as much as by cognitive extension insofar as this 
is “going out of” one’s “witt with thought.” In contrast, “he may come into his witt” only 
when his senses retreat from the world, to see with cognitive rather than perceptual faculties. 
For Castiglione, this retreat enables the soul to grasp its own being as consubstantial with the 
heavens, in that the soul’s isolation works by: 
tourninge her to the beehouldyng of her owne substance, as it 
were raysed out of a most deepe sleepe, openeth the eyes that 
all men haue, and fewe occupy, and seeth in her self a shining 
beame of that light, which is the true image of aungelike 
beawtye partened with her, whereof she also partneth with 
the bodye a feeble shadowe: Therefore wered blinde about 
earthlye matters, is made most quicke of sight about 
heauenlye.92 
 
The contemplation of the soul’s “owne substance” leads the anima to glimpse not the depths 
of interiority, but rather that which “heauenlye” and consubstantial with the “aungelike 
beawyte” that the divine mind infuses within the self. “By going inward, I am drawn upward,” 
as Charles Taylor renders this motion in the consideration of another Neoplatonic thinker, 
whose establishment of the trope of extended interiority would help to theologically inflect 
the idea of psychic flight in the early modern period.93  
                                                
91 Baldessar Castilio [sic.], The Covrtyer, trans. Thomas Hoby (London: Wyllyam Seres, 1561), sig. Xx2v. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 
134. Taylor develops his discussion of Augustine to posit an ethical dimension of extended interiority, by which 
the illumination at the heart of Augustine’s Neoplatonism leads the contemplative to orient itself towards God: 
“The experience of being illuminated from another source, of receiving the standards of our reason from 
beyond ourselves, which the proof of God’s existence already brought to light, is seen to be very much an 
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With regards to Endymion, Castiglione’s emphasis on sleep, that this extension 
through inwardness becomes easier when “the stirringe vertues of the body are withdrawen 
alone through earnest behouldinge, eyther fast bounde through sleepe, whan she is not 
hindred by them,” further suggests that the slumbering Endymion finds his soul unmoored 
from the body, located somewhere between the depths of contemplative interiority and the 
heavenly substance of which such inwardness partakes.94 Indeed, in Castiglione’s praise of 
“most holy loue,” he affirms that this emanation of the divine mind functions as a circuit, 
binding the celestial and the terrestrial in a manner that recalls Ficino’s philosophy: “Thou 
the most sweete bonde of the worlde, a meane beetwext heauenlye and earthlye thynges, 
wyth a bountifull tempre bendest the high vertues to the gouernment of the lower, and 
tourninge backe the mindes of mortall men to their beeginning, cooplest them with it.”95 
Like Ficino, Castiglione theorizes love as both a constitutive force within the cosmos and the 
mechanism for hailing contemplative selves as cognitive subjects before the divine mind. But 
in extending the circuit to include the depths of the soul, which the self must plumb before 
ascending through the cosmos, Castiglione’s model of erotic contemplation does more to 
complicate than resolve the initial question: in the flight of amatory cognition, through what 
medium does Endymion’s (potentially dilated) soul move?  
Returning to the concept of amatory cognition with the concepts of intramundane 
place and extracosmic space in mind, it becomes clear that Ficino’s theorization of psychic 
flight also raises the question of location without fully disclosing the dimension through 
which the soul moves in its extension beyond the body. Although the distribution of 
                                                                                                                                            
experience of inwardness” (135). This ontology of the self ultimately leads to an ethics of orientation, in which 
the subject’s failure to turn towards God (or, in Althusserian terms, its refusal of interpellation) becomes the 
sign of evil: “for Augustine, it is not reflexivity which is evil; on the contrary, we show most clearly the image of 
God in our fullest self-presence. Evil is when this reflexivity is enclosed on itself” (139).  
94 Castilio, The Covrtyer, sig. Xx2v. 
95 Ibid., sig. Xx8r. 
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amatory cognition principally occurs when the contemplative subject becomes oriented 
towards the Beautiful and the Good, desire can also attach itself to human bodies; when this 
occurs, amatory cognition displaces the soul of the lover and locates it instead within the 
body of the beloved. Ficino’s conceptualization of erotic extension would seem to suggest 
that Endymion, in the throes of his ardor for Cynthia, would be located somewhere along 
this circuit, imperfectly poised between the object of his desire and the reason for that 
object’s brilliance. But Ficino also notes that such desire fragments the lover, making it too 
difficult to establish the precise location of the soul: 
La maison du Penser humain est l’ame: la maison de l’ame est 
l’esprit: la maison de l’espirt est le corps. trois sont les 
habitateurs, trois les maisons. Chascun de ceux-cy pour 
l’Amour sort de sa maison. Parce que tout penser de l’amour, 
l’amant se retorne plustost au seruice de l’aymé, qu’à son bien 
propre. Et l’ame laisse en arriere le ministre de son corps, & 
s’enfforce d’outrepasser au corps de l’aymé. L’esprit qui est 
chariot de l’ame, pendant que l’ame est ententiue ailleurs, 
luymesme aussi s’enuolle ailleurs: de sorte que le penser sort 
de sa maison, l’ame en sort, & en sort l’esprit (244-5). 
 
The home of human thought is the soul; the home of the 
soul is the spirit; the home of the spirit is the body. Three are 
the inhabitants, three homes. Each of them, out of Love, 
leaves its home. Because thinking completely of love, the 
lover returns himself rather to the service of the beloved, … 
And the soul leaves behind its ministry of the body and 
attempts to extend itself into the body of the beloved. The 
spirit that is the chariot of the soul, while the soul is 
elsewhere, is itself flying elsewhere: in this way, thought 
leaves its home, the soul leaves its home, and the spirit leaves 
its home. 
 
Although Ficino’s initial comments on a psychic flight through the cosmos imply that the 
soul travels intact, his efforts to theorize the implications of this experience for embodied 
cognition disrupt that sense of unity. For the soul, incorporeal in its essence, remains 
distributed across the body through spirits, and this multiplicity suggests that fragmentation 
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accompanies any erotic extension beyond the lover’s body. The indeterminacy that governs 
these statements attests to the difficulty of locating a lover’s soul in a discrete location. 
Ficino develops this concept to align the soul’s motility with its ability to think:  
S’il ne pense point de soy, certainement il ne pense point en 
soy: & pourtant telle ame n’agit en soy mesme: comme ainsi 
soit que la principalle action d’Amour96 soit le Penser. Celuy 
qui n’agit en soy, n’est point en soy (66). 
 
If he [the lover] doesn’t think at all of oneself, then certainly 
he doesn’t think in himself. And therefore such a soul does 
not act within itself, as the principal action of Love is to 
Think. That which does not act in itself is not in itself. 
 
Here, cognition functions as a capacious category, containing within itself both the purpose 
and the essence of the contemplative subject. Insofar as the “principal action of Love is to 
Think,” desire defines the lover in the act of cognition. But more suggestive than this 
implicit alignment of longing with ensoulment is Ficino’s suggestion that the object of 
cognition determines the location of that cognition. To think ardently is to displace one’s self 
onto the object of thought, in other words, such that one becomes lodged within another’s 
body at the moment of desiring it.  
In his claim that a lover’s soul becomes located within the body of his beloved, 
Ficino theorizes amatory cognition in such a way that it acquires the overtones of early 
modern Petrarchanism. Because this discursive re-presentation brings his model of the soul 
into greater proximity with Endymion, it helps to demonstrate the spatial ambiguity governing 
                                                
96 Here, la Boderie’s text has “d’Amour,” in place of the “d’Ame” that one might expect. This may be the result 
of la Boderie’s efforts to align cognition with desire, but it is more likely the result of an error. Jayne, in her 
English translation of the De amore, assigns the action to the soul, rather than to Love: “If he does not about 
himself he certainly does not think in himself. And therefore a soul thus afflicted does not function in itself, 
since the special function of the soul is thought itself” (55). Beyond the fact of this apparent indeterminacy, 
however, the possible conflation of “d’Amour” and “d’Ame” gestures to what I have argued is an important 
element of early modern Neoplatonism: the intersection of amorous desire and cognition within the soul. 
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the shepherd’s desire for Cynthia. The discourse of Petrarchanism organizes itself around an 
ostensibly cold or otherwise inaccessible woman and thus maintains itself through a certain 
topos, that the lover’s heart or soul (an elision richly suggestive of amatory cognition) resides 
within the body of the beloved. As long as his love is unrequited, the lover experiences a 
kind of melancholy or lovesickness as a result of this absent anima.97 Certainly, for Ficino, 
the lover’s soul may inhere within the beloved’s body only when that beloved consents to 
this desire in the form of reciprocal love; in the absence of such consent, the lover’s soul 
hovers in a kind of limbo, exiled from its initial corpus and from the locus of its desire. But 
Ficino articulates the platial implications of that displacement in asking where the soul of a 
rejected suitor resides:  
L’Amour simple est où l’Aimé n’aime point l’Amant. Là 
l’Amant est du tout mort, par-ce qu’il ne vit point en soy, 
comme nous auons monstré, & ne vit point aussi en l’Aimé 
estant de luy mesprisé. Où est ce donc qu’il vit? Vit-il en l’Air, 
or en l’Eau, or au Feu, or en la Terre, ou au corps d’vn animal 
irraisonnable? Non, par-ce que l’ame humaine ne vit point en 
autre corps que l’humain. (67-8) 
 
Simple Love is where the Beloved does not love the Lover at 
all. There, the Lover is completely dead, because he does not 
live in himself, as we have shown, and does not live in the 
Beloved, being in contempt of her. Where, then, does he live? 
Does he live in the Air, or in Water, or in Fire, or in the Earth, 
or in the body of an irrational animal? No, because the 
human soul does not live in a body other than a human.  
 
In claiming that the soul can only inhere within a human body, either the body of the lover 
or that of the beloved, Ficino implicitly asserts that the desire that enables cognitive 
                                                
97 I justify the use of the masculine pronoun by the fact that, with the significant if late exception of Lady Mary 
Wroth’s Pamphilia to Amphilanthus, English sonnet sequences largely reproduce Petrarch’s gender binary, in 
which a male lover addresses a female beloved. Of course, Shakespeare’s sonnets notably depart from this 
model, not the least in exhorting a young man to procreation and considering the putative promiscuity of a 
female beloved, but the speaker is nevertheless male. 
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extension must be erotic in its charge and normative in its attachment. In other words, 
Ficino’s thesis privileges an eroticism of sentient bodies and thereby stands in contrast to his 
claims elsewhere in the text, that an attraction to Beauty suffuses the cosmos and draws 
subjects through a series of concentric circles towards the divine mind. Beyond the fact that 
Ficino’s assertion seems to obviate the very form of desire that he lauds elsewhere, his claim 
leaves the question of the soul’s location unresolved. For, if the human soul can inhere 
neither within the elements nor within animality, one must wonder what space that soul 
inhabits when it transcends the body in contemplation.  
 At another point in the treatise, Ficino hints at a means of resolving this conceptual 
confusion. Offering a taxonomy of the various echelons of being, from the divine mind 
through the earth into the body of an individual subject, Ficino renders all of these entities 
exempt from place, save for corporeality:  
L’Ange a nombre de parties, ou bien de formes, mais est libre 
de mouuement & de lieu. L’ame a multitude de parties & 
d’affections, & se mue au discourir de la raison, & aux 
perturbations des sens, mais elle est libre & franche des 
termes du lieu. Le corps est soumis à toutes ces choses. (297) 
 
The Angel [or Angelic Mind] has a number of parts, or rather 
of forms, but is free from movement and from place. The 
soul has a multitude of parts and affections and moves itself 
with the discourse of reason and the perturbations of the 
senses, but she is free and uninhibited in terms of place. The 
body is subject to all these things. 
 
Rendering the body subject to place, Ficino reiterates the existence of an intimate 
relationship between embodiment and emplacement, in such a way as to affirm that the 
concept of “place” is isomorphic with intramundane locales. Bodies cannot exist within the 
extracosmic void, by definition, and the limiting of their possible locations to within the 
cosmos ensures that place is a symptom of the physical world and of nothing else. Whereas 
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phenomenologists like Casey emphasize the primacy of place, however, Ficino’s argument 
works to delegitimize that category, presenting it as abject because of its relation to 
materiality. This presumes the existence of another dimensionality, an immaterial space 
through which the soul moves, in contrast to the physical sites that are the demesne of the 
body. Indeed, the concept of an imperceptible sphere, existing beyond the cosmos, had 
already begun to disrupt the primacy of place in premodern thought; as Grant notes, the 
“actual existence of such a spirit-filled extra-mundane void space would be affirmed in the 
fourteenth century,” a century before Ficino theorized the site of amatory cognition in the 
De amore.98 Thus, although Ficino’s efforts to articulate an amatory form of cognitive 
extension contain within them a lacuna with regards to space, this uncertainty appears 
symptomatic of a wider disruption within the early modern episteme regarding the possibility 
of space beyond the cosmos. Ficino’s denigration of place reflects the growing discontent 
with Aristotle’s legacy in the premodern period, as Grant suggests in noting that Ficino 
joined a number of other philosophers in citing Plato “in opposition to the dominant 
Aristotelian natural philosophy and cosmology of medieval and early modern 
scholasticism.”99 Even though Ficino hesitates to posit the existence of extracosmic space, 
his emphasis on the soul’s transcendence of place ensured that his works were among those 
authoritative texts “invoked in defense of God’s omnipresence in an imaginary space” that 
extended beyond the firmament.100 Thus, in his rejection of place and in his assumption of 
an immaterial dimension through which the soul moves, Ficino participates in a wider effort 
to theorize the existence of an extracosmic void. 
                                                
98 Grant, Much Ado about Nothing, 115. 
99 Ibid., 183. 
100 Ibid., 160-161. 
 74 
Endymion, in turn, parallels this aspect of Neoplatonic discourse in initially theorizing 
emplacement as embodiment and in representing the limit of embodiment as a void. 
Moreover, the play appears to register Ficino’s denigration of place through the comedic 
subplot of Sir Tophas. An allusion to Chaucer’s boy knight, Sir Thopas, whose diminutive 
exploits comprise the first narrative in The Canterbury Tales halted for its poor construction,101 
Tophas appears as a braggart, an adult version of his predecessor who has gained nothing 
with his advancing age. In his early articulation of an unrequited love, and in the sleep that 
will shortly overtake him, Tophas functions as a comedic inversion of Endymion in his 
longing for Cynthia, reifying what the shepherd locates in the celestial as a telluric, even 
carnal, desire. Tophas thereby represents – and embraces – the very abjection that the 
Neoplatonism mobilized elsewhere in the play would reject, making him an appropriate site 
for affirming emplacement as embodiment. His articulation of this relationship comes in 
Tophas’s caveat regarding his friendship with Dares and Samias, who are much shorter than 
the knight. Distending Aristotle’s claims that friendship obtains only among equals, Tophas 
articulates this equality on the level of corporeality; “Because amicitia, as in old annuals we 
find, is inter pares,” and Dares and Samias are but half his height, Tophas rejects a total 
friendship with them, offering instead that “you shall be my half friends, for, reaching to my 
middle, so far as from the ground to the waist I will be your friend” (1.3.31-2, 33-5). This 
humorous displacement of equality onto the materiality of the body anticipates and, indeed, 
enables Tophas’s rejection of space beyond corporeality. In response to Dares’s query, “what 
shall become of the rest of your body, from the waist to the crown?,” Tophas asserts that 
                                                
101 In The Canterbury Tales, the pilgrim Chaucer offers the tale of Sir Thopas as his first story, but the Host cuts 
him off after a mere nine hundred lines, complaining of his prosody that “Thy drasty rymyng is nat worth a 
toord!” (Geoffrey Chaucer, “Sir Thopas” in The Riverside Chaucer, ed. Larry Benson, 3rd ed. [Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1987], 930). The tale itself concerns a boy knight who parodically figuring himself as an apt 
subject of the romance genre, an ironic self-fashioning that culminates in his mock-heroic encounter with Sir 
Olifaunt (an elephant). 
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“quod supra vos nihil as vos [that which is above is nothing to you],” and affirms that “you must 
think the rest immortal because you cannot reach it” (1.3.36-9). In aligning the 
transcendental with the “immortal,” Tophas echoes Endymion at the moment that he 
theorizes Cynthia’s divinity through distance from him, as another entity that he “cannot 
reach.” But whereas Endymion values the celestial precisely because it remains inaccessible, 
Tophas denigrates it in his Latin aphorism, signifying that space as literally “nothing.” 
Tophas’s jokes build upon one another, and the effect of this accumulation of meaning is to 
affirm that embodiment constitutes emplacement; that which remains beyond the body is 
“nothing” to it and is thus consubstantial with the void of extracosmic space. Insofar as all 
place is of the body and thus intramundane, the knight’s assertion parodically affirms 
Ficino’s subjugation of the platial to the corporeal. 
The conceptualization of embodiment as emplacement leaves the question of 
extracosmic space unanswered; it posits the need for such a dimension without affirming the 
existence of such space, forcing one to inquire as to the medium through which a soul 
moves at the moment of contemplative transcendence. In Ficino’s assertion that the body 
alone is subject to place, he notes that the soul “se mue au discourir de la raison, & aux 
perturbations des sens, mais elle est libre & franche des termes du lieu. Le corps est soumis à 
toutes ces choses” or “moves itself with the discourse of reason and the perturbations of the 
senses,” while the Angelic Mind remains “libre de mouuement & de lieu” or “free from 
movement and place” (297). Through what medium, then, does the soul move when it 
dissevers itself from the body and from place? Although Tophas inserts Neoplatonic 
discourse into the play, his claims neither resolve the spatial paradox at the heart of Ficino’s 
argument nor explain how Endymion’s reproduction of this paradox functions onstage.  
 76 
Where, then, does the shepherd find himself in his desire for Cynthia? The play 
declines to furnish an answer to this question, but the inability to locate Endymion’s soul 
already gestures towards space. Given that the discourse of Neoplatonism overwhelms the 
play up to the moment of the shepherd’s collapse, it is likely that Endymion’s slumber 
represents a psychic flight of his soul beyond the cosmos.102 To support this reading, 
Gannon cites Giordano Bruno’s description of contemplative slumber:  
If [the soul] is carried aloft through the power of 
contemplation or is transported above the horizon of the 
natural affections, seeing the difference between one life 
[spiritual] and the other [material] and conquered by lofty 
thoughts as though dead to the body, it aspires to what is 
superior. Although living in the body, it vegetates there, 
present in the act of animation but absent in the act of 
operation – not that it stops functioning while the body is 
alive but rather that the operations of the composite are 
deferred, enfeebled, and suspended.103 
 
Prior to his sleep, Endymion’s soul had already partially ascended “above the horizon of the 
natural affections,” as his experience of amatory cognition combined “contemplation” with 
desire to locate his thoughts among the stars. When he collapses, still longing for Cynthia, 
Endymion “aspires to what is superior,” and one can even read Dipsas’s curse upon him as a 
punishment for his constancy in this contemplation. Slumber thereby exacerbates 
Endymion’s extension in amatory cognition when understood through a Neoplatonic 
framework. And although Bruno’s description recalls Aristotle’s conceptualization of the 
                                                
102 Indeed, Knapp acknowledges the possibility that Endymion’s sleep can be “a deathlike state enchaining him” 
or “a visionary state which liberates him,” before asserting that “most authorities” who considered the 
Endymion myth in the early modern period “conclude that Endimion’s was a sleep of the senses which freed 
his mind for higher contemplation” (“Monarchy of Love,” 357). Gannon cites Giordano Bruno to demonstrate 
the validity of interpreting Endymion’s sleep as a psychic flight in “Lyly’s Endimion,” 227 (see above for a more 
detailed discussion). Da Crema also notes that Endymion’s sleep enacts a Neoplatonic trope, in which age 
purifies the soul in liberating it from the body (The Neoplatonic Element in John Lyly, 42). This, admittedly, fails to 
explain why Cynthia restores Endymion’s youth, but I suggest an alternative strategy at work in Endymion’s 
awakening in what follows. 
103 Quoted in Gannon, “Lyly’s Endimion,” 227. 
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soul “suspended” in sleep, Endymion ultimately surpasses this model, in that his soul is not 
even “present in the act of animation,” as Bruno would have it.104 Corsites’s inability to 
move Endymion from the lunary bank manifests this lack of animation and thereby 
foregrounds the absence of Endymion’s soul from his body, present perhaps in a kind of 
vegetation but “absent in the act of operation.” As I have suggested, the play itself gestures 
towards this possibility, and although it leaves the location of Endymion’s soul undisclosed, 
this uncertainty already bestows upon the shepherd’s soul a kind of placelessness. The 
attenuation of the body’s hold over the soul, whether in an Aristotelian suspension of 
somatic power or, more likely, in a Neoplatonic contemplative ascent, unsettles Endymion’s 
placement and thereby dislocates him within space. 
 
ii. Cynthia’s Rule over Intramundane Place 
At the moment that Endymion’s cognitive extension threatens to dislocate him, the 
play registers this disruption through the search for a cure for the shepherd’s slumber. The 
effect, I suggest, is that Endymion’s flight into extracosmic space enables a deepening sense 
                                                
104 The belief that sleep seals the soul within the body owes much to Aristotle’s theorization of slumber. As 
Daniel Heller-Roazen argues in The Inner Touch: Archaeology of a Sensation (New York: Zone Books, 2007), sleep, 
for Aristotle, “plays an important role in the Peripatetic doctrine of the soul, where it constitutes the necessary, 
if temporary, suspension (dialusis) of the sensation to which no animal can be immune: an ‘affection’ (pathos) of 
the perceiving power, in which a period of inactivity inevitably comes to follow on the heels of activity, as the 
otherwise sensitive being withdraws into a state of mere self-conservation and organic growth close in the form 
to that of the nutritive life of plants. According to the classical theory, it is at once a physiological and a 
psychological process” (66). The effect of this diminution of the body’s abilities is that the soul ceases to 
perceive through the body but remains active as it works to organize the residuum of disparate sensations in 
the common sense. For Aristotle, this residuum constitutes the stuff of dreams, and the soul’s ability to 
apprehend its oneiric experience without full perceptual capacity testifies to the ambiguity regarding its 
embodiment. Of course, as Garrett A. Sullivan, Jr. suggests, sleep can also work through the body, rather than 
against it, to transport the self from one environment to another. See Sullivan, Jr., “Romance, Sleep, and the 
Passions in Sir Philip Sidney’s The Old Arcadia” ELH 74 (2007): 735-757. The slumber that Sullivan theorizes, 
however, is intimately related to the genre of romance, in which sleep “functions much as metaphor does: it 
transports the sleeper from one (subjective and/or physical) place to another)” (752). Moreover, the emphasis 
on transport between physical places gestures to the fact that the sleeping figures in Sidney’s Arcadia can be 
moved, as Sullivan notes (749), in a way that the inanimate Endymion cannot. 
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of intramundane place within the play and of Cynthia’s monarchical dominion over those 
places. Cynthia’s first words upon entering the play concern the partial disserving of 
Endymion’s soul from his body, the fact that his flesh lies unresponsive and inanimate upon 
the lunary bank. Receiving confirmation of this fact, Cynthia demonstrates her political 
dominion over place by sending emissaries throughout the world, with her command 
offering the first (and significantly, the only) geographic hint as to the location of the play’s 
events: 
Eumenides, if either the soothsayers in Egypt, or the 
enchanters in Thessaly, or the philosophers in Greece, or all 
the sages of the world can find remedy, I will procure it. 
Therefore dispatch with all speed: you, Eumenides, into 
Thessaly; you, Zontes, into Greece (because you are 
acquainted with Athens); you, Panelion, to Egypt, saying that 
Cynthia sendeth and, if you will, commandeth. (3.1.47-53) 
 
These directives are tantalizing in their suggestion that Cynthia’s kingdom might be located 
with reference to the lands of Thessaly, Greece, and Egypt, as though with further 
pronouncement Cynthia might state which of these lands touch her realm, which are 
connected through trade routes, and thereby reveal over which country (fictional or 
otherwise) her rule extends. But these commandments fail to offer anything more precise 
than the names of potentially distant lands. Cynthia’s utterance is fascinating not because it 
defines her kingdom with geographic specificity, but because it locates that kingdom upon 
the earth. Previously, Cynthia’s absence from the stage and her lunary status positioned her 
transcendentally, with her dominion over the earth manifesting itself in her ability to infuse 
Tellus with beauty. Here, the play posits Cynthia’s kingdom within the world and brings it 
into being through other, intramundane places.   
In her articulation of concern for Endymion, Cynthia implies that the nature of her 
power has shifted, even if the location of that puissance remains constant. Cynthia 
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dominates the earth as a monarchical power, rather than as a cosmological force located 
beyond the earth. Indeed, Eumenides acknowledges this alteration in his response to 
Cynthia’s commands. Eumenides’s utterance should contain within itself some of the 
disbelief that he once voiced to Endymion, his suspicion that the moon would never appear 
in the shape of a mistress, but his words work instead to elide Cynthia’s transformation and 
to recognize her monarchical status: “Your Highness, on whose hands the compass of the 
earth is at command (though not in possession), may show yourself both worthy of your sex, 
your nature, and your favor, if you redeem that honorable Endymion” (3.1.1-3, 28-32). 
Eumenides’ response plays upon Cynthia’s oscillation between a celestial body and a human 
ruler, working to distinguish the kinds of power that these various ontologies enable. 
Whereas Cynthia’s status as the moon once enabled her dominion over the earth, 
Eumenides notes that Cynthia as a ruler may “command” the world without being said to 
possess it, a subtle demarcation of her authority as political rather than cosmological. 
 The increased specification of intramundane place within the play and the 
transformation of Cynthia’s dominion over the world further manifest themselves through 
Tellus, whose oscillation between an allegorical embodiment of the earth and a lady of the 
court registers the complex imbrication of space and subjectivity in Endymion. Prior to 
Cynthia’s appearance onstage, Tellus appeared subjected to Cynthia on a cosmological 
register, her beauty owing more to an emanation of divine love than to the base qualities of 
Earth itself. With the moon’s metamorphosis into a monarch, however, Tellus’s status as the 
Earth becomes attenuated through the loss of her allegorical counterpart, and she finds 
herself politically subservient to Cynthia. In one sense, Cynthia surrounds Tellus, insofar as 
her monarchical presence creates a court, within which Tellus is located. This spatialization 
of power, as it were, contains within itself a peculiar inversion: Cynthia’s presence upon the 
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planet that Tellus once represented does not signify her subjection to Tellus, but functions as 
the means of ensuring Tellus’s deeper subjectification to Cynthia, now on a political rather 
than cosmological register. In another sense, Cynthia’s transformation disrupts Tellus’s 
spatial and allegorical potential in locating her within a physical place. When Tellus’s snide 
remarks regarding Endymion’s slumber anger Cynthia, she deepens the platial specificity of 
the play in banishing Tellus, ordering Corsites to “carry her to the castle in the desert, there 
to remain and weave” (3.1.42). This utterance names the only dramatic location, apart from 
the lunary bank and Geron’s fountain, to be named in the course of Endymion, and the fact 
that the castle remains “in the desert” further demonstrates that Cynthia now rules over an 
intramundane place. But more fascinating is the potential paradox of the scene, that Tellus is 
now divested of her allegorical status and confined to a specific location upon the earth. The 
containment of Tellus within the castle effects her displacement from Cynthia’s presence to 
a discrete site, likely contained with Cynthia’s kingdom but not within her court. Because 
both sites function as intramundane places, however, they effectively circumscribe Tellus 
within the circle of Cynthia’s influence. Tellus, in short, is contained within the very places 
that she once comprised. Through her subjection to Cynthia and her imprisonment within 
the castle, Tellus metonymically figures the subjugation of the earth to political power. With 
this subjugation, Cynthia’s rule establishes her governance over the totality of place, insofar 
as all places are of the world that Cynthia now rules.  
 Cynthia’s political dominion over place, however, does not succeed in locating 
Endymion’s soul. The search for a means of awakening Endymion deepens our sense of 
intramundane place (Egypt, Greece, and Thessaly), but this quest does little to resolve our 
uncertainty regarding the location of the shepherd’s soul. Whether slumber has indeed 
enabled a kind of psychic flight, allowing Endymion to extend into the void beyond the 
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firmament, or whether sleep has sealed the soul within the body and thus ensured 
Endymion’s utter lack of animation, the shepherd’s imperfect embodiment disrupts his 
emplacement and threatens to locate him within an indeterminate, and possibly extracosmic, 
space. The deepening specificity of place within Endymion and the entanglement of these 
sites with Cynthia’s rule work to counter the loss of place that occurs in Endymion’s slumber, 
as though the transformation of Cynthia into a sublunary figure might circumvent the play’s 
investment in the cosmos and ground the drama within a discrete location. But Endymion 
remains displaced as a result of amatory cognition, and in the efforts of the courtiers to find 
a cure for his slumber, the question of where Endymion resides becomes less an inquiry into 
his location than an effort to return him to embodiment and thus to move him from space 
to place. 
The spatial ambiguity that undergirds Endymion’s desire and the play’s efforts to 
relocalize him parallel a larger uncertainty regarding the diegetic locales within which the 
drama of Endymion unfolds. Although the prologue and epilogue allude to the performance 
at Greenwich on Candlemas 1588 and thereby firmly ground the production within 
Elizabeth’s court, the dramatic locations encompass only the lunary bank upon which 
Endymion sleeps, the castle to which Tellus is banished, and the fountain near Geron’s 
hermitage. That is to say that, with few exceptions, there is what Peter Saccio has termed a 
“curious placelessness” about the play, in which location emerges suggestively rather than 
definitively.105 Although this placelessness should accommodate the play’s Neoplatonism, 
enacting Endymion’s flight from the body and from the world by leaving questions of 
geographic specificity unanswered, the fact that Endymion’s desire is cosmopolitical, i.e., 
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takes part of the cosmos and of the political order, makes such a reading untenable. His 
longing shifts from Cynthia as moon to Cynthia as monarch, and because the orientation of 
Endymion’s desire changes with the metamorphosis of the love object, the locus of his soul 
changes too. As Saccio suggests, Cynthia’s status is crucial for defining the place of the play: 
“where does Cynthia rule? Over all the earth, as long as she is called the Moon. Over a 
specific country, one assumes, when she sends her courtiers to Egypt, Greece and Thessaly, 
but that country is as placeless as Spenser’s Faerie Land, and nameless to boot.”106 Cynthia’s 
shape-shifting thereby frustrates one’s efforts to locate the play with much specificity. In his 
edition of Endymion, George P. Baker bemoans: “To place satisfactorily the scenes of this 
play is practically impossible.”107 Baker’s concerns largely turn towards the performative, 
however, and his frustration lies in the fact that there remains little within Lyly’s text to 
articulate the place of a particular scene. For this reason, he suggests, the audience was 
required to parallel Endymion’s flight in the expansion of their own cognitive faculties: 
“Lyly’s audience was to follow in imagination where he led.”108 Similarly, Alexander Leggatt 
acknowledges that the play represents a spatial paradox, but he somewhat dismissively 
resolves that paradox by appealing to performance conditions: insofar as “we are in an acting 
area, and a place of the mind,” we are placed in the same sphere of the imagination that 
Baker proposes. But in these critical appraisals, the question of a cognitive discernment of 
locale is displaced from the performance onto the playgoers; it leaves the paradox of 
dramatic location unresolved.109 Ultimately, the placelessness of Endymion’s soul reflects a 
problem of place that suffuses the entire play, and although playgoers participate in this 
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problem, gesturing towards them does not resolve the tensions between space and place 
within Endymion. 
Implicit in these concessions, however, is the recognition that Cynthia functions as 
part of the crux of the play’s placelessness. Her ambiguous status, oscillating between moon 
and monarch, implicates the potential location of Endymion’s soul at the moment he desires 
her; to the extent that she is the moon, Endymion has little chance of extending his soul into 
that lunar entity, while her potential figuration as a human monarch might allow him the 
chance at a re-embodiment, insofar as she becomes the Beloved within which his soul may 
dwell. At the same time, Cynthia’s oscillation between a Neoplatonic virtue and an embodied 
monarch is itself a negotiation of the play’s space, insofar as her status translates the stage, 
alternatively, into the cosmos or into a court. For these reasons, an inquiry into the play’s 
consideration of space must attend to the means by which Endymion shifts its discursive 
focus from Neoplatonism into a theorization of monarchical power. Indeed, Cynthia’s 
transformation from moon to monarch occurs at the same time that Endymion’s desire 
renders him asleep, suggesting the degree to which political power is predicated upon its 
management of Neoplatonic discourse. This discursive shift illuminates a stunning, if 
inadequately theorized, crux in the play: if Endymion’s sleep represents the liberation of his 
soul from his body, itself a fulfillment of the Neoplatonic dream, why does the play devote 
such energy to rescuing the shepherd from this triumph? The answer, I suggest, lies in the 
terms under which Endymion emerges from his slumber. As his articulation of his 
awakening (and Cynthia’s resignification of that experience) testify that the shepherd returns 
to embodiment and thus to emplacement, Endymion recalls the spatialization of desire that 
Ficino theorizes as constitutive of the cosmos, at once distending Neoplatonism to advance 
a spatial politics of the early modern court and revealing the latent ideological gesture that 
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animates Ficino’s universe. Finally, insofar as this recovery plucks Endymion from an 
extracosmic space of contemplation and recathects his desire onto the monarch, Cynthia’s 
efforts to return her adoring shepherd to place figure the final articulation of the spatial 
politics of Endymion. 
 
III. The Spatial Politics of Cynthia’s Court 
 Although Neoplatonism shapes the allegory that will in turn structure Endymion, 
Ficino’s philosophy appears inadequate as an interpretive paradigm once Cynthia enters the 
scene in the form of an embodied monarch. If Eumenides mocks his friend for adoring 
Cynthia as a celestial body, noting that few are so foolish as to “imagine the moon either 
capable of affection or shape of a mistress,” it is notable that, upon Cynthia’s entrance at the 
beginning of the third act, neither Eumenides nor other characters (or critics) pause to 
wonder at her transformation, demonstrating that which had hitherto been deemed 
impossible (1.1.22-3). Implicitly, this alteration has suggested to some that the play’s 
investment in Neoplatonism is limited or “conventional,” resulting in historicist explorations 
of Endymion.110 This, however, requires a refusal to recognize the play’s initial invocation of 
Neoplatonism and its theorization of amatory cognition that, if not indebted to Ficino’s 
writing, is nonetheless illuminated by the De amore. Not withstanding this, critics have 
struggled to sustain a Neoplatonic reading in the face of the play’s shift towards a more 
political relationship between Endymion and Cynthia. The moment in which Cynthia’s kiss 
awakens Endymion, for example, represents a kind of supplementarity that, in turn, exposes 
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a lacuna in the play’s Neoplatonism. C. C. Gannon makes the strongest case for this reading, 
noting after an excursus on the Neoplatonic tradition of a mors osculi, or a death by a kiss, 
that Cynthia’s gesture liberates Endymion from his body: “The excessus that results, one 
which separates man’s soul from his body (Endymion’s sleep), is represented in the moon 
goddess’ kiss bestowed upon the sleeping Endymion (mors osculi).”111 For Gannon, as for 
others who seek to rescue the play’s Neoplatonism, this moment is overdetermined – both 
Endymion’s sleep and his awakening signify the soul’s liberation from the body – but that 
very act of overdetermination exposes the unstable center of the argument. For if 
Endymion’s soul leaves his body at the moment of his slumber, how can it depart when he 
awakes, except through a second, indeed supplementary, flight? Moreover, as Ficino asserts 
in his description of the exchange of souls between lover and beloved, this Neoplatonic 
reading depends upon an equality established through reciprocity, a point that Castiglione 
affirms in meditating upon the transmigrational capacity of a kiss. A man: 
hath a delite to ioigne hys mouth with the womans beloued 
with a kysse: not to stirre him to anye vnhonest desire, but 
bicause he feeleth that, that bonde is the openynge of an 
entry to the soules, which drawen with a coveting the one of 
the other, power them selues by tourn, the one into the 
others bodye, and be so mingled together, that ech of them 
hath two soules, and one alone so framed of them both ruleth 
(in a maner) two bodyes.112 
 
Philip Dust invokes this passage to offer a Neoplatonic interpretation of Cynthia’s kiss: “In 
the perfect kiss, there is a mysterious union of the souls of both lovers. And at its highest 
perfection, the souls are actually drawn out of their bodies,” such that one can speak of 
mystical union of Endymion’s soul with Cynthia’s, in which the kiss re-localizes Endymion 
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within the world.113 But these readings obscure the political nature of the kiss, bestowed 
upon a recumbent subject by a bending monarch, who actively figures her gesture as regal: “I 
will not be so stately, good Endymion, not to stoop to do thee good; and if thy liberty 
consist in a kiss from me, thou shalt have it” (5.1.20-22). Cynthia’s emphasis on Endymion’s 
“liberty” hardly makes sense in a Neoplatonic schema, in which the shepherd’s soul, freed 
from his body in sleep, will be returned to the prison of the flesh at the moment of his 
awakening. Why, then, does a play that begins with an investment in Ficinian Neoplatonism 
devote so much energy to saving Endymion from the fate of a contemplative 
disembodiment? 
 One answer lies in the fact that Cynthia’s political order is predicated upon, and 
emerges through, Endymion’s amatory cognition. The pivot between its early figuration of 
Cynthia as the moon and her later manifestation as monarch occurs with striking proximity 
to the moment that Endymion begins his forty-year slumber. Furthering the play’s 
distinction between celestial and terrestrial bodies, Endymion affirms Cynthia’s status as the 
moon immediately before he sleeps: “Thy majesty, Cynthia, all the world knoweth and 
wondereth at, but not one in the world that can imitate it or comprehend it” (2.3.17-9). Here, 
Cynthia’s ontological domination of the world, previously seen in her power over Tellus’s 
beauty, only inchoately signifies a political order, as “majesty” encodes a monarchical 
puissance within Cynthia’s beauty. Falling into a slumber under the influence of Dipsas’s 
magic, moreover, Endymion experiences a vision, represented onstage by a dumb show that 
he later describes as a political allegory of Cynthia’s rule. Tellingly, in the narrative that 
fixates on an insertion of mercy into the righteous anger of a female monarch, Endymion 
pauses at the moment in which “there appeared in her heavenly face such a divine majesty, 
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mingled with a sweet mildness, that I was ravished with the sight above measure, and wished 
that I might have enjoyed the sight without end” (5.1.101-4). On the one hand, Endymion’s 
description signals a Neoplatonic ecstasy, in which his contemplation of a “heavenly” body, 
celestial in the same manner as the moon, renders him rapt with attention. That this 
investment remains primarily ocular, as it is the “sight” of the heavenly subject that 
captivates him, revisits Endymion’s initial claim that his amatory cognition is “stitched to the 
stars,” in such a way that he remains transfixed, gazing upon that which, “being as high as I 
can see,” remains distant (1.1.4-6). On the other hand, Endymion’s narrative signals a shift 
towards a political figuration of Cynthia, its invocation of “a divine majesty” referring back 
to Endymion’s initial praise of Cynthia’s magisterial beauty. Significantly, this description of 
Endymion’s vision illuminates the transformation that the play effects in the midst of his 
sleep, as Cynthia ceases to signify moon and becomes, instead, the monarch who enters 
immediately following the dumb show. Through the sleep that liberates Endymion’s soul 
from his body and furthers his erotic contemplation of the celestial Cynthia, the play 
performatively reconstitutes Cynthia, locating the divine mind that animates the cosmos at 
the center of a terrestrial court. 
 Despite her sudden appearance in the play, Cynthia’s reconstitution is temporally 
complex, mediated at once through the vision that instantiates Endymion’s slumber and 
through the subsequent narration of that vision. That is to say, the figuration of moon as 
monarch is as proleptic as it is processual, with the utterances that determine Cynthia’s 
transformation frequently looking ahead to later moments in her gradual resignification. In 
the stage direction that begins Endymion’s vision, an obscure pantomime of vengeance 
forestalled lays the foundation for Cynthia’s monarchical transformation: “Three ladies enter, 
one with a knife and a looking glass, who, by the procurement of one of the other two, offers to stab 
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Endymion as he sleeps, but the third wrings her hands, lamenteth, offering still to prevent it, but dares not. 
At last, the first lady, looking in the glass, casts down the knife” (2.3.63 s.d.). For playgoers and 
readers unfamiliar with the events of subsequent acts, this triad might dimly figure Tellus, 
whose anger at Endymion dominates the play’s opening, and her servants, Floscula and 
Dipsas. In this interpretation, the woman carrying a knife and mirror would represent the 
sorcerer Dipsas, who casts Endymion into his slumber “by the procurement of one of the other two,” 
or at the behest of Tellus. Floscula, who initially warns Tellus that “love gotten with 
witchcraft is as unpleasant as fish taken medicines unwholesome,” might then stand as the 
referent of the third figure, whose protestations save Endymion’s life (1.2.80-2). The trouble, 
of course, is that Floscula fails in her efforts, and Endymion languishes in his sleep for the 
next forty years, awaking to scarcely remember himself. The inadequacy of this reading 
gestures to another interpretation of the dream, provided by Endymion upon his awakening. 
I have already argued that Endymion’s vision effects a performative reconstitution of 
Cynthia, but Enydmion’s narration of that experience extends the reconstitution to implicate 
Cynthia’s nature as a monarch, beyond her provisional status as ruler. In Endymion’s 
subsequent narration, this section of the dream functions as a dialectic of vengeance and 
forgiveness; the armed lady, “passing fair but very mischievous,” is mollified by the woman 
carrying the mirror, “wherein seeing how ill anger became ladies, she refrained from 
intended violence” (5.1.84-5, 87-8). Indeed, Endymion describes the emergence of divine 
majesty in the heavenly face as a moment in which “mercy overcame anger,” such that the 
monarch manifests herself through another affect (5.1.100-1). 
 In their discussion of the play, critics tend to ignore the conditions under which 
Endymion’s vision reconstitutes Cynthia and therefore forget that it is her transformation 
that effectively refracts the discursive investment of the play, bending it from Neoplatonic 
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allegory towards a commentary on Elizabeth’s court. Bennett, furthering her identification of 
Endymion with Oxford, interprets this part of the vision as a struggle between Floscula and 
Semele, respectively representative of Oxford’s friends and enemies, to influence the 
monarch. For Bennett, the visions owe their intelligibility to the topicality of the play, since 
“if Endymion is not Oxford, then they remain unexplained, for they certainly do not fit into 
any interpretation of the play as physical or philosophical allegory.”114 Although Bennett’s 
critique aptly suggests the dream’s distance from Neoplatonism, it presumes a strict 
distinction between allegory and historical topicality, making Endymion the epiphenomenon 
of historical events. In other words, it does little to illuminate the play, working instead to 
reduce it to the level of a symptom. The excavation of historical analogues for each character 
obscures, among other things, the fact that the scene represents the final phase of Cynthia’s 
reconstitution, what Saccio identifies as “the real development” of the play: “She is identified 
at first merely as the Moon; gradually we discover her also to be a human queen; only in the 
final scene is her sovereignty fully exercised.”115 Indeed, if Cynthia’s transformation occurs in 
tandem with – and indeed, may be said to actualize – the play’s shift from the discourse of 
Neoplatonism to questions of governance, then it matters in part because it reminds us that 
Cynthia’s status is not constant, that she remains neither moon nor monarch for the 
duration of the play. In this regard, Gannon’s claim to Cynthia’s liminal status, her oscillation 
between human and divine, appears more accommodating: “Cynthia is not God in his 
essence, but she performs divine functions in the last act as she judges, dispenses mercy, 
uncovers truth, rewards, cures, and orders.”116 Arguing that Cynthia does not replace but 
adopts the subject position of God, Gannon suggests the politics that inhere within a 
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divinity’s dominion over the earth. Moreover, his emphasis on these preternatural abilities 
accords with a more mystified understanding of monarchical privilege, appropriate in both 
the contexts of Cynthia and of Elizabeth, whose reigns are legitimated with reference to 
divine sanction. Endymion’s vision thereby works to place Cynthia in a position of mercy, 
which – as Knapp admirably notes – effects a challenge to Elizabeth to misrecognize herself 
in the reconstituted monarch. The mirror upon which the lady of the vision gazes becomes a 
mirror in which Elizabeth must view herself, such that the entire play becomes “a mirror in 
which ruler and subjects alike should seek their better selves.”117 Indeed, as Bevington notes, 
the admonition of the dream implicates Endymion as much as his beloved Cynthia, in that 
the disparate threats represented in the dream “are not political rivals whom Endymion 
would like to see crushed for his own advancement, but the generic disturbances of court 
peace which he too must avoid.”118  
Because the vision implicates Cynthia as much as Endymion, offering a mirror to 
monarch and subject alike, I would argue that it disrupts the rather facile reading of sleep as 
a sign of political disfavor, which many critics of the play, particularly those invested in 
topical readings, have advanced. Certainly, this trope has precedence, and there is at least one 
example of a performance that, with some proximity to Lyly, represents sleep as a kind of 
languishing outside the monarch’s pleasure. Sir Henry Lee’s Woodstock entertainments of 
1592 feature a “knight in perpetual sleep,” seemingly in punishment for having “failed to 
guard the pictures left in his care.” That he “can be awakened only by the relenting Queen” 
works to suggest, as Bevington asserts, that “the sleep is royal disfavor.”119 But Bevington 
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himself suggests the difficulty of applying this reading to Endymion, where “Cynthia is at first 
unaware of Endymion’s tribulations” and “once she hears of her courtier’s sad absence, she 
resolves compassionately and pragmatically to relieve his distress.”120 More radically, I would 
suggest that sleep cannot signify royal displeasure in this instance because, at the moment 
that Endymion enters into his slumber, Cynthia does not exist as a political monarch; rather, 
in her absence from the play, she retains the status of a celestial body. Given the vision that 
Endymion encounters, this temporary flight of the soul from the body that sleep represents 
implicates the shepherd-courtier more than the Cynthia he desires. If we accept the 
proposition of The Covrtyer that sleep aids the soul’s isolation, “tourninge her to the 
beehouldyng of her owne substance,” Endymion’s vision reveals the substance of his 
contemplative soul to be the court within which he and Cynthia inhere.121 When his soul 
turns upon itself, in other words, Endymion glimpses a vision that concerns neither the 
Neoplatonic hybrid of the Beautiful and the Good, nor indeed any transcendent truth; rather, 
what he sees concerns Cynthia’s court, suggesting that this place constitutes the very 
substance of his soul. 
 Cynthia’s transformation, then, occurs through Endymion’s reconstitution as a 
contemplative subject, although the processual nature of this alteration ensures that the 
shepherd, too, changes through the monarch that he brings into being. Endymion’s gradual 
awakening is, I argue, the slow descent of his soul into his body, and it depends upon 
gradual stages of recognition, in which Endymion finds himself through Cynthia before he 
remembers either his name or, even, the feel of his own corporeality. Eumenides hails the 
shepherd repeatedly – “Speak, Endymion, Endymion, Endymion!” – only to be met with 
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misrecognition, shown by Endymion’s inability to accept himself as the referent of that 
signifier: “Endymion? I call to mind such a name” (5.1.37-9). Here, Cynthia shifts her 
position from standing behind the recumbent shepherd to locating herself within his line of 
sight, and this vision offers Endymion an object towards which he may orient himself; 
although tentative in his first appraisal – “Oh, heavens, whom do I behold? Fair Cynthia, 
divine Cynthia?” – Endymion finds her to be the foundation of his certitude: “Only divine 
Cynthia, to whom time, fortune, destiny, and death are subject, I see and remember, and in 
all humility I regard and reverence” (5.1.58-60). Endymion’s memory of Cynthia stands 
before his recognition of his own subjectivity, manifested in Eumenides’s incredulous 
question, “Hast thou forgotten thyself, Endymion?” (5.1.40). The shepherd’s refusal to 
assent to the sound of his name suggests an inability to incorporate that signifier of his 
identity into his body, to register his subjectivity on the level of embodiment. Indeed, 
Endymion’s rapid transition from this foreign sign to his equally uncanny body testifies to 
the proximity of the two discourses, that Endymion lacks self-presence as a result of his 
disembodiment: “Endymion? What do I hear? What, a gray beard? Hollow eyes? Withered 
body? Decayed limbs?” (5.1.50-1). Recovering his body, ultimately, proves the last stage of 
Endymion’s self-recognition, subsequent to his rapture at the sight of Cynthia and his 
eventual acceptance of himself through Eumenides: “Ah, sweet Eumenides, I now perceive 
thou art he, and that myself have the name of Endymion. But that this should be my body I 
doubt; for how could my curled locks be turned to gray hairs and my strong body to a dying 
weakness, having waxed old and not knowing it?” (5.1.68-72). With this as yet unconquered 
uncertainty, Endymion’s body only inchoately his own, Cynthia inquires as to the visions 
Endymion might have seen during his forty year slumber, in effect hailing him as a political 
subject as a means of solidifying his embodiment. For the visions that Endymion recounts 
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are those of the dumb show that separates his sleep from Cynthia’s transformation, gesturing 
to the moment at which the shepherd’s dreams performatively reconstitute the moon as 
monarch; Cynthia’s power here is, on the one hand, predicated upon this transformation and 
affirmed, on the other, by her ability to extract the narrative of those events from her 
courtier-shepherd. 
 The political import of this moment works not only on the level of Endymion’s 
somatic structure, but also registers the question of space that suffuses the play, insofar as 
the conceptualization of embodiment as emplacement renders the two concerns 
coterminous. When Endymion’s slumber separates his soul from its corporeal locus, the 
location of that unmoored anima remains unarticulated within the play; the psychic flight 
that Ficino’s conceptualization of love would enable stops short of allowing the lover’s soul 
to inhere within an insentient being, and thus amatory cognition seems unable to transpose 
Endymion’s soul into Cynthia, so long as she remains the moon. Ostensibly, Endymion’s 
soul extends into the cosmos, ascending through his desire to reach, however inadequately, 
the divine mind animating the universe. As Ficino suggests, the beauty that instantiates 
desire emanates from God and moves through the universe to radiate from individual bodies, 
such that the subject ascends through amatory cognition: 
elle [l’ame] le tire auec soy à son mesme lieu: duquel il [le ray 
de la beauté, c’est à dire le desir] descend par certains degrez, 
premierement au corps de l’aimé, secondement à l’ame, 
tiercement à l’Ange, quartement à Dieu, qui est premiere 
origine de la splendeur susdite. (254) 
 
she [the soul] draws it with itself to its own place: through 
which he [the ray of beauty, theorized by Ficino as desire] 
descends by certain degrees, first to the body of the beloved, 
secondly to the soul, thirdly to the Angelic Mind, fourthly to 
God, who is the first origin of the aforesaid splendor.  
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Ficino’s conceptualization of erotic extension provides grounds for assuming that Endymion, 
in the throes of his ardor for Cynthia, would be located somewhere along this circuit, 
imperfectly poised between the object of his desire and the reason for that object’s brilliance. 
But Ficino’s assertion that the concept of “place” only obtains with regard to bodies 
complicates this question as to the location of his soul, insofar as it becomes difficult to 
know through what medium his disembodied thoughts move. Thus, the conceptual 
indeterminacy that hovers behind these statements attests to the difficulty of locating a 
lover’s soul, such as Endymion’s, in a discrete location. Not only does the anima exist 
independent of place, but its complex relationship to the spaces within the body and beyond 
the cosmos make it an analogue to the “curious placelessness” of Lyly’s play. 
 With Endymion’s awakening, however, the shepherd becomes re-located in two 
senses. On the one hand, his gradual re-embodiment enables a sense of emplacement. This 
relationship between the body and its embeddedness in place manifests itself in Ficino’s 
cosmology as a sign of material abjection, and the fact that Endymion articulates this baseness 
through the figure of Sir Tophas is no surprise, given that character’s uninspired carnality. 
But that Endymion should mirror the braggart knight, whose presence in the play serves 
largely as a foil to the shepherd’s aspirations, functions as a kind of rupture, a sharp 
qualification of Endymion’s initial investment in Neoplatonism. In the second instance, 
Endymion’s awakening re-locates him on the lunary bank, by far the most defined place in 
the play and one that metamorphoses through Cynthia’s resignification, laying the 
foundation for the play’s politics of space. The lunary bank, where Endymion succumbs to 
Dipsas’s spell, initially stands as the place from which the shepherd contemplates Cynthia as 
a celestial body; once Cynthia ceases to function as the moon, however, the contemplative 
site becomes resignified as the court. Like Elizabeth, Cynthia finds her court wherever she is 
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present, and her appearance at the lunary bank translates that location into a political sphere, 
into which she hails Endymion – “the flower of my court” – through a kiss (5.4.18-9). In 
disrupting its initial investment in Neoplatonism, rescuing Endymion from the fate of 
contemplative disembodiment, the play performs a preference for place over transcendental 
space. 
 With this return to place, Endymion’s desire no longer distributes him across the 
cosmos but rather becomes resignified as a sign of his political subjection. In the final scene, 
Cynthia asks Endymion to recount the visions that, in the psychic flight of his slumber, he 
must have encountered: “tell what hast thou seen in thy sleep all this while? What dreams, 
visions, thoughts, and fortunes? For it is impossible but in so long time thou shouldst see 
things strange” (5.1.74-77). This inquiry into Endymion’s cognitive experience becomes a 
means of relocating the shepherd’s thoughts within a political sphere; in assenting to 
Cynthia’s request, Endymion recounts his visions within her court and shows that his 
thoughts bend, however humbly, towards the monarch. Indeed, Endymion qualifies his 
affection for Cynthia with the same recognition of her greatness that marked his adoration 
of the moon, telling her that: “The time was, madam, and is, and ever shall be, that I 
honored Your Highness above all the world; but to stretch it so far as to call it love, I never 
durst” (5.4.150-2). The affirmation that Endymion’s desire places the monarch “above all the 
world” neatly recalls the play’s opening, when Cynthia’s dominance located her above the 
earth. Coming on the heels of Endymion’s repudiation of Tellus, moreover, this utterance 
affirms the play’s initial articulation of allegory through affection; Endymion’s desire 
mediates between heaven and earth, between a spiritually transcendent conceptualization and 
an embodied subject. But here, in keeping with the play’s transposition of Neoplatonic 
principles into a court context, Endymion qualifies his desire as political: “Such a difference 
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hath the gods set between our states that all must be duty, loyalty, and reverence; nothing, 
without it vouchsafe Your Highness, be termed love” (5.4.156-9). This subjection differs 
significantly from Endymion’s previous utterances to Cynthia as the moon, before whom he 
figures himself as possessed by an antinomian desire, one that would remove him from the 
political sphere: 
Endymion who, divorcing himself from the amiableness of all 
ladies, the bravery of all courts, the company of all men, hath 
chosen in a solitary cell to live only by feeding on thy favor, 
accounting in the world (but thyself) nothing excellent, 
nothing immortal. Thus mayest thou see every vein, sinew, 
muscle, and artery of my love. (2.1.42-7) 
 
In contradistinction to his subsequent utterance before Cynthia, where the monarch elevates 
loyalty to love, Endymion affirms that his affection for the moon is love by citing his 
isolation; his devotion is such that he has removed himself from “all courts” and from the 
men and women who constitute courtiers. Endymion’s apostrophe to the moon remains for 
the moment rhetorical; he remains within society, conversing with Eumenides and 
dissembling with Tellus. But the slumber that befalls him instantiates the very isolation that 
he praises. It launches Endymion into the space from which Cynthia must wrest her courtier. 
Endymion’s gradual re-embodiment, then, renders the shepherd a political subject and 
locates his desire not within the stars but upon the monarch herself. 
 For her part, Cynthia affirms that Endymion’s affect signifies his subservience and, 
ultimately, implies the degree to which her political power depends upon such desire. 
Whereas Ficino theorizes love as an illumination, drawing the contemplative soul towards 
God, Lyly’s play transposes this conceptualization onto Cynthia herself; she instantiates 
Endymion’s love as such, offering it as a performative utterance: “Endymion, this honorable 
respect of thine shall be christened ‘love’ in thee, and my reward for it ‘favor’” (5.4.169-70). 
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This asymmetrical circuit of feeling – in which love emanates from the courtier, to be 
reflected as political favor in the monarch – reproduces the power structure of Ficino’s 
universe, insofar as Endymion is hailed into being by the force of his desire. Ficino grounds 
the structure of the cosmos on such spatialization, but Endymion appropriates this concept to 
position the political subject with regard to the monarch. As Cynthia notes in her 
encouragement of Endymion, this affect serves as the true substance of the realm: 
“Persevere, Endymion, in loving me, and I account more strength in a true heart than in a 
walled city” (5.4.170-2). For Cynthia, amatory cognition locates her subjects within a political 
place. 
 Ultimately, this management of affection does more to politicize Neoplatonic desire 
than its deployment within Castiglione’s The Covrtyer, where Pietro Bembo describes amatory 
cognition without sufficiently articulating its relationship to the early modern court. Like 
Ficino, Castiglione’s Bembo presents love as “nothinge elles but a certein couetinge to enioy beawtie.” 
Because beauty, insofar as it manifests itself within bodies, is “an influence of the heauenlie 
bountifulness, the whiche for all it stretcheth ouer all thynges that be created (like the light of 
the Sonn),” love comes to signify a subject’s efforts to retrace the effervescence of beauty 
back to its divine origin.122 But Bembo’s discourse on the matter does not explain the 
potential efficacy of such desire within the court; rather, his claims are offered (at the explicit 
request of the Duchess Elisabetta Gonzaga) to counter Pallavicino Gasparo’s assertion that 
love distracts a courtier from his duties. Mocking the example of Aristotle instructing 
Alexander as a model for a courtier’s instruction of a prince, Gasparo notes: “in case this 
your Aristotel an old Courtier were a louer, and practised the feates that yong louers do (as 
                                                
122 Castilio, The Covrtyer, sig. Xx1v. 
 98 
some that we haue sene in our daies) I feare me, he woulde forgete to teach his Prince.”123 
Bembo’s task, in this regard, is to assert the usefulness of this love within a political order, 
but his discourse on the etiology and ethics of desire does less to address this problem than 
to enable his apolitical conclusion, that “Yt is not therfore out of reason to say, that olde 
men may also loue without sclaunder and more happily, then yong men.”124 With further 
prodding, Bembo develops his point to suggest that, although proper love can ensure that 
“oure Courtier be most acceptable to his Lady,” he would be happier still if his desire led 
him towards the stars: 
Whan oure Courtier therfore shall be come to this point, 
although he maye be called a good and happye louer, in 
respect of them that be drowned in the miserye of sensuall 
loue, yet wil I not haue him to set his hart at rest, but 
bouldlye proceade farther, folowinge the high way after his 
guyde, that leadeth him to the point of true happinesse.125  
 
Although Castiglione’s text may be said to perform an insertion of love in the political order 
of the court, insofar as Bembo offers his Neoplatonic theory of desire at the behest of the 
Duchess, it fails to accommodate the implicit antinomianism of the soul’s flight. It concludes 
with a celebration of divine love that, as Bembo’s argument for a contemplation of the soul 
for the sake of achieving the heavens suggests, locates the political subject beyond, rather 
than within, the court that he should serve.   
In contrast, the spatial politics of Endymion emerge through the play’s appropriation 
of Neoplatonic discourse, its redeployment of a relationship between thought and desire, on 
the one hand, and of the implications of such amatory cognition for space, on the other. 
Ficino’s treatise illuminates the degree to which embodied and impassioned thought can 
                                                
123 Ibid., sig. Ss4v. 
124 Ibid., sig. Tt3r. 
125 Ibid., sig. Vv3v, sig. Xx2v. 
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distribute an individual soul across the cosmos, tracing through ascent the universe’s origin 
in the divine mind. Both the De amore and Endymion appear as symptoms of an effort to 
wrestle with the locus of an embodied and yet spiritually transcendent soul; they discursively 
illuminate one another, with Ficino’s claims working to evince the implicit negotiations of 
embodiment and extension in Endymion’s longing, and the play itself appropriating that 
discourse to politicize the distribution of desire that lies at the heart of the Neoplatonic 
cosmos. Wherever Endymion goes in his slumber, he is absent from Cynthia’s court for the 
duration of his sleep. Amatory cognition is antinomian in precisely this sense. Both in its 
expansiveness and in the indeterminacy of its location, Endymion’s experience of cognitive 
extension is incompatible with the rootedness of political subjectivity. Like the passions, 
which “characterize the microcosm’s shifting interaction with a continuously changing 
macrcosm,” cognition is a means of negotiating the soul’s place within the world.126 When 
Cynthia apprehends Endymion in his experience of amatory cognition and ensures that his 
desire attaches itself to her, she does so as a means of putting Endymion in his place. This 
maintenance of intramundane place within the play comes at the expense of space, for when 
Endymion becomes cognitively extended into the monarch, his movement into the 
extracosmic void ends with the localization of his soul within the world. Endymion becomes 
re-placed within the sphere of Cynthia’s rule. Dilating to the space of the universe and 
contracting to the site of a fictional court, Endymion concerns itself, ultimately, with neither 
site, except insofar as it works to represent a spatial homology between the two; both the 
cosmos and the court emerge as distributions across unequal subjects, the divine mind and 
the contemplative subject on the one hand and the monarch and courtier on the other. In 
the articulation of this homology, however, Endymion demonstrates that the soul’s expansion 
                                                
126 Paster, Rowe, and Floyd-Wilson, Reading the Early Modern Passions, 18. 
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in amatory cognition moves the mind beyond an emplacement within the body and enables 
it to reconstitute space by distributing thought and desire. 
There are many ways to theorize a connection between the microcosm and the 
macrocosm. But Endymion departs from the dominant models of the early modern period in 
two specific ways. It grounds the relationality of microcosm and the macrocosm upon the 
contemplative soul and, in turn, emphasizes the spatializing potential of that soul: when it 
inheres within the body, the soul gives rise to a sense of emplacement, while its capacity to 
move beyond the flesh in thought and desire allows it to constitute space. That this 
constitutive potential threatens Cynthia and that it appears to be suppressed by her in the 
final moments of the play does not, in my view, mean its ultimate subjection to political 
power. To politicize amatory cognition is to make cognitive extension subject to one of the 
many things that it enables (here, the relationality between subject and monarch). But in 
attempting this very act of delimitation as part of a larger effort to subjugate Endymion, 
Cynthia does not succeed in resolving the spatial paradoxes of the play. To the question, 
“where does Endymion occur?,” these efforts offer the rather limited answer of “Cynthia’s 
court” and thereby elide the rich ambiguity that suffuses Lyly’s play. Despite Cynthia’s 
rhetoric and the rhetoric of her courtiers, the negotiation of the cosmos and of the world is 
more complex than can be suggested through recourse to the monarch. It is not simply that 
the conceptual work of establishing the contours of the cosmos (and, later in the play, of the 
world) require cognitive extension; it is equally true that cognitive extension creates the space 
of negotiation, of potentiality, of dynamic and conflicted significations through which these 
other sites emerge. This is not to refute the early modern distinction between 
(intramundane) place (as a function of embodiment) and (extracosmic) space (as a void) but 
rather to bring them into dialogue with contemporary theoretical formulations of these 
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concepts and to suggest that both space and place depend upon particular processes in order 
to come into being. With Michel de Certeau, we can believe that power instantiates place, 
that practice, in turn, produces space; with Henri Lefebvre, we can assume the work of the 
social in producing space.127 But in Endymion, cognitive extension is precisely that process 
through which space and place emerge: thinking, feeling, and desiring through embodiment 
establishes the shepherd’s place within the cosmos, even as those thoughts, feelings, and 
desires extend beyond the world to constitute the rich potentiality of space. 
 
  
                                                
127 In The Practice of Everyday Life, trans. Steven Rendall (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), Michel 
de Certeau argues that places are instantiations of power, that they exist in anticipation of the signifying power 
of individual subjects: “The law of the ‘proper’ rules in the place: the elements taken into consideration are 
beside one another, each situated in its own ‘proper’ and distinct location, a location it defines” (117). As this 
passage implies, strategy defines the place in terms of the proper, always already existing before the individual 
subject, ready to assign that subject to his or her “proper” location. Space, on the other hand, is produced as a 
result of the practice that constitutes individual negotiation: “Space occurs as the effect produced by the 
operations that orient it, situate it, temporalize it, and make it function in a polyvalent unity of conflictual 
programs or contractual proximities” (117). As an effect of operations, space does not anticipate the individual 
subject; rather it emerges from the operations, or practices, of that subject, negotiated with the same agency as 
tactics are mobilized. To say, as de Certeau does, that “space is a practiced place,” is to invert the relationship of 
space to place both on the level of temporality and of potentiality (117). Henri Lefebvre, in The Production of 
Space, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Malden: Blackwell, 1991), argues that the production of space depends 
upon the ability of subjects to apprehend and to signify particular places; it is only through the triad of the 
perceived, the conceived, and the lived that one’s encounter with space aligns the physicality of a place with the 
praxis that makes a site meaningful. As Lefebvre articulates this relationship in a definition of spatial practice, 
there is “a close association, within perceived space, between daily reality (daily routine) and urban reality (the 
routes and networks which link up the places set aside for work, ‘private’ life and leisure” (38). That is to say, 
the organization of space as the “urban reality” of a built environment, a built environment that one must 
perceive in order to experience, constitutes and is reconstituted by the “daily reality” that is the practice of 
everyday life. Rather than a frame that contains quotidian experience, then, space emerges through an 
oscillation between the perceived physicality of a place and the practice of that physicality, of which perception 
and cognition are a part. Although Lefebvre’s interest lies with a Marxist understanding of practice as labor, I 




The Ecology of Remembrance:  
Memory, Place, and Affect in Dido, Queen of Carthage 
 
Shortly after his arrival upon the Carthaginian shore, Marlowe’s Aeneas hesitates to 
name himself, claiming that the loss of his home has bereft him of identity.128 To Dido’s 
question, “What stranger art thou that dost eye me thus?,” he answers: “Sometimes I was a 
Trojan, mighty Queen. / But Troy is not, what shall I say I am?” 129 Aeneas’s response is 
unnerving, for its brevity and for the peculiar relationship that it implies. Despite Aeneas’s 
insistence upon the importance of place in this moment, the roughness, even rudeness of his 
claim, implies that he is deeply unaware of the social space around him and its sense of 
decorum. Moreover, Aeneas’s claim not to know himself remains strange for the ontology 
that it presumes: an intimate relationship between place and personhood, such that the 
                                                
128 Although the earliest edition of Dido names Thomas Nashe as one of the authors, I follow the current 
critical consensus that Nashe’s contributions to the play were “minimal, or perhaps even non-existent,” as Sara 
Munson Deats has argued (“Dido, Queen of Carthage and The Massacre at Paris,” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Christopher Marlowe , ed. Patrick Cheney [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004], 194). For example, 
Richard Proudfoot has claimed that Nashe was responsible for publishing Dido in 1594, a year after Marlowe’s 
death, noting that this would have given Nashe both opportunity and reason to name himself on the title page, 
regardless of his contribution to the play itself (“Marlowe and the Editors,” in Constructing Christopher Marlowe, 
ed. J. A. Downie and J. T. Parnell [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000], 49). Similarly, Lisa Hopkins 
has argued in Christopher Marlowe, Renaissance Dramatist (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008) that the 
play “bears no obvious traces of another hand” and that “Nashe elsewhere accepts the alternative version of 
Dido as perpetually chaste,” a fact that may “make it improbable that he would be partly responsible for the 
lustful Dido of Marlowe’s play” (39).  
129 Christopher Marlowe, Dido Queen of Carthage and The Massacre at Paris, ed. H. J. Oliver (London: Methuen & 
Co., 1968), 2.1.74-76. All further citations are from this edition and will be made parenthetically. 
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destruction of the former can cause a disruption of the latter. Dido herself works to 
undermine this relationship, entreating Aeneas to: “Remember who thou art: speak like 
thyself,” as though his misprision were the result of a willful forgetfulness (2.1.100). From 
this initial suggestion, Dido Queen of Carthage evolves into a complex meditation on the 
relationship between embodiment and environment in early modern culture. Throughout the 
play, Aeneas maintains a memorial relationship to the fallen city of Troy, navigating and 
reencountering its spaces in remembrance. This compulsion to recollect implies not simply 
the centrality of Troy to Marlowe’s play, but more broadly the importance of ecological 
memory to Dido’s consideration of empire, territoriality, and nomadic subjectivity. 
With the phrase “ecological memory,” I mean to foreground a particularly spatial 
form of remembrance, where place is both the object and the medium of memory. On the 
one hand, place provides the setting of remembrance, offering what Edward Casey calls “a 
mise en scène for remembered events precisely to the extent that it guards and keeps these 
events within its self-delimiting perimeters.” This establishment of a boundary means that 
“place holds in” the contents of a given memory “by giving to memories an authentically local 
habitation: by being their place-holder.” On the other hand, the particularity of place ensures 
that a location can invoke certain traces of the past: as Casey goes on to argue, “place is 
selective for memories,” in the sense that “a given place will invite certain memories while 
discouraging others.”130 Ecological memory thereby maps an internal, psychological 
topography onto the environment. These two spaces, mental and material, become 
conjoined with one another, establishing a circuit of influence and mutual reconstitution. At 
the same time that the mind incorporates place within itself, cognition is continually 
distributed, prompted and contained by the external environment. Accordingly, through 
                                                
130 Edward S. Casey, Remembering: A Phenomenological Study (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), 189. 
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ecological memory, I want to underscore the importance of specific locations in anchoring 
and shaping the mind.  
Throughout Dido, ecological memory transforms the environment into a complex 
and deeply contested domain. Whether in Aeneas’s compulsion to rebuild Troy or in Dido’s 
efforts to reshape Carthage, the concept of platial reconstitution is central to Marlowe’s play. 
It is this centrality, I argue, that critics have overlooked in considering the peculiar 
topographies of Dido and of Marlowe’s works in general. In Renaissance Self-Fashioning, for 
example, Stephen Greenblatt argues that “Marlowe seems to be battering against the 
boundaries of his own medium,” shifting the scenes of Tamburlaine so rapidly “as if to insist 
upon the essential meaningless of theatrical space.”131 Tamburlaine and other works repeatedly 
show the ease with which spaces may be resignified, representing in a dramatic context what 
Greenblatt calls the “secularization of space” in early modern culture, in which abstraction 
deprives the environment of its mythic potential: “Space is transformed into an abstraction, 
then fed to the appetitive machine.”132 But, as other critics have argued, Greenblatt’s account 
misrepresents the relationship between spatiality and human subjectivity within Marlowe’s 
plays. For Emily Bartels, it is “not that space is meaningless, but that the differences assigned 
to it are empty, overdetermined, or arbitrary, at best,” a point that Bartels develops in 
offering a postcolonial reading of Dido, together with other works by Marlowe.133 For 
                                                
131 Stephen Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 195. 
132 Ibid., 196. Significantly, Greenblatt overlooks Dido in developing his theory of Marlovian space, focusing 
instead on Tamburlaine, The Jew of Malta, Edward II, and Doctor Faustus. Perhaps because of this omission, 
Greenblatt reaches the troubling conclusion that the concept of place is ultimately insignificant within 
Marlowe’s plays. He argues that the only exception to this principle lies in Doctor Faustus, where, “at the close of 
the twenty-four years,” Faustus “feels a compulsion to return to Wittenberg” (196). For this reason, Greenblatt 
observes, “it is ironic that when a meaningful sense of place finally emerges in Marlowe, it does so only as a 
place to die” (196).   
133 Emily C. Bartels, Spectacles of Strangeness: Imperialism, Alienation, and Marlowe (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1993), 15. Although this claim provides an important conceptual foundation for Bartels’ 
study, which brings colonial and postcolonial concerns to bear upon Marlowe’s plays, it is worth noting that 
her work is more sympathetic to Greenblatt’s than this comment implies. In Renaissance Self-Fashioning, 
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Garrett Sullivan, Greenblatt’s emphasis on geopolitical space partially obscures the 
significance of more intimate locations within Marlowe’s plays, the importance of what 
Sullivan calls “affective geography.”134 Indeed, as I will argue here, Aeneas’s investment in 
the lost city of Troy reveals that spaces within Dido are neither meaningless nor arbitrary, but 
rather shaped through complex negotiations of memory and affect. 
In Dido, Aeneas experiences memory as a profoundly spatial phenomenon. His 
description of the fallen city of Troy subtly mirrors the arts of memory in using specific 
architectural features to navigate the ruined landscape. But whereas this indebtedness to the 
ars memorativa might imply a degree of mastery on Aeneas’s part, his brief hallucination of 
Priam before the walls of Carthage shows that, even in the absence of volition, Aeneas’s 
memory is driven by a tendency towards extension and spatialization. Locating these 
moments within the wider context of Marlowe’s play, I will argue that the deeply parodic 
tone of Dido empties Aeneas’s ecological memory of significance.135 Diminishing the 
                                                                                                                                            
Greenblatt concludes that the meaningless of space prompts men, whether Marlovian characters or 
Elizabethan explorers, to commit violence as a way of making the environment meaningful: “For experiencing 
this limitlessness, this transformation of space and time into abstractions, men do violence as a means of 
marking boundaries, effecting transformation, signaling closure” (197). In this regard, Bartels follows 
Greenblatt in situating Marlowe’s plays within the historical matrix of colonial power, as Bartels herself 
suggests in presenting her work as a corrective to Greenblatt’s: “As important and enabling, and as grounded in 
history, as this story of self-fashioning is, Greenblatt’s argument moves away from the context of imperialism, 
suggesting that what the characters face and what the plays address is a sort of existential crisis, an awareness 
that identity is itself an invention, that we are all, in fact, homeless and alienated and must construct ourselves 
in order to exist” (Spectacles of Strangeness, 13).  
134 Sullivan argues that “it is not only world geographies that matter; the affective geography of the household, for 
instance, can serve a crucial function in Marlowe’s exploration of the interrelatedness of space and identity” 
(see Garrett A. Sullivan Jr., “Geography and identity in Marlowe” in The Cambridge Companion to Christopher 
Marlowe, ed. Patrick Cheney [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004], 237). He defines affective 
geography as “a physical site that functions as important ground for the identity of a character who perceives 
himself as being in some way connected to that site and/or the social relationship emerge on or around it” 
(Ibid.). My analysis here is deeply indebted to Sullivan’s argument, although we differ in our understanding of 
the relationship between affective and world geographies within the early modern period. Citing the work of 
John Gillies, Sullivan foregrounds a tension between poetic and cartographic representations of space in the 
early modern period, between what he calls the old and new geographies (Ibid., 232-233). In contrast, I 
consider affective geographies to be more local, more the result of a particular cognitive ecology than the effect 
of a larger, poetic mapping of the world. 
135 As many critics have noted, Marlowe’s Aeneas lacks the heroic qualities that we find in previous versions of 
the character. In “Marlowe’s ‘Theatre of Cruelty,’” in Constructing Christopher Marlowe, ed. J. A. Downie and J. T. 
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importance of the remembered Troy, the play disrupts the memorial connection between the 
city that Aeneas has lost and the imperial center that he intends to found, also figured as 
“Troy” throughout the play. And through Iarbus’s brief allusion to Elizabeth, Dido extends 
this parodic denunciation of the ecology of remembrance to London, mocking the place of 
its first performance for figuring itself as Troynovant, or “New Troy.” Placing Aeneas’s 
memory in this way allows us to recognize the importance of location and embodied 
cognition for what may be Marlowe’s earliest play.   
 
I. Moving through Memory: Troy’s Destruction and the Arts of Memory 
 Shortly after Aeneas claims that the destruction of Troy has bereft him of identity, 
Dido asks him “to discourse at large, / And truly too, how Troy was overcome,” offering 
the observation that “many tales go of that city’s fall / And scarcely do agree upon one point” 
as an explanation for her curiosity (2.1.106-109).136 Aeneas initially responds by resisting her 
                                                                                                                                            
Parnell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), Janet Clare argues that “Marlowe first undermines 
Aeneas’ heroism and imperial aspirations” in his revision of the Aeneid (80). For example, Marlowe’s Aeneas 
displays little bravery during the siege of Troy, as Clifford Leech notes in “The Hesitation of Pyrrhus,” in The 
Morality of Art: Essays Presented to G. Wilson Knight by his Colleagues and Friends, ed. D. W. Jefferson (London: 
Routledge, 1969), 44-5. Leech also argues that Marlowe has “written independently of his source” to make 
Aeneas appear more culpable than he is in Virgil’s text (“Marlowe’s Humor,” in Marlowe: A Collection of Critical 
Essays [Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964], 170). For similar reasons, in “‘By Shallow Riuers’: A Study of 
Marlowe’s Dido Queen of Carthage” in Studies in Medieval, Renaissance, American Literature, ed. Betsy Feagan Colquitt 
(Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 1971), 73-94, John P. Cutts devotes most of his critical attention 
to critiquing Marlowe’s Aeneas in comparison with Virgil’s. See also Don Cameron Allen’s assertion that, when 
Aeneas encounters Dido for the first time, “he is a far more humble and self-depreciating hero than he had 
ever been before” (Essays on Shakespeare and Elizabethan Drama in Honor of Hardin Craig, ed. Richard Hosley 
[Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1962], 65).  
136 As several critics have noted, Dido’s questions implicitly gestures towards medieval accounts of the fall of 
Troy, where Aeneas joins Antenor in betraying the city. Raoul Lefèvre’s The recuile of the histories of Troie, first 
translated into English by William Caxton and reprinted throughout the early modern period, reproduces this 
version of the event (see, for example, the 1553 edition of the Recuile [London: William Copland, 1553], sig. 
G3v-G6r. Hopkins notes that Aeneas’s betrayal is briefly described in William Alexander’s Jvlius Caesar, bearing 
witness to at least one citation of this version on the early modern stage (Christopher Marlowe: Renaissance 
Dramatist, 130). Nevertheless, Oliver is right to note in his Revels edition that Dido alludes to such complicity 
without actually staging it: “Marlowe knew his medieval authorities – but he was dramatizing Virgil,” as Oliver 
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inquiry, claiming that grief would interfere with his memory, disrupting the very faculties 
upon which his narrative depends: “A woeful tale bids Dido to unfold, / Whose memory, 
like pale death’s stony mace, / Beats forth my senses from this troubled soul” (2.1.114-116). 
For Aeneas, the affective charge of his memory risks rendering his body senseless and 
unfeeling, a peculiar disruption where the forcefulness of embodied thought temporarily 
suspends the mind’s ability to think through the body. Assenting to Dido’s request, Aeneas 
endeavors to harness this disruption, commanding himself to “speak, Aeneas, with Achilles’ 
tongue,” as though the circulation of Trojan memories within a Greek body might protect 
him from the destabilizing potential of remembrance (2.1.121). Similarly, Aeneas 
recommends that his audience fortify itself within the hardened bodies of Troy’s enemies:  
And, Dido, and you Carthaginian peers,  
Hear me, but yet with Myrmidons’ harsh ears,  
Daily inur’d to broils and massacres, 
Lest you be mov’d too much with my sad tale. (2.1.122-125) 
 
In these utterances, Aeneas repeatedly figures affect as a mediating force between the body 
and the soul, a means of configuring the distribution of thought across a somatic structure. 
Within the context of Aeneas’s narrative, these references to ecological thought foreground a 
particular problem for Dido, the difficulty of navigating a remembered environment. As 
Casey has argued, the fact that places are partially constitutive of memories means that “in 
remembering we can be thrust back, transported, into the place we recall,” in such a way that memory 
can be conceived as a “re-implacing.”137 For Aeneas, who feels that the loss of Troy deprives 
him of identity, this reimplacement carries with it an incredible affective charge, an emotive 
force that his comments about “pale death’s stony mace” ultimately anticipate. 
                                                                                                                                            
puts it, and this alternative version of Troy’s destruction haunts Aeneas’s account, contributing to what I will 
argue is the play’s devaluation of his ecological memory. 
137 Casey, Remembering, 201. 
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 Aeneas’s conceptual reimplacement within Troy underscores the delicate relationship 
between the environment and ecological memory within Dido. Through the narrative of 
Troy’s destruction, Marlowe’s play reimagines memory as a profoundly spatial phenomenon, 
as a force distributed across different facets of a location, while it also endows remembrance 
with the ability to transform and resignify the environment. Aeneas’s narrative moves 
through four distinct spaces – the Greek camp outside the walls of Troy, the walls 
themselves, the streets within the city, and the royal palace – with each space providing a 
frame for memory. Organized in this way, Aeneas’s memory suggestively recalls certain 
precepts from the arts of memory, or more specifically what Mary Carruthers has termed the 
“architectural” model of artificial memory.138 The architectural model encourages the 
rememberer to incorporate a place – such as a church or a marketplace – into memory and 
to use that space as a mental background for retaining distinct images.139 Because this model 
proposes a cognitive exchange between space and the remembering self, I invoke it here as a 
means of historicizing the relationship between memory, affect, and environment that we 
see in Aeneas’s remembrance of Troy. 
 The architectural model of memory was indebted to the pseudo-Ciceronian Ad 
Herennium, which codified the relationship of the mental background to the memory-image 
by asserting the importance of using uncrowded spaces for memory, the need to imagine 
oneself at a certain distance from the background, and so forth. As the architectural model 
was disseminated in early modern England, the precept of a physical background was 
                                                
138 Mary Carruthers, The Book of Memory: A Study of Memory in Medieval Culture, second edition (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008), 89. 
139 Carruthers notes that these spaces may be real or imagined; what matters more than the particular ontology 
of the place is that it be experienced in memory as a physical location. “These backgrounds should be viewed 
from about thirty feet away, ‘for, like the external eye, so the inner eye of thought is less powerful when you 
have the object of sight too near or too far away’” (90). In other words, they must be visually apprehended in a 
manner analogous to the eye’s perception of an environment. 
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retained, while the quality of memory-images was developed with greater specificity. In Peter 
of Ravenna’s The art of memory, that otherwyse is called the Phenix, acknowledged by Carruthers 
and Frances Yates to be among the most influential of the memory treatises, the 
architectural model depends upon the incorporation of a physical space; Ravenna states that 
“I take than the churche greatly knowen by me, the partyes wher of I do consyder, and go 
into it walkynge it. iii. or. iiii. tymes, and than retourne home to my house, & there I tourne 
in my thought to remembre the thynges by me sene.”140 Having gazed upon the church with 
his bodily eye, Ravenna returns to his home to remember the space through his mind’s eye, 
refashioning as a mental background with the precision glimpsed in the Ad Herennium: “I 
gyue the begynnyng of the work to ye places on ye ryght syde of the gate fro the whiche men 
go in the ryght pathe or yle to the hygh auter ther I fyx and ordayne the fyrst place, and the 
seconde on ye walle next to it a. v. or. vi. fote of.”141 Within these places, Ravenna locates 
memory-images that, following the precepts of earlier, non-architectural models of memory, 
must be affectively charged.  
In this regard, Ravenna articulates what Carruthers asserts is a medieval development 
of the Ad Herennium tradition, an interest in the quality of the memory-image: “Because the 
memory retains distinctly only what is extraordinary, wonderful, and intensely charged with 
emotion, the images should be of extremes – of ugliness or beauty, ridicule or nobility, of 
                                                
140 In The Art of Memory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), Yates asserts that “The Phoenix, sive 
artificiosa memoria (first edition at Venice in 1491) by Peter of Ravenna became the most universally known of all 
the memory text books” (112). Carruthers also describes the Phoenix as “A late but important description of 
memory-work by the fifteenth-century Italian jurist, Peter of Ravenna,” noting its status as “one of the works 
on the art of memory most popular in the Renaissance” (The Book of Memory, 137). Peter of Ravenna, The art of 
memory, that otherwyse is called the Phenix, A boke very behouefull and profytable to all professours of scyences. Grammaryens, 
Rethoryciens Dialectyke, Legystes, Phylosophres & Theologiens. Trans. Robert Copland (London: Wyllyam Myddylton, 
1545), sig. A3v. 
141 Ibid., sig. A3v-A4r. 
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laughter or weeping, of worthiness or salaciousness.”142 For Ravenna, this affective charge is 
inchoately signified through the movement of particular memory-images. Having included 
humans and animals in his memory-images, he emphasizes movement in noting that 
inanimate objects stir memory only insofar as they are placed in the hands of one who will 
move them: “And yf it can nat moeue to be moeued with another, put such a thynge in the 
hande of mouer, bycause that by the mouynge the memory be moued to the naturall.”143 The 
movement of the memory-image is correlative to the movement of memory itself, as it “by 
the mouynge” of the image that memory is “moued to the naturall” process of recollection. 
The animate quality of memory-images thereby stands in contrast to the stability of the 
mental background. Although the mental background functions as a contained space insofar 
as it has been incorporated into the subject’s cognition, its function as a containing locus 
obviates the possibility of movement that the background bestows upon the objects placed 
upon it. 
 With William Fulwood’s translation of Guglielmo Gratarolo’s De Memoria Reparanda, 
the architectural model of memory acquires a more explicit association of movement with 
affect in the English vernacular. To articulate the architectural model of memory, Fulwood’s 
The Castle of Memorie cites the Rhetorica ad Herennium, following the early modern belief that 
the text had been written by Cicero: “(as Cicero saith in his seconde to Herennius) it 
consisteth or [pla]ces as it were of waxe or tables, and of Images of as fygures & letters,” to 
which end “Cicero inuented a certeine familiar house, seuered or parted into many places.”144 
                                                
142 Carruthers, The Book of Memory, 166-7. 
143 Peter of Ravenna, The art of memory, sig. A6r-A6v. 
144 Willyam Fulwod, The Castel of Memorie: wherein is conteyned the restoring, augmenting, and conseruing of the Memorye and 
Remembraunce, with the safest remedies, and best precepts therevnto in any wise apperteyning: Made by Gulielmus Gratarolus: 
Bergomatis Doctor of artes and Physike (London: Rouland Hall, 1562), sig. G6v, sig. G7r. The passages are 
underlined in the British Library shelfmark C.31.c.45, suggesting the importance of the architectural model for 
at least one early modern reader. 
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According to Fulwood, the first precept of this model is that the memory-images placed 
upon the background are affectively striking: “The firste is, that the fygure doe moue either 
to laughter, compassion or admiration: for one maye soone fynde a fygure that dothe styre 
vp and moue the affection of the soule.”145 Whereas Ravenna implicitly locates this affect in 
the movement of the memory-image, suggesting that the image’s movement prompts a 
movement in recollection, Fulwood explicitly states that it is the affective charge of a 
particular image, irrespective of the image’s movement, that enables a movement of the soul: 
“Again you shall not forget that in placing or setting of ye images or figures in their places 
the thing is alwaies to be placed wt a mery, a merueilous or cruel act, or some other 
vnaccustomed maner: for mery, [cr]uell, iniurious, merueilous, excellently faire, or excedingly 
foule thinges do change & moue ye senses, & better styre vp ye Memorie.”146 Although the 
claim that the memory-image represents an “act” implies a degree of movement, Fulwood 
emphasizes the movement of the soul in its apprehension of the affective image, in such a 
way as to suggest that feeling has a motility of its own. Whereas Ravenna would argue that 
the strangeness of the image should help to move one through the memorial space, Fulwood 
assumes that the rememberer can move of his own accord: the importance of the affective 
charge lies in its ability to inspire remembrance, not movement. Affect, itself a kind of 
movement, become the force that enables the soul’s remembrance.  
 As articulated in the English vernacular, the architectural model of memory thereby 
posits an incorporation of space into the self, by which that self is induced to remember 
through the affective charge of the memory-image. Although it would be tenuous to suggest 
that Aeneas has actively structured his memory through the architectural model, the practice 
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of artificial memory renders explicit the cognitive processes implicit in natural memory, 
thereby articulating the means by which a perceived space becomes embodied within a 
subject’s remembrance. As Fulwood suggests in a passage that distinguishes natural and 
artificial memory on the basis of intentionality, the two depend on the same faculties of 
inward impression: “Artificiall Memorie is a disposyng or placing of sensible thinges in the 
mynde by imagination, wherevnto the natural Memorie hauing respect, is by them 
admonished that it may be hable to call to mynde more easely and distinctly such thynges as 
are to be remembrede.”147 As “natural Memorie” depends upon an ordering of “sensible 
thinges” in the common sense, which allows disparate perceptions to appear as a unified 
image before the “imagination,” the “Artificiall Memorie” works through the same cognitive 
faculties, its particularity emerging only in the implicit claim that “the disposying or placing” 
of these images is an intentional incorporation. In the case of Aeneas, one need not posit a 
familiarity with the arts of memory to suggest that the architectural model reveals the 
cognitive processes at work in his incorporation of Troy. As will become clear in the 
foregoing discussion, Aeneas’s narrative amply reveals that his memory functions according 
to the precepts of the architectural model, albeit without the intentionality that Fulwood 
posits as the distinguishing factor between natural and artificial memory.  
 In response to Dido’s question, Aeneas begins his narrative outside the city walls, 
using the suburban space as a mental background in which the image of the Greek army is 
placed. At what Marlowe imagines is the Trojan port of Tenedos, the Greek army prepares 
to depart, its soldiers having previously declared, “‘Let us unto our ships, / Troy is invincible, 
why stay we here?” (2.1.127-8). As becomes evident in the narrative’s concern for the 
destruction of Troy, this claim to Troy’s invincibility is primarily spatial, referring to the city 
                                                
147 Ibid., sig. G6v. 
 113 
walls that the Greek army has been unable to penetrate. Aeneas remembers the space of 
Tenedos through its natural qualities, constructing the space as a background within which 
Ulysses, speaking to the disgruntled soldiers, appears as the memory-image:  
Ulysses on the sand  
Assay’d with honey words to turn them back;  
And as he spoke to further his intent,  
The winds did drive back huge billows to the shore,  
And heaven was darken’d with tempestuous clouds. (2.1.136-
40) 
  
Here, the affective charge often associated with the memory-image extends to the spatial 
frame, as the rough winds and “tempestuous clouds” of the natural space evince the violence 
implicit in Ulysses’s “honey words” regarding the fall of Troy. Within this affective space of 
Aeneas’s memory, Ulysses enlists Sinon and Epeus to construct the Trojan horse, whose 
progress toward the city walls enacts a transition from the first memorial background to the 
second. Both the movement of Tenedos in wind and tempest and of the horse towards the 
city walls tie the affect of Aeneas’s memory to the mobile oscillation between the 
background and the memory-image. 
 Through the movement of Trojan horse, Aeneas shifts from the suburban space to 
the liminal point that distinguishes urban from suburban, the city walls. Aeneas locates 
himself immediately before the city walls, where having witnessed Laocoon’s death as an 
ostensible punishment for impiety towards the horse, Aeneas and other Trojans prepare to 
bring the object into the space of Troy: “we were commanded straight / With reverence to 
draw it into Troy; / In which unhappy work was I employ’d: / These hands did help to hale 
it the gates” (2.1.167-70). In a memorial background that encompasses the liminal space 
surrounding the walls, the wall itself oscillates between a locus for the memory-image of the 
horse and as a memory-image itself. As Aeneas notes, the city walls cannot accommodate the 
immense size of the horse: “it could not enter, ‘twas so huge” (2.1.171). For this reason, the 
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city wall is fractured, with the Greeks achieving through deceit what they were unable to 
accomplish through force: “Priamus, impatient of delay, / Enforc’d a wide breach in that 
rampir’d wall / Which thousand battering-rams could never pierce, / And so came in this 
fatal instrument” (2.1.173-6). Insofar as the walls function as a memorial background, 
containing the memory-image of the horse and the Trojan soldiers who bring it within the 
city, this breach suggests the violent effect of such a memory for Aeneas. It is not simply 
that the horse functions as a metonym for the city’s destruction, as Aeneas suggests in crying 
“O had it never enter’d, Troy had stood,” locating the physicality of Troy, as that which 
would have “stood,” in the now fractured walls (2.1.173). Rather, the breach of the walls 
implies a fracturing of Aeneas’s mental background, the space that Ravenna and Fulwood 
theorize as stable in contradistinction to the affective charge of the image contained within 
the space. As in the memory of Tenedos, where the movement of the background intersects 
with the movement of the horse as memory-image, the city walls evince a motility in the 
space of Aeneas’s memory. For this reason, Aeneas stumbles in his narrative as he traces the 
movement of the horse toward the city walls, overcome with affect in crying out, “And then 
– O Dido, pardon me!” and continuing only when Dido demands, “Nay, leave not here; 
resolve me of the rest” (2.1.159-60). Aeneas’s lament performs his prior claim regarding the 
memory that constitutes his narrative, what he previously describes as “A woeful tale … / 
Whose memory, like pale death’s stony mace, / Beats forth my senses from this troubled 
soul” (2.1.114-6). In Aeneas’s narrative, the physical space of Troy and the function of that 
space as a memorial background appear indistinguishable in their affective charge, a claim 
given ontological foundation by the fact that Troy no longer exists, its space only emergent 
in Aeneas’s memory of it. Here, the violence of the memory-image, as the destruction of the 
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wall that distinguishes Trojan space from other spaces, folds back upon the mental 
background, the space itself moving Aeneas in affective remembrance. 
 With this initial fracturing of Trojan space, Aeneas traces the movement of Greek 
soldiers into the city, following the narrative’s centripetal logic to move from suburban to 
urban space. The horse’s entrance has already staged the incorporation of Greek soldiers 
into the city of Troy, an incorporation made explicit as “From out his [the horse’s] entrails 
Neoptolomus, / Setting his spear upon the ground, leapt forth, / And after him a thousand 
Grecians more” (2.1.183-5). The movement of these soldiers, from Tenedos to Troy, is 
paralleled by the remainder of the Greek army, as Sinon “caus’d the Greekish spies / To 
haste to Tenedos and tell the camp,” which follows the horse’s transgression of the city walls 
to enter the space of Troy: “By this, the camp was come unto the walls / And through the 
breach did march into the streets” (2.1.180-1, 188-9). Although the movement of the Greek 
soldiers facilitates a progression through the multiple backgrounds of the narrative, from the 
suburban space of Tenedos to the interurban sphere of the city, Aeneas’s memory shifts 
from these figures to fixate upon a different series of memory-images, a series that locates 
the imagined community of Troy within the physicality of that space.148 Looking from his 
turret into the streets, Aeneas sees: 
Young infants swimming in their parents’ blood,  
Headless carcases [sic] piled up in heaps,  
Virgins half-dead dragg’d by their golden hair  
And with main force flung on a ring of pikes, 
Old men with swords thrust through their aged sides, 
Kneeling for mercy to a Greekish lad, 
Who with steel pole-axes dash’d out their brains. (2.1.193-9) 
 
                                                
148 I borrow the phrase “imagined community” from Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities: Reflections on the 
Origin and Spread of Nationalism, revised edition (London: Verso, 2006). Although Anderson uses the term to 
suggest how nations emerge from ideas of simultaneity, I invoke it here in order to foreground the cognitive 
underpinings of political communities, as implied in the word “imagined.” 
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The description of these figures fragments the massacre of the Trojan population into a 
series of tableaux vivants, into violent images that often occupy no more than a single metrical 
line. Contained within the locus of the Trojan street, these memory-images evince the 
affective quality that Fulwood asserts is requisite for memory, each a kind of “a mery, a 
merueilous or cruel act, or some other vnaccustomed maner.”149 Although the space of Troy 
has already been fractured, with the breach of the walls metonymically signifying the city’s 
collapse, that space is temporarily preserved in the form of the street in order to enable 
Aeneas’s memory of Troy’s imagined community. In this instance, space not only shifts 
between the physicality of the street and the function of that physicality as a memorial locus, 
but it also extends to encompass the individuals who constitute the Trojan community. 
Moved by the sight of Troy’s murdered citizens, Aeneas prepares to defend the town, only 
to be warned by Hector’s ghost that “Troy is a-fire, the Grecians have the town!” (2.1.208). 
Appearing immediately after the description of Troy’s murdered population, Hector’s 
statement functions as a gloss on the spectacle that Aeneas has just witnessed, interpolating 
the murdered individuals within the definition of Troy as a “town.” As in Aeneas’s memory 
of the wall’s destruction, the sense of Troy as space oscillates between the physicality of the 
mental background and the memory-image contained within that background. 
 Progressing from the street to the royal palace, Aeneas’s narrative traces the 
movement of Neoptolomus into the most intimate of Trojan spaces, the final mental 
background of Aeneas’s memory. Aeneas escapes an encounter with Neoptolomus through 
the intercession of his mother Venus, only to see that the Greek soldier “then ran to the 
palace of the King, / And at Jove’s altar finding Priamus,” prepared to kill the Trojan king 
(2.1.224-5). Given that Neoptolomus remained hidden within the horse, having “leapt forth” 
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as the first Greek to attack Troy, his movement eclipses that of the wooden equine used to 
breach the city’s wall; Neoptolomus’s progress, albeit implicit in the first backgrounds of 
Aeneas’s memory, is constant, emerging explicitly in his place within the street and the royal 
palace. In terms of affective violence, the most striking memory-image within the 
background of the royal palace is the wounded Priam’s response to the torture of Hecuba. 
Seeing that the Greek soldiers “pull’d her by the heels, / And swung her howling in the 
empty air,” Priam is affectively moved to the point that he forgets that Neoptolomus has 
struck off his hands with a sword: “he lifted up his bed-rid limbs, / And would have 
grappled with Achilles’ son [Neoptolomus], / Forgetting both his want of strength and 
hands” (2.1.247-8, 250-2).  
Before this moment, however, Aeneas remembers Priam’s impassioned plea to 
Neoptolomus, a plea that stages the very incorporation of space that Aeneas will perform in 
his memory of Troy: 
‘Achilles’ son, remember what I was: 
Father of fifty sons, but they are slain; 
Lord of my fortune, but my fortune’s turn’d; 
King of this city, but my Troy is fired –  
And now am neither father, lord, nor king.’ (2.1.233-7) 
 
Priam articulates his identity through a series of incorporations, evincing what Timothy J. 
Reiss has termed the passibility of the premodern self. Passibility refers to “experiences of 
being whose common denominator was a sense of being embedded in and acted on by [a series of 
concentric] circles – including the material world and immediate biological, familial and 
social ambiences, as well as the soul’s (or ‘animate’) and cosmic, spiritual or divine life.”150 In 
passible selfhood, “these circles preceded the person, which acted as subjected to forces working 
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in complicated ways from ‘outside.’ But because of the embedding, that ‘outside’ was 
manifest in all aspects and elements of ‘inside’ – of being a person.”151 Beginning with the 
familial circle, Priam figures himself as father of fifty sons, experiencing the externality of his 
children as a sign of the inwardness of his identity. Moreover, the death of these sons in the 
course of the war recalls on a causal level the massacre of the Trojan population that Aeneas 
has just witnessed. Through this recollection, the claim anticipates Priam’s assertion that he 
is king, folding the imagined community of Troy into Priam’s identity as patriarch and as 
ruler. Through the loss of this imagined community and of the physical space of Troy, Priam 
articulates a loss of identity, being now “neither father, lord, nor king.” Priam’s 
incorporation of both the physical and imagined spaces of Troy as constitutive of his identity 
thereby anticipates Aeneas’s own lament, that “Sometimes I was a Trojan, mighty Queen; / 
But Troy is not; what shall I say I am?” (2.1.75-6). The parallel assertions suggest that 
Aeneas’s claim to an imbrication of self and space lies in his identification with Priam. To 
the extent that Priam embodies Troy, this identification serves to incorporate the lost space 
of Troy, insofar as it exists within the king, into Aeneas’s own subjectivity.  
 Aeneas’s incorporation of Troy emerges not only through this identification, but also 
through the memorization of physical and imagined spaces that give rise to his narrative. 
Insofar as the narrative begins with a centripetal logic, moving from the suburban space of 
Tenedos to the interurban space of the city streets before entering the royal palace, Aeneas’s 
memory of Troy’s destruction concludes centrifugally, successively exiting these spaces in 
order to suggest the loss of the city. This movement completes the fracturing of Trojan 
space initially suggested in the breach of the city walls, working to destroy the mental 
backgrounds that Aeneas employs in remembrance of place. Within the royal palace, 
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Neoptolomus kills Priam, the embodiment of Trojan space, and “took his father’s flag, / 
And dipp’d it in the old King’s chill cold blood, / And then in triumph ran into the streets,” 
inaugurating the centrifugal movement of the narrative (2.1.259-61). Following 
Neoptolomus into the streets, Aeneas sees that the Greek soldier “stood stone still, / 
Viewing the fire wherewith rich Ilion burnt,” and it is through this temporary identification 
with Neoptolomus’s gaze that Aeneas witnesses the destruction of Troy’s physicality 
(2.1.263-4). Having lost the space that previously functioned as a memorial locus, Aeneas 
gathers his family and flees the city for the ships at Tenedos, returning to the initial space of 
his narrative.152 There, the space that once contained the memory-image of the horse’s 
construction is marked with traces of the city’s destruction, as Aeneas witnesses the death of 
Polyxena at the hands of Neoptolomus, here called Pyrrhus after his mother Pyrrha: “she, 
standing on the shore, / Was by the cruel Myrmidons surpris’d / And after by that Pyrrhus 
sacrific’d” (2.1.286-8). With this final image, Aeneas concludes his narrative in the space 
beyond Troy, the only space that survives the Greek attack upon the city and its 
embodiment in the figure of Priam. To the extent that the spaces of Troy function as 
memorial backgrounds for Aeneas, their successive destruction within the narrative implies a 
violence contained within Aeneas’s memory, a violence inaugurated by the Greek attack but 
perpetuated through Aeneas’s incorporation of the ruined space.  
 In recounting the fall of Ilium to Dido, Aeneas is distributed across a vast cognitive 
system. This system comprises the memorial background of the city and the affective images 
                                                
152 It is worth noting that, in Marlowe’s version of these events, Aeneas flees the city after learning that Priam 
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and leaves the former to approach the royal palace while the latter disappears from the narrative. 
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Aeneas places there, images that include the Greeks soldiers, the Trojans in the midst of 
their suffering, and Aeneas himself at the moment of the siege. This oscillation between loci 
and images subtly recalls the precepts of the arts of the memory, foregrounding what I have 
argued is the essentially ecological nature of Aeneas’s memory. As Garrett Sullivan has 
suggested, “recollection is a performance that occurs across ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ and thus 
reveals the blurriness in praxis of any distinction drawn between the two.”153 Aeneas’s 
continual traversing of the internal and the external in his narrative is thus not 
supplementary to the act of remembrance, but rather constitutive of it. Aeneas navigates this 
tension between the internal and the external, between a psychic topography and a physical 
space, largely through affect, as grief and terror propel him through the different spaces of 
his memory.  
 Through this act of remembrance, Aeneas finds himself partially displaced. His 
absorption within the narrative suggests a profound detachment from the environment of 
Dido’s court, in favor of a brief and almost hallucinatory reimplacement within the city of 
Troy. Whereas Dido first entreats Aeneas to speak of the city’s destruction, she later finds 
herself unable to command him, first entreating him to “end, Aeneas, I can hear no more!” 
and later exclaiming, “I die with melting ruth; Aeneas, leave!” (2.1.243, 289). In both 
instances, Aeneas ignores Dido’s plaintive cries, stopping only to direct another warrior to 
conclude the tale: “Achates, speak; sorrow hath tir’d me quite” (2.1.243, 289, 29). Where 
Aeneas’s attentiveness to his surroundings once allowed Dido to interrupt him with 
questions and commandments, here we find that Aeneas’s captivation with his narrative 
removes him from his immediate environment, relocating him within memory.  
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II. Ecological Memory and the Reconstruction of Troy 
 
i. Aeneas’s Hallucination before the Walls of Carthage 
 Aeneas’s narrative foregrounds a tension within ecological memory, the ease with 
which recollection might dislocate or displace a person from their immediate environment 
into a conceptual or imaginative space. In this regard, the account of Troy’s destruction 
sheds light upon an earlier instance in the play, where Aeneas and Achates find themselves 
before the walls of Carthage. There, Aeneas oscillates between memory and hallucination, 
mistaking a statue of Priam for the king himself and resignifying Carthage as Troy. As I will 
argue, this hallucinatory moment deepens our understanding of the relationship between 
memory and place within Dido, showing Aeneas’s recollection to be something unbidden, a 
force drawn out by the environment rather than deployed intentionally, as the arts of 
memory might imply.154 After examining the cognitive ecology that underpins Aeneas’s 
hallucination and the spatial implications of his confusion, I will argue that this moment also 
sheds light on the principal source of dramatic tension within Dido, the desire to rebuild the 
city of Troy. In its treatment of this drive, the play reveals a profound investment in 
remembrance as a kind of reconstruction, in which memory becomes less the recollection 
than the re-membering of disparate artifacts and shattered pieces.155 Because this alignment 
                                                
154 As John Sutton has argued, the arts of memory betray a deep anxiety about the inability to control one’s 
memory, making questions of will and intention central to their role in distributing cognition. See “Body, Mind, 
and Order: Local Memory and the Control of Mental Representations in Medieval and Renaissance Sciences of 
the Self,” in 1543 and All That: Word and Image in the Proto-Scientific Revolution, ed. Guy Freeland and Anthony 
Corones (London: Kulwer, 2000), 117-150. 
155 In The Medieval Theater of Cruelty: Rhetoric, Memory, Violence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), Jody 
Enders argues that memory begins “with the need to remember what had been dismembered,” and I am 
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maps a topographic imaginary onto a physical space, blending the mental and the material, it 
also brings Aeneas’s ecological memory into greater proximity with the translatio imperii that 
constitutes the central problem of the play.  
 Standing before the walls of Carthage, Aeneas confuses his fellow Trojans by 
claiming to be uncertain of where they find themselves. His hesitation – “Where am I now? 
These should be Carthage walls” – baffles Achates, who asks, “Why stands my sweet Aeneas 
thus amaz’d?” (2.1.1-2). In their last appearance onstage, Achates hears the goddess Venus 
inform her son Aeneas that they have landed upon the shores of Carthage, where Dido “will 
receive ye with her smiles,” and so his question implicitly concerns the fallibility of Aeneas’s 
memory (1.1.234). But Aeneas responds with melancholic awareness, gesturing towards a 
statue of Priam that underscores both the similitude between Carthage and Troy and the fact 
that the cities are not identical to one another: “Methinks that town there should be Troy, 
yon Ida’s hill, / There Xanthus stream, because here’s Priamus – / And when I know it is 
not, then I die” (2.1.7-9). Through the statue, Aeneas imaginatively resignifies his 
environment, translating the arid landscape into the river Xanthus, the walls into Troy’s 
defenses, and the city itself into his memory of Ilium.   
 While reimagining the space around him, Aeneas maintains an affective relationship 
with the statue, engaging it as a kind of cognitive scaffolding. For cognitive theorists, 
scaffolding refers to a material prompt that lies outside the embodied mind but which 
nevertheless aids in thought, a thing or a system that works to “allow types of operations not 
readily (if at all) performed in the inner realm.”156 The statue elicits and transforms Aeneas’s 
memory, shaping his recollection of Troy as part of an ecological system that spans the walls 
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156 Andy Clark, Being There: Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1997), 65. 
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of Carthage, the statue itself, the discrete memories of Priam that Aeneas briefly describes. 
Seemingly aware of this relationship, Aeneas indulges in a fantasy:  
O, yet this stone doth make Aeneas weep,  
And would my prayers, as Pygmalion’s did, 
Could give it life, that under his conduct 
We might sail back to Troy, and be reveng’d 
On these hard-hearted Grecians which rejoice 
That nothing now is left of Priamus! (2.1.15-20) 
 
In this fantasy, Aeneas endows his affect with strangely animate powers, obscuring the role 
that his tears and his words play in manifesting grief in favor of a kind of vivifying potential. 
But it is within the space of this fixation that Aeneas begins to hallucinate. He contradicts 
those Greeks who “rejoice / That nothing now is left of Priamus,” declaring instead, “O, 
Priamus is left and this is he! / Come, come aboard, pursue the hateful Greeks!” (2.1.21-22). 
Aeneas’s utterances are deeply ambiguous, seeming to acknowledge that Priam is dead, “left,” 
and that all that remains of him is the statue (“this is he”), while also suggesting the opposite, 
that he lives, standing before Aeneas and Achates, and is prepared to lead them into battle 
(“this is he”).  
Indeed, Achates entreats Aeneas to explain himself, whereupon Aeneas 
acknowledges that his thoughts oscillate between an imaginative fantasy and a recognition of 
the reality before him. Aeneas figures this tension as a split between perception and 
cognition, wherein the objects of bodily sight differ from what the mind’s eye apprehends:   
Achates, though mine eyes say this is stone, 
Yet thinks my mind that this is Priamus; 
And when my grieved heart sighs and says no,  
Then would it leap out to give Priam life. (2.1.24-7) 
 
In this moment of distancing between embodied experience and the flights of desire, affect 
is what provides the transversal thrust, as Aeneas’s “grieved heart” moves to make what he 
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sees synonymous with what he imagines to be there. Aeneas displays an uncanny awareness 
of the fact that his emotivity surges beyond his embodiment, admitting that his heart “would” 
“leap out to give Priam life,” to render the statue human, if it could.  
 Almost immediately, Aeneas begins to hallucinate, crying out: “Achates, see, King 
Priam wags his hand; / He is alive; Troy is not overcome!” (2.1.29-30). As Anthony Dawson 
has noted, Aeneas’s vision dramatically alters a similar moment in the Aeneid, where Aeneas, 
after landing upon the shores of Carthage, stumbles upon a frieze depicting the fall of Troy. 
There, Aeneas’s grief stems from his contemplation of the sculpture, with Virgil’s ekphrasis 
suggesting the reason for this sorrow. By contrast, the same scene in Marlowe’s play contains 
“no external, visible record of the past traumatic events, no frieze, only an elusive mental 
image,” making Aeneas’s unstable mental state, his distraction in grief and uncertainty, the 
prompt for this sudden recollection of Troy.157 For Achates, Aeneas suffers from a 
distension of embodied thought: “Thy mind, Aeneas, that would have it so / Deludes thy 
eyesight: Priamus is dead” (2.1.31-32). Here, perception fails to apprehend the external 
environment, and rather than conveying the sensory contours of that space to the mind, it 
directs the mind outward, seeing the imaginary objects (a living Priam, an edified Troy) in 
the world.   
Indeed, in this substitution of cognition for perception, Aeneas stages a kind of 
spatial melancholia, as Robert Burton defines it in his encyclopedic text on the subject.158 
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Burton theorizes melancholy through its ability to disrupt the cognitive processes of an 
individual, as “Wee properly call that Dotage, as Laurentius interprets it, when some one principall 
facultie of the minde, as imagination, or reason is corrupted, as all Melancholy persons have.”159 In keeping 
with early modern faculty psychology, Burton locates the imagination within the second 
ventricle of the brain, where it functions as the mind’s eye, gazing upon the perceptible 
objects presented by the common sense or upon the images impressed into memory. Burton 
notes: “In Melancholy men this faculty is most Powerfull and strong, and often hurts, 
producing many monstrous and prodigious things, especially if it be stirred up by some 
terrible object, presented to it from common sense, or memory.”160 The strengthening of 
imagination in melancholy thereby helps to explain the quality of Aeneas’s memory, which if 
unstructured by the art of memory remains acute through the affective alteration of his 
cognitive faculties.  
In his discussion of the loss of temporal goods, Burton articulates the relationship of 
melancholy, as an affective state in the absence of an appraised object, to the destruction of 
space. Taking as an example the 1527 sack of Rome, Burton recounts that “the common 
souldiers made such spoile that faire Churches were turned to stables, old monuments and 
bookes, made horse-litter, or burned like straw,” shifting from the attack on the physicality 
of the city’s space to note the massacre of Rome’s population: “Senators and Cardinals 
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themselves, dragd along the streets, and put to exquisite torments, to confesse where their 
mony was hid; the rest murdered on heapes, lay stinking in the streets; Infants braines 
dashed out before their mothers eyes.”161 Burton’s description figures the destruction of 
Roman space in terms that parallel Aeneas’s account of Troy’s fall. Moving from the attack 
on the physicality of urban space, Burton’s narrative turns to the streets, where the 
destruction of Rome’s imagined community recalls Aeneas’s memory of the carnage he 
witnessed in Troy: “Young infants swimming in their parents’ blood, / Headless carcases 
[sic] piled up in heaps” (2.1.193-4). Moreover, in prefacing this example, Burton articulates 
an imbrication of space and self, noting that the loss of the former prompts a fragmentation 
of the latter: “Be it by suretiship, shipwracke, fire, spoile and pillage of souldiers, or what 
losse soever, it boots not, it will worke the like effect, the same desolation in Provinces and 
Citties, as well as private persons.”162 What Burton figures as a melancholy stemming from 
the loss of temporal goods thereby provides an affective foundation for the intersection of 
space and subjectivity, as “what losse soever” that befalls the space of “Provinces and Citties” 
is experienced as the inward “desolation” of “private persons.” Melancholia thereby signifies 
a form of spatial affect, since it extends across the inwardness of self and the external 
environment to unify the two spheres. 
Aeneas stages this distension of the imagination in mapping a particular memory of 
Troy onto the space of Carthage, translating the remembered sphere into a place that he can 
physically inhabit. Significantly, Aeneas’s vision of a moving statue recalls a particular 
moment in the destruction of Troy, which Aeneas will later recount to Dido and her court. 
After Pyrrhus enters the Trojan palace, he strikes off Priam’s hands, watches as his soldiers 
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swing Hecuba “howling in the empty air,” before splitting Priam in half: “from the navel to 
the throat at once, / He ripp’d old Priam; at whose latter gasp / Jove’s marble statue gan to 
bend the brow, / As loathing Pyrrhus for this wicked act” (2.1.248, 255-258). Aeneas’s 
hallucination seems to engage this scene in deeply ambiguous ways, made only more 
complex by the fact that he recounts the moment of Priam’s death only after his vision of 
the moving statue. Nevertheless, the hallucination seems to resignify this previous vision, 
translating a supernatural event at the moment of Priam’s death into a miracle that restores 
Priam to life, however briefly and phantasmagorically. Perhaps more troublingly, Aeneas’s 
hallucination risks being parodic, or parasitic upon, the earlier vision, insofar as the “wag” of 
the hand that Priam’s statue performs is far less solemn than the gesture of “bend[ing] the 
brow.” Still, the two visions inform one another, with Aeneas’s hallucination resignifying and 
being resignified by the events that he will narrate before Dido.  
Like his narrative, Aeneas’s hallucination invokes the precepts of the arts of memory, 
realizing them within a physical, rather than intrapsychic, environment. Appearing on what 
Dawson rightly describes as “the blank wall of the theatre/city,” the vision of Priam’s statute 
functions like a memory-image: animate, charged with affective significance, and placed 
upon the memorial background of a physical space.163 The distinction, of course, is that the 
memorial background exists not within Aeneas’s mind, as something remembered and 
incorporated, but rather through the walls of Carthage. This instance of cognitive extension 
(or, perhaps more accurately, of cognitive projection) becomes another sign of Aeneas’s 
instability, of the dotage that seems to disrupt his thoughts and distribute those memories 
that should be seen intrapsychically by the imagination across Carthaginian space. 
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 Indeed, within the perverse cognitive ecology of Aeneas’s hallucination, Carthage 
ceases to function as a particular place and becomes, instead, a screen for recalling the lost 
city of Troy. In this regard, Aeneas’s hallucination anticipates his later, colonialist enterprise 
within the play, where his commitment to rebuilding Troy leads him to overlook the specific 
qualities of the locations in which he finds himself. For this reason, Lisa Hopkins has read 
Aeneas’s hallucination as reproducing certain tropes of early modern colonialism, 
considering it “a powerful emblem of how new lands can only ever be understood, for the 
Renaissance mind, in terms of the old.”164 However successful this account is at 
foregrounding the discursive situatedness of Marlowe’s play, Hopkins’ account overlooks a 
crucial difference between colonialism and Aeneas’s experience; whereas colonialism 
proceeds through a logic of aggrandizement, in which extension is invoked in the service of 
empire, Aeneas’s memory is predicated upon the loss of space and thereby depends upon a 
logic of substitution. The projection, in effect, enacts on a cognitive level precisely what 
Aeneas will propose to do to the materiality of Carthage: reduce the place before him into a 
template for remembrance, upon which he can reconstruct the lost city. 
  
ii. Translatio Imperii as a Form of Memory 
 In Dido, ecological memory transforms the environment into a space for 
remembrance, a transformation that culminates in the desire to memorialize the lost city of 
Troy by building it once again. Although Aeneas most often embodies this desire, it is 
important to note that the intention to reconstitute the Trojan empire anticipates Aeneas’s 
appearance within the play. In the first scene, Venus criticizes Jove for “toying there / And 
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playing with that female wanton boy,” the playful Ganymede, while her son “Aeneas 
wanders on the seas / And rests a prey to every billow’s pride” (1.1.50-53). Jove responds by 
promising that, although “thy Aeneas’ wand’ring fate is firm,” his “weary limbs shall shortly 
make repose / In those fair walls I promis’d him of yore” (1.1.83-5). More specifically, Jove 
offers a stunningly detailed account of Aeneas’s future triumph in Italy, describing a three-
year struggle against the Rutuli in which Aeneas eventually triumphs, becoming “the lord of 
Turnus’ town” before beginning another three-year effort to subdue “those fierce barbarian 
minds” that he has defeated in battle (1.1.87, 92). According to Jove’s prophecy, this struggle 
will culminate in the rebirth of Troy: “once perform’d, poor Troy, so long suppress’d, / 
From forth her ashes shall advance her head, / And flourish once again that erst was dead” 
(1.1.93-95). Figuring Troy as a kind of phoenix, rising from its own ashes, Jove alludes to the 
very conflagration that consumed the city as a means of envisioning its eventual resurrection. 
Through a translatio imperii, the glory of Troy will be reconstructed, the city itself rebuilt, 
upon the shores of Italy.  
 In contrast, Venus displays a surprising indifference as to the site of Aeneas’s future 
triumphs. When she instructs Cupid to turn Dido’s affections towards Aeneas, Venus is 
principally concerned with securing Dido’s aid, regardless of whether that aid leads Aeneas 
to Italy or keeps him within Carthage. Cupid must entrance Dido, in such a manner: 
That she may dote upon Aeneas’ love, 
And by that means repair his broken ships 
Victual his soldiers, give him wealthy gifts, 
And he at last depart to Italy, 
Or else in Carthage make his kingly throne. (2.1.327-331) 
 
Venus mentions Carthage almost as an afterthought, as though recognizing that the 
translation of empire from one space to another is arbitrary, to a degree. Should Venus’s plot 
succeed, as indeed it will over the course of the play, Aeneas will be well equipped to depart 
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from Carthage and to found a new empire in Italy. But as Cupid takes hold of Dido’s desire, 
the Carthaginian queen will also offer to share her throne with Aeneas, making him the king 
that Venus envisions and providing him with a new site for reconstituting the Trojan empire. 
In short, Venus implies that the two sites are equally hospitable to this project, and her 
indifference as to which location will provide the foundation for New Troy makes Jove’s 
insistence upon Italy seem somewhat capricious, all the more so for the fact that his reasons 
for doing so are not stated within the play.  
 As the figure who must initiate the reconstruction of Troy, Aeneas is caught between 
Jove’s insistence upon a particular place and Venus’s belief that the site of Troy’s rebirth is 
less important than the act itself. After Dido bestows her affections and her country’s 
resources upon Aeneas, the Trojan warrior prepares to bid farewell to Carthage, claiming 
that “destiny doth call me from the shore” and citing the fact that “Hermes this night 
descending in a dream / Hath summon’d me to fruitful Italy” (4.3.2-4). Building upon this 
sense of a “destiny” that he cannot resist, Aeneas locates the desire to leave Carthage in the 
gods and the sempiternal sphere that they represent, saying of his impending departure: 
“Jove wills it so, my mother wills it so” (4.3.5). With these words, Aeneas divests himself of 
agency, figuring himself instead as a vehicle for realizing Jove’s prophecy. His claim 
underscores the complexity of the translatio imperii within Dido, the fact that the site of Troy’s 
eventual reconstruction is profoundly arbitrary, selected by Jove rather than by a human 
agent. Certainly, many Trojans celebrate Aeneas’s decision to depart for Italy. Achates 
encourages Aeneas to forget Dido, warning that Carthage effects a strange corruption of 
Trojan thought, as “wanton motions of alluring eyes / Effeminate our minds inur’d to war” 
(4.3.34-35). Similarly, Ilioneus argues that desire has a corrosive effect upon the Trojan 
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warriors, but he also suggests that Carthage lacks the proper infrastructure to remember and 
reconstruct Troy: 
Why, let us build a city of our own 
And not stand lingering here for amorous looks. 
Will Dido raise old Priam forth his grave? 
And build the town again the Greeks did burn? (4.3.37-40) 
 
Here, Ilioneus builds upon Achates’s assertion that desire and affective attachment are 
ultimately debilitating, but he focuses upon their relationship to what I have been calling 
ecological memory. In his account, Dido’s “amorous looks” stand in sharp contrast to her 
inability to “raise old Priam forth his grave,” suggesting that Dido’s compassion in the face 
of Aeneas’s tale is ultimately insufficient as a form of memorialization. Rather, the Trojans 
must “build a city of our own,” a claim that emphasizes not only a proprietary relationship to 
urban space, but also a subtle reversal of Aeneas’s initial claim that the fall of Troy has 
deprived him of an identity. If, in Aeneas’s figuration, the destruction of space has 
implications for the self, Ilioneus reverses that trajectory, suggesting that selves can 
reconstitute space, insofar Trojans must build their own city for it to be a new Troy. That is 
to say, there is a curious synecdoche within Dido, where places and persons are used to 
signify one another. When Venus entreats Jove to guard Aeneas’s ships, for example, she 
worries that “Poor Troy must now be sack’d upon the sea,” locating the lost city within the 
few warriors to have escaped its conflagration. So, too, does Aeneas figure himself as the 
continuation of Troy. After Dido persuades him to stay, he declares: “Then here in me shall 
flourish Priam’s race,” creating a patrilineal foundation for the new empire (4.4.87). 
Ilioneus’s critique of Dido works according to a similar logic, envisioning new Troy as a 
space created and defined by the Trojans alone. 
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 When Dido stops Aeneas from leaving, she counters these assertions by offering the 
constitutive elements of her kingdom as the raw material for rebuilding Troy. Dido first 
crowns Aeneas king of Carthage, and in response to Anna’s uncertainty – “What if the 
citizens repine thereat?,” refusing to accept Aeneas as their lord – Dido claims a kind of 
supernatural control over the very elements of the earth, suggesting that her dominion 
extends through these substances to touch all aspects of her subjects’ lives: “The ground is 
mine that gives them sustenance, / The air wherein they breathe, the water, fire, / All that I 
have, their lands, their goods, their lives” (4.4.70, 74-76). Dido articulates this biopolitical 
fantasy as a way of ensuring her country’s fidelity to Aeneas, but her words also suggest the 
degree to which the environment, from its very elements to the social organizations that it 
sustains, might be transformed as part of the effort to rebuild Troy. Indeed, after Aeneas 
agrees to this coronation, he envisions destroying Carthage in order to build a new city upon 
its foundations. According to the stage direction, he enters “with a paper in his hand, drawing the 
platform of the city,” a gesture that materializes the relationship between remembering and 
rebuilding Troy (5.1.1.s.d.). Speaking to Achates, Ilioneus, and other Trojans, Aeneas 
declares:  
Triumph, my mates, our travels are at end; 
Here will Aeneas build a statelier Troy 
Than that which grim Atrides overthrew; 
Carthage shall vaunt her petty walls no more, 
For I will grace them with a fairer frame (5.1.1-6) 
 
With this reference to Troy’s destruction, Aeneas foregrounds the violent transformation of 
the urban fabric that he narrated before Dido and her court, the destruction of the city’s 
walls and the conflagration which “burnt the toplesse Towers of Ilium,” as Marlowe will 
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describe it elsewhere.165 The parallel between Troy’s destruction and the promised 
transformation of Carthage, whose walls will also be torn down, excavates the implicit 
violence of Aeneas’s fantasy, his readiness to destroy an urban environment in order to 
recreate a city that has been lost to him. Moreover, Aeneas’s willingness to undertake this 
project in Carthage reinforces what I have argued is a profound indifference to the site of 
Troy’s eventual reconstitution. In contrast to Jove, whose prophecy insists that Italy will 
provide a foundation for the new Trojan empire, Aeneas betrays little concern for the 
particular place. His ecological memory directs itself more to the past, displaying a profound 
investment in Troy as the home he has lost, and less an interest in the relationship between 
place and futurity at the moment of Troy’s reconstruction. 
 Indeed, as Aeneas moves closer to realizing this translatio imperii, Troy moves farther 
from his thoughts. When Ilioneus asks, hearing of Aeneas’s plans for Carthage, “But what 
shall it be call’d? Troy, as before?,” Aeneas hesitates in naming the new city: “That have I 
not determin’d with myself” (5.1.18-19). This remark is strange and somewhat unsettlingly, 
given that the lost space of Troy structures not only Aeneas’s grief and hallucinatory 
recollections within the play, but also the drive to reconstruct the empire, articulated by Jove 
and Venus while being embodied in Achates, Ilioneus, and the other Trojan warriors. 
Cloanthus and Sergestus offer patrilineal names for the new city, suggesting that “it be 
term’d Aenea, by your name,” or “Ascania, by your little son” (5.1.20-21). But Aeneas 
decides upon “Anchisaeon, / Of my old father’s name,” in a curious move that invokes the 
recent past while obscuring the place that binds these figures together (5.1.22-23). In this 
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way, the remembrance of Troy gradually disappears from this project of reconstruction and 
imperial expansion, in what should function as a materialization of Aeneas’s memory. 
 Perhaps for this reason, Hermes intervenes within the plan to rebuild Troy, 
reminding Aeneas of his supposed destiny to found a new empire in Italy: “Why, cousin, 
stand you building cities here / And beautifying the empire of this Queen, / While Italy is 
clean out of thy mind?” (5.1.27-29). In its reference to Dido, Hermes’ critique rehearses the 
same argument that Achates and Ilioneus had previously offered: re-edifying Troy upon the 
stones of Carthage ultimately fails as a form of remembrance, since it serves an ornamental 
“beautifying” of Dido’s realm rather than as the construction of a new Trojan city. 
Significantly, Hermes figures his reproach in terms of remembrance, chiding Aeneas for 
being “Too too forgetful of thine own affairs” while endeavoring to restore the thought of 
Italy to his “mind” (5.1.30). The reason for Hermes’s insistence remains unclear, although it 
is likely, given his subsequent references to the “good hap” of Aeneas’s son and to Aeneas’s 
own dreams of a “monarchy,” that Jove has fixated upon Italy for patrilineal reasons (5.1.31, 
34).   
But regardless of the reason, it is this insistence upon a particular place that leads 
Aeneas out of Carthage, moving the play closer to its conclusion with the suicides of Dido, 
Iarbas, and Anna upon the same funeral pyre. Still complaining that he travels to Italy against 
his will, Aeneas submits to Jove’s commandment, with thoughts of Troy at the forefront of 
his mind:  
Now will I haste unto Lavinian shore 
And raise a new foundation to old Troy. 
Witness the Gods, and witness heaven and earth, 
How loth I am to leave these Libyan bounds, 
But that eternal Jupiter commands! (5.1.78-82) 
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In this struggle, Dido figures ecological memory as the material connection between the two 
spaces of the play’s translatio imperii. The ruined Troy bears little relationship to the “new 
foundation” that Aeneas will erect upon Italian soil, save for the fact that he and his 
compatriots consider that act of reconstruction to be a form of memory. 
 At the same time, Dido stages the limitations of ecological memory in order to 
foreground the implicit arbitrariness of the play’s translatio imperii. If Aeneas’s memory 
constitutes a material connection between the old Troy and its reconstruction as the Roman 
empire, then the limits of this memory, in Aeneas’s hallucination or in his willingness to 
rebuild Troy as Carthage, severely weakens the sense of a purposeful transition from one 
space to another. For this reason, Dido would seem to affirm Emily Bartels’ claim that space 
is not “meaningless” within Marlowe’s plays, but rather that these struggles of conquest and 
displacement reveal that “the differences assigned to it are empty, overdetermined, or 
arbitrary, at best.”166 But while this observation sheds light on the status of new Troy within 
the play, on the tension between Jove’s selection of Italy and Aeneas’s willingness to build 
the city in Carthage, it overlooks the conceptual and affective significance of the 
environment for Aeneas. Place remains deeply significant within Dido, the object as well as 
the medium of memory. The fact that this significance is conditional and constructed, that it 
comes into being through a gradual formation, does not mean that it remains arbitrary, 
particularly within an early modern episteme that aligned the sense of emplacement with 
personhood.  
 In “Of Solitude,” for example, Montaigne foregrounds this relationship between 
environment and embodied subjectivity, even as he endeavors, over the course of the essay, 
to find solace in the idea of a conditional and temporary separation from the world. Here, 
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Montaigne famously suggests the need to cultivate an arrière-boutique, or “back shop,” within 
the self, a place to which one can occasionally retreat. But his argument remains haunted by 
an inchoate awareness of the impossibility, or at least unsustainability, of maintaining this 
distance. In one classical anecdote, Montaigne notes an extreme separation of the self from 
its environment. 
After Stilpo escaped the burning of his city, in which he had 
lost wife, children, and property, Demetrius Poliorcetes, 
seeing him unperturbed in expression amid the great ruin of 
his country, asked him if he had not suffered loss. No, he 
replied; thanks to God he had lost nothing of his own.167 
 
In Montaigne’s version of these events, Stilpo undergoes a series of losses that are strikingly 
similar to Aeneas’s: a conflagration that consumes his city, the destruction of his property, 
and the death of his wife. But, in contrast to Aeneas, who figures himself as consubstantial 
with the city of Troy, Stilpo refuses such an alignment, claiming to suffer no loss. Montaigne 
ultimately argues in favor of Stilpo’s position, offering a slightly more moderate version of 
his conclusion in declaring: “We should have wife, children, goods, and above all health, if 
we can; but we must not bind ourselves to them so strongly that our happiness depends on 
them.”168 Still, through its very existence, Montaigne’s essay implies the difficulty of 
achieving that distance. Its argument in favor of the arrière-boutique, where one “must talk and 
laugh as if without wife, without children, without possessions, without retinue and servants,” 
implies that the separation of one’s self from a social and physical environment is ultimately 
an aspirational feat within early modern culture.169 
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 Indeed, Dido figures an intimate relationship between embodied thought and the 
environment, staging a form of ecological memory in Aeneas’s continued efforts to think 
through the spaces of Troy and of Carthage. In positing this intimacy, however, the play 
explores a more subtle and vexed relationship between affective space of Aeneas’s thoughts 
and the larger political entity of Troy, or between what Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari 
have termed the territory and the State. In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari define 
the territory as the spatialization or distribution of a particular organism, “an act that affects 
milieus and rhythms, that ‘territorializes’ them” within a particular space.170 In the sense that 
“the bird sings to mark its territory,” animals are adept at creating territories, but one can 
also interpret the spatialization of thought, in Aeneas’s hallucination of Priam for example, 
as another act of territorial formation.171 In contrast, Deleuze and Guattari figure the State as 
a geopolitical entity, the result of a sudden reconstitution of spatial entities, including the 
territory.172 Their distinction thereby poses an essential question: how do cognitive and 
affective spaces, like the territory, become absorbed, incorporated, or reconstituted within 
larger and explicitly political domains like the State? In the gap between Aeneas’s memory 
and his intention, in the Troy that he remembers and the empire that he promises to found, 
Marlowe’s play stages the vexed oscillation between the territory and the State. Moreover, it 
is through this oscillation that Dido traces the geopolitical implications of ecological memory, 
revealing the ease with which a political domain can resignify the effort of thinking through 
the environment. 
                                                
170 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 314. 
171 Ibid., 312. 
172 They argue that the State functions as an “apparatus of capture,” generating and sustaining itself through the 
organization of raw materials. Specifically, they argue that rent, profit, and taxation are essential components of 
the State, as it transforms – in Deleuze and Guattari’s formulation – territory, activity, and exchange into land, 
work, and money. See, in particular, their discussion on pp. 440-445. 
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III. Troynovant and the Place of Memory in Early Modern London 
 The effort to stage and to critique an ecological form of memory situates Dido at the 
heart of early modern English culture, in no small part because of the particular place that 
Marlowe’s play endeavors to remember. In many topographical, literary, and historical 
renderings, London was called Troynovant, or “New Troy,” a name intended to 
acknowledge the role of Aeneas’s great-grandson Brutus in founding Britain upon an 
uninhabited island.173 Brutus’s exile and eventual resettlement upon the island parallels 
Aeneas’s own narrative of displacement and spatial reconstitution, and this repetition serves 
to legitimate the British empire as a continuation of Troy’s dominion. Indeed, in chronicling 
Aeneas’s movement through the Mediterranean, Dido alludes to this translatio imperii, in such 
a way that it touches directly upon the topographical imaginary of early modern England.174  
The Agas map of London, for example, introduces its subject, the “antient and 
famous City of London,” as being “first founded by Brute the Trojan, in the year of the 
World two thousand, eight hundred thirty & two, and before the Nativity of our Saviour 
                                                
173 Lawrence Manley discusses the origin and the development of this myth in Literature and Culture in Early 
Modern London (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), esp. 182-185. He argues: “While they supported 
the Tudor image, and reflected the late-feudal arrangements that enabled London to function as a ‘collective 
seigneur’ through royal charter and privilege, the foundation-myth and its chivalric associations also had a wide 
appeal among the members of London’s citizen class” (184). Nevertheless, as I argue, historians and 
chorographers such as John Stow and William Camden began to undermine the legend of Troynovant in 
gesturing toward other foundational myths.   
174 I borrow the phrase “topographical imaginary” from Karen Newman, who uses it in Cultural Capitals: Early 
Modern London and Paris (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007) to theorize a relationship between 
physical space and innersubjective experience. In Newman’s own words, her second chapter “argues for what I 
call in this study the topographic imaginary by considering one of the most prominent images of modernity in early 
modern Paris, the Pont Neuf,” and her method foregrounds the interplay between the materiality of that space 
and the ideas and representational idioms that it generated: “Demographic growth and the reconfiguration of 
urban space effected by the Pont Neuf had aesthetic, cognitive, psychic, and social effects traced in visual and 
verbal representations that make legibile the actions, practices, and experience of urban life in early modern 
Paris” (8, 39). In other words, the topographic imaginary refers to the fact that ideology and environment are 
mutually constitutive of one another.    
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Christ, one thousand, one hundred and 30.”175 The map radically simplifies the translatio 
imperii, making Brutus himself a Trojan and thus obviating the need for Aeneas to effect a 
translation of the empire through Rome. In the incredible economy proposed by the map, in 
other words, Aeneas’s stay in Carthage and Rome is elided and the line of descent from Troy 
to London becomes direct. Perhaps for this reason, when the Agas map gives voice to 
London, it places the myth of origin within the city’s mouth and thereby elides its role in 
constructing a line of direct descent: “New Troy my name: when first my fame begun / By 
Trajon Brute: who then me placed here.”176 Here, London remembers its own foundation at 
the hands of the “Trajon Brute” only by forgetting Brutus’s Roman heritage.   
In his Survey of London, John Stow recalls precisely what the Agas map forgets in its 
peculiar economy of empire. But his efforts to remember Rome serve the rather critical 
function of undermining the myth of Brutus’s appearance. “As the Romane writers to 
glorifie the citie of Rome drew the originall thereof from Gods and demie Gods, by the 
Troian progenie,” Stow writes, “so Giffrey of Monmouth the Welsh Historian, deduceth the 
foundation of this famous Citie of London, for the greater glorie therof, and emulation of 
Rome, from the very same originall.”177 The penchant for grounding urban splendor upon 
“Troian progenie” is itself a Roman inheritance, according to Stow. The “emulation of Rome” 
thereby doubles. One, it manifests itself as a fantasy of origins, wherein London follows 
Rome in descending from Troy; two, it represents a historiographical impulse, wherein the 
descent from Troy becomes a means of valuation. Indeed, it is in this critical context that 
Stow recounts Brutus’s descent from Aeneas and his arrival upon the island, where 
                                                
175 Civitas Londinvm (The Agas Map), ed. Janelle Jenstad (Victoria: MoEML, 2012), map D2. 
176 Ibid., map D7, D8. 
177 John Stow, A Survey of London, by John Stow, Reprinted from the Text of 1603, ed. Charles Lethbridge Kingsford, 
2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1908), 1:1.  
 140 
Monmouth claims that he “builded this city neare vnto the riuer now called Thames, and 
named it Troynouant or Trenouant.”178 Stow’s reinsertion of Rome into the translation of 
empire thereby returns the very term that the Agas map elides, but to different ends. Rather 
than severing London’s relationship to Rome through a suppression of the Italian city, Stow 
invokes it to suggest a Roman impulse within English historiography, an impulse that he 
avoids in interrogating the myth that Brutus founded London. Stow’s Survey thereby registers 
a growing uncertainty with regard to the myth of Brutus’s foundation, suggesting a split 
between London and the lost space that Dido remembers.179 
 Indeed, Marlowe’s play briefly interrogates its relationship to the English capital in a 
stunning eruption that shifts Dido from Carthage to Elizabethan England. When Iarbas 
despairs that Dido’s affections have shifted from him to Aeneas, he prepares a sacrifice to 
Jove and intones: “Hear, hear, O hear Iarbas’ plaining prayers, / Whose hideous echoes 
make the welkin howl, / And all the woods ‘Eliza’ to resound!” (4.2.8-10). The cry is almost 
non-diegetic, in that it seems to come from beyond the narrative, from Marlowe’s own world 
rather than from the Carthage that he endeavors to stage. The moment, as Bartels suggests, 
makes manifest “an embedded parallel between Carthage’s queen (whose Phoenician name 
                                                
178 Ibid.  
179 Lister M. Matheson, in The Prose Brut: The Development of a Middle English Chronicle (Tempe: Medieval & 
Renaissance Texts & Studies, 1998), notes that although the incorporation of the Brut chronicle into “the works 
of the sixteenth-century historians such as Stow and Holinshed” ensured the continued circulation of the myth 
of Brutus, “the version of early British history presented in the Brut (and in its ultimate source, Geoffrey of 
Monmouth’s Historia Regum Britannie) was challenged and ridiculed” with increased intensity in the early modern 
period (27). Indeed, in “Early British Chorography,” The Sixteenth Century Journal 17:4 (Winter 1986): 459-481, 
Stan Mendyk notes that William Camden, in his Britannia, diminished the importance of Troy in the foundation 
of Britain, but for the purpose of elevating Rome: “The Britannia, by presenting to the world the Roman 
antiquities of Britain, was designed to entrench the author’s native land amongst those European nations which 
claimed the mighty Roman Empire as their origin. The attempt to dispel the myth of the Trojan Brutus aided 
this cause to a large extent” (473). Jonathan Gil Harris, in Untimely Matter in the Time of Shakespeare (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), notes Stow’s dismissal of the Brutus myth and suggests that it is part 
of a larger strategy: “Stow refuses to countenance any one myth of ‘first foundation’ and instead recounts 
several tales of London’s beginning; in this way, he reads difference and multiplicity into the city’s very moment 
of origin” (105).  
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was ‘Elissa’) and England’s.”180 Moreover, the line subversively parodies Spenser’s refrain in 
the Epithalamium, which also culminates in Spenser’s famed meditation on the three 
Elizabeths of his affection – his mother, his wife, and his queen – to suggest a certain pagan 
fetishization.181 Marlowe’s appropriation of the line critiques both the desire to fetishize the 
queen – Iarbas’ instability will lead him to follow Dido into the flames – and the object that 
fetishization (as Hopkins argues, the “ruling queen” is presented as an unstable and 
unreliable victim of passion).182 But, regardless of the implications for Elizabeth, the eruption 
suggests less that the play “announces the resemblance between its African landscape and 
England” than the fact that the two locations are incommensurate; the knowledge that 
Iarbas “is an African king complaining to a pagan god and invoking a name that is otherwise 
suppressed emphasizes the incongruity, as ours and theirs suggestively collide in a space that 
excludes neither.”183 The binding together of these disparate locations within one conceptual 
or performative “space” does not, however, succeed in equating the one place with the other. 
If anything, the multiple tragedies of Dido depend upon the irreducibility of one place to 
another. With Aeneas’s departure for Italy, Dido underscores the space that separates 
Carthage and Rome, claiming that geographical fact as a metaphor for affective distance: 
“Betwixt this land and that be never league,” she declares, before throwing herself into the 
fire (5.1.309). 
                                                
180 Bartels, Spectacles of Strangeness, 15.  
181 Patrick Cheney analyzes this relationship in Marlowe’s Counterfeit Profession: Ovid, Spenser, Counter-Nationhood 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), esp. 99-114, and he discusses Marlowe’s relationship to Spenser 
more generally in “‘Thondring Words of Threate’: Marlowe, Spenser, and Renaissance Ideas of a Literary 
Career,” in Marlowe, History, and Sexuality: New Critical Essays on Christopher Marlowe, ed. Paul Whitfield White 
(New York: AMS Press, 1998), 39-58. 
182 Hopkins, Christopher Marlowe: Renaissance Dramatist, 40. Hopkins also alludes to another topical subtext within 
the play, a celebration of Elizabeth’s virginity through a critical representation of Dido’s passion; as she argues, 
however, “it is hard to believe that Marlowe would have much time for ‘the cult of Elizabeth’, most notably 
exemplified in Edmund Spenser’s The Faerie Queene” (158).  
183 Bartels, Spectacles of Strangeness, 15-16. 
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 Through its invocation of ecological memory, Dido offers a radical critique of the 
conceptual and affective ties that merged London with the Trojan empire. The play presents 
the relationship between Troy and Italy as the result of a deux ex machina, where Jove, in his 
only appearance onstage, foresees an intimacy between the two spaces that is neither 
explained nor shared by other characters. Moreover, the tone of Dido, as Clifford Leech has 
argued, is humorous, even campy, in such a way that “the affairs of men and gods are seen 
as a spectacle engagingly absurd” throughout the performance.184 Although Leech’s account 
ignores the tonal complexity of Dido, it rightly foregrounds the hermeneutic difficulty of 
determining the play’s stance toward the literary events that it depicts. In a sense, Dido’s 
quasi-parodic tone undermines the significance of Aeneas’s memory, making it superficially 
incongruous with the play’s more satirical representation of desire and divine intrigue. 
Furthermore, the fact that Dido was first enacted “by the Children of her Maiesties Chappell,” 
according to the 1594 quarto, may have deepened the play’s critique of Aeneas and the 
putative heroism of his intention to rebuild Troy. From the play’s first scene, where Jove and 
Ganymede engage one another with flirtatious banter, “the metamorphosis of the boys and 
their master into the luxurious pagan gods provides self-conscious satire,” as Jackson Cope 
has claimed.185 In other moments, as Michael Shapiro noted, the play seems to offer a 
metatheatrical apology, implying that its use of boy actors to depict an epic tragedy verges on 
the absurd.186 Together with its tone, Dido’s resignification of its earliest performance 
conditions allow the play to deepen its critique of ecological memory, blending Aeneas’s 
                                                
184 Clifford Leech, “Marlowe’s Humor,” in Marlowe: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Clifford Leech (Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964), 169.  
185 Jackson I. Cope, Dramaturgy of the Daemonic: Studies in Antigeneric Theater from Ruzante to Grimaldi (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), 65. 
186 Michael Shapiro, Children of the Revels: The Boys Companies of Shakespeare’s Time and Their Plays (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1977), 166. Crucially, for Shapiro as for Cope, these moments exist in elaborate 
tension with the play’s more serious moments, contributing to the complexity of tone that I noted above. 
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need to remember the space of Troy with a satirical treatment of the ends to which that need 
is used. 
 The complexity and strangeness of Dido, then, stems in part from a tension within its 
treatment of ecological memory. The play begins with a tragic meditation on the relationship 
between memory and environment, foregrounding the intimacy between the two spheres in 
Aeneas’s brief hallucination, in his narrative of Troy’s fall, and in his claims that he has lost 
his identity. In particular, Aeneas’s memorial navigation of the space of Troy reveals the role 
of place in providing a conceptual and affective foundation for early modern personhood. 
With regard to the tonal complexity of Dido, that moment also works to legitimate Aeneas’s 
grief, as his narrative moves Dido and her courtiers to suffer compassionately with Aeneas, 
to experience within themselves the devastating effects of displacement. But, in contrast to 
this moment, Dido repeatedly figures as arbitrary the relationship between the lost city of 
Troy and the empire that Aeneas must found. In Jove’s insistence upon Italy, and in 
Aeneas’s eventual willingness to accede to this demand, the play suggests that ecological 
memory is insufficient to justify a fixation upon one space over another in the construction 
of empire. Through these scenes, Dido offers a subversive, and occasionally satirical, critique 
of ecological memory, weakening the relationship between the lost city of Troy and its 
eventual reconstruction, between new Troy and London, and between the affective space of 
the territory and the larger political domain of the state. Marlowe’s play exposes a gap 
between environments remembered and imagined, using this gap to undermine the 







Embodiment and the Perception of Place in King Lear 
 
When Lear asks the blinded Gloucester if he can “see how this world goes,” there is 
a peculiar and haunting quality to Gloucester’s response: “I see it feelingly.”187 To “see it 
feelingly” is, on the one hand, to grasp the world through the layering of sight and touch; the 
hands extend to take the part of the eye’s now dormant rays, mapping the contours of space. 
But as Gloucester’s plight makes readily apparent, to “see it feelingly” is also to conflate 
sensation with sentience, to claim to know the world through the pain that it inflicts upon 
the body. Gloucester’s rhetoric thereby grounds an epistemology of the world upon a 
sensing and suffering corporeality. In doing so, his quasi-synesthetic claim encodes within 
itself the many modes of spatial apprehension that suffuse King Lear. Lear himself responds 
to Gloucester’s invocation of sight and touch by offering another sense: “A man may see 
how this world goes with no eyes; look with thine ears” (4.5.142-43), and there is a similar 
eruption in Regan’s cruel imperative to let Gloucester: “smell / His way to Dover” (3.7.91-
92). This multiplicity, I want to suggest, gestures towards an early modern phenomenology 
of the environment, in which places emerge through an oscillation between different modes 
of perception and cognition.  
                                                
187 William Shakespeare, The Tragedy of King Lear, in The Norton Shakespeare, ed. Stephen Greenblatt, Walter 
Cohen, Jean Howard, and Katharine Eisaman Maus, 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 2008), 4.5.141. All further 
citations of Shakespeare’s works are from the Norton edition and will be made parenthetically. 
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Guided by Lear’s imperative, “Give me the map there,” critical work on the spaces 
of King Lear has been dominated by interest in cartographic representation, in monarchical 
power and questions of nationhood, and in the vexed translation of land into property 
(1.1.35).188 These efforts have shown space to be an inherently political dimension, a domain 
that both contains and recapitulates the tensions between power and violence that set the 
play’s tragedies in motion. But this interest in cartographic and representational space has 
also overlooked, and partially obscured, Lear’s investment in the phenomenological 
dimension of the environment, in the way that places are imagined, experienced, and 
disrupted.189  
Gloucester’s claim directs us toward a more nuanced understanding of the nature of 
place within King Lear, and in the early modern period more broadly. The sixteenth and 
                                                
188 See, for example, Terence Hawkes, Meaning by Shakespeare (New York: Routledge, 1992); John Gillies, 
“Introduction: Elizabethan Drama and the Cartographizations of Space” in Playing the Globe: Genre and Geography 
in English Renaissance Drama, ed. John Gillies and Virginia Mason Vaughan (Madison: Associated University 
Press, 1998), 19-45; Bernhard Klein, Maps and the Writing of Space in Early Modern England and Ireland (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2001); Gillies, “The Scene of Cartography in King Lear” in Literature, Mapping, and the Politics 
of Space in Early Modern Britain, ed. Andrew Gordon and Bernhard Klein (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001), 109-37; Jerry Brotton, “Tragedy and Geography” in A Companion to Shakespeare’s Works, Volume 1: 
The Tragedies, ed. Richard Dutton and Jean E. Howard (Malden: Blackwell, 2003), 219-40; Peter Holland, 
“Mapping Shakespeare’s Britain” in Shakespeare’s Histories and Counter-Histories, ed. Dermot Cavanagh, Stuart 
Hampton-Reeves, and Stephen Longstaffe (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006), 198-218; and 
Gavin Hollis, “‘Give me the map there’: King Lear and Cartographic Literacy in Early Modern England” The 
Portolan 8 (Spring 2007): 8-25, as well as other works that I will engage in greater detail. In addition to several of 
those cited here, Richard Dutton’s “King Lear, The Triumphs of Reunited Britannia, and ‘The Matter of Britain’” 
Literature and History 12:2 (Autumn 1986): 137-151 and Leah S. Marcus’s Puzzling Shakespeare: Local Reading and its 
Discontents (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988) focus on Lear’s interest in reimagining the space of 
the nation. Finally, on land, property, and labor, see Francis Barker, The Culture of Violence: Tragedy and history 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993) and Garret A. Sullivan, Jr., The Drama of Landscape: Land, Property, 
and Social Relations on the Early Modern Stage (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998). Valerie Traub also notes 
these critical trends, among others, in “The Nature of Norms in Early Modern England: Anatomy, 
Cartography, King Lear,” South Central Review 26, no. 1 & 2 (Winter & Spring 2009): 42-81, where she moves 
beyond this fixation on the play’s cartographic imaginary by offering “less a reading of the play’s anatomical 
and cartographic consciousness than the excavation of a “style of reasoning” that King Lear shares with these 
two scientific endeavors” (45).  
189 A notable exception to this trend is Gillies’s “The Scene of Cartography,” which anticipates my work here in 
offering a phenomenological approach to the spatiality of the play. As suggested in his claim that “the major 
spatial idiom in Lear is built around the bodily opposition of housedness and unhousedness, accommodation 
and nakedness,” Gillies’s use of phenomenology is deeply indebted to the work of Gaston Bachelard and Yi Fu 
Tuan (123). In contrast, I take a Heideggerian approach to the relationship between embodiment and 
environment, using phenomenology to suggest that ontology and epistemology are inseparable from one 
another. 
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seventeenth centuries witnessed a profound shift in the conceptualization of space and place, 
a gradual rejection of the quasi-Aristotelian belief that nature abhors a vacuum in favor of 
the empty and infinite dimension that we call space. Caught in the midst of this shift, Lear 
registers the tension between a plenitudinal cosmos and empty space with exceptional 
sensitivity, as Henry S. Turner has shown.190 But rather than locating the events of Lear 
within a void, as Turner does, I argue that the play’s emphasis on feeling highlights the 
phenomenological significance of place within early modern culture. Prior to the 
conceptualization of space as an a priori sphere, the drama of Lear shows that emplacement, 
or the feeling of being within space, defined the contours of the environment, and that this 
constitutive power enabled place to provide a foundation for early modern subjectivity.  
To excavate these relationships, and to foreground Lear’s interest in reimagining 
them, I blend insights from cognitive ecology with historical phenomenology. Stemming 
from the work of Bruce R. Smith, Jonathan Gil Harris, and others, historical 
phenomenology denotes an emerging critical movement within early modern studies, one 
that examines theories and experiences of perception in Renaissance culture in order to 
foreground what Smith has called “the ambient quality of knowing-in-place-in-time.”191 
Together with cognitive ecology, this approach to perception, feeling, and thinking reveals 
that places are created and shaped through conceptual and affective signification, realized in 
the most literal sense by the embodied mind.  
                                                
190 Henry S. Turner, The English Renaissance Stage: Geometry, Poetics, and the Practical Spatial Arts 1580-1630 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006). 
191 Bruce R. Smith, The Key of Green: Passion and Perception in Renaissance Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2009), 8. For other examples of historical phenomenology in early modern studies, see Smith, The 
Acoustic World of Early Modern England: Attending to the O-Factor (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999) and 
Jonathan Gil Harris, Untimely Matter in the Time of Shakespeare (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2009), especially 119-139. 
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In Gloucester’s approach to Dover cliff, and in Lear’s encounter with the storm, Lear 
stages this phenomenological approach to the environment. Foregrounding what I will argue 
was a foundational assumption within the early modern episteme – that place provided the 
grounds of personhood – the play suggests that the embodied mind and its immediate 
environment were mutually constitutive of one another. Gloucester’s claim to see the world 
“feelingly” and his multisensory navigation of that world depend upon this intimate 
relationship. In the approach to Dover cliff, Edgar’s efforts to convince his father that they 
stand at the edge of a precipice (when, in fact, they do not) transform these issues of 
embodiment and emplacement into a performative crux, allowing the scene to locate the 
proto-phenomenology of the early modern period on a spatial register. In this way, 
Gloucester’s confusion illuminates something implicit in other instances of disorientation 
within the play, most notably Lear’s wandering in the storm. Like Gloucester, Lear struggles 
to locate himself within a vast and dimly perceptible environment, and the fallen monarch’s 
effort to grapple with this dislocation shows the same interlacement of environment and 
embodiment that Gloucester’s blindness evinces. In these scenes, Lear reimagines space as 
coextensive with the self, as less of an a priori sphere than an ambient and strangely labile 
environment. 
 
I. Early Modern Phenomenology and the Perception of Place 
 As a philosophy that seeks to allow sensory apprehensions to appear in the manner 
of their unfolding, phenomenology locates subjects and space on a kind of continuum. 
Whether in Husserl’s work on the showing of objects or in Heidegger’s theorization of being 
as Being-There (Dasein), phenomenology “reminds us that spaces are not exterior to bodies,” 
as Sara Ahmed puts it, but that these environments actually emerge out of somatic and 
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psychic experience.192 This investment in a processual unfolding, however, is by no means 
exclusive to the philosophy of the early twentieth century. In the 1615 edition of the 
Mikrokosmographia, Helkiah Crooke evinces a similar interest in interpreting sensation as a 
process, and his claims effectively anticipate phenomenology in describing embodied 
thought as a gradual and distributed achievement. In the preface to a chapter on the organs 
of the head, for instance, Crooke begins with the sense organs and moves towards the 
faculties of cognition, asserting that: 
The eye receiueth the visible formes, the eare the audible, the 
nose such as cast an odour from them; and so of the rest. All 
these indiuiduall formes receiued by the sences, are by them 
resigned vp in token of foealty to the Common sense or 
priuy-chamber of the soule from whence they receiued their 
faculties: and then out of those formes the soule gathering 
phantasmes or notions doth eyther lay them vp in the 
Memory, or worke vpon them by discourse of Reason.193 
 
Crooke’s description usefully suggests the means by which disparate sensations appear 
before the common sense, a faculty akin to the imagination, which unifies these impressions 
into a single, cognitive object. The thing perceived is, in a way, not readily apparent to the 
mind; rather, the idea must be created through a complex interplay between perceptual and 
cognitive faculties, an interplay that makes the embodied mind partially constitutive of the 
world that it encounters  
Crooke’s writings on this point are less particular than symptomatic of dominant 
medical theories on the relationship of perception to cognition in the early modern period. 
With some variation, the phenomenology that Crooke articulates also appears in André du 
                                                
192 Sara Ahmed, Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, Others (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 9. 
193 Helkiah Crooke, Mikrokosmographia: A Description of the Body of Man. Together with the Controversies Thereto 
Belonging. Collected and Translated out of all the Best Authors of Anatomy, Especially out of Gasper Bauhinus and Andreas 
Laurentius (London: William Jaggard, 1615), 432. 
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Laurens’s A Discovrse of the Preservation of the Sight and Timothy Bright’s A Treatise of Melancholie, 
among many other treatises on humoral physiology to circulate within England.194 Together, 
these writers assume a thoroughly embodied mind, anticipating Crooke in describing a 
profound intimacy between perceptual and cognitive faculties (indeed, Crooke draws many 
of his claims from previous writers, as the subtitle of the Mikrokosmographia – “Collected and 
Translated out of all the Best Authors of Anatomy” – suggests). In this regard, early modern 
philosophers of embodiment evince what Deborah Shuger has described as a profound 
indebtedness to “Aristotelian theory, in which knowledge derives from sense-perception.”195 
That is to say, they reproduce Aristotle’s claim in the De anima that “the objects of thought 
are in the sensible forms” and that, for this reason, “no one can learn or understand anything 
in the absence of sense.”196 For Aristotle, and his early modern adherents, one might say that 
one thinks through the body, or not at all.197 
Similarly, these writers follow Aristotle in assuming that thought has a visual 
component. In the De anima, Aristotle proposes that: “when the mind is actively aware of 
                                                
194 André du Laurens, in A Discovrse of the Preservation of the Sight: of Melancholike diseases; of Rheumes, and of Old age 
(London, 1599), cites Aristotle in claiming that “nothing (as saith the Philosopher) can enter into the 
vnderstanding part of our minde, except it passe through one of these fiue doores” that are the external senses 
(9). Timothy Bright anticipates Crooke in figuring the brain as a site that organizes disparate senses into 
thought by virtue of the common sense; see A Treatise of Melancholie (London: Thomas Vautrollier, 1586), 47. 
195 Deborah Shuger, “The ‘I’ of the Beholder: Renaissance Mirrors and the Reflexive Mind” in Renaissance 
Culture and the Everyday, ed. Patricia Fumerton and Simon Hunt (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1999), 21-41, esp. 33.  
196 Aristotle, On the Soul, in The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation Vol. 1, ed. Jonathan 
Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 432a1.5-7. 
197 Of course, many early modern writers distinguished embodied cognition from the workings of the immortal 
soul. In The Examination of mens Wits. In whicch, by discouering the varietie of natures, is shewed for what profession each one 
is apt, and how far he shall profit therein (London: Adam Islip, 1594), Juan Huarte cites a conversation between the 
souls of Abraham and a sinner in order to demonstrate that the soul does not require a body to think (101). 
Nevertheless, as long as the soul remains within the body, it maintains an instrumental relationship with regard 
to that corporeality, thinking and working through the flesh. As Huarte reasons, “if vnderstanding were seuered 
from the body, and had nought to do with heat, cold, moist, and drie, nor with the other bodily qualities, it 
would follow that al men should partake equall vnderstanding, and that all should equally discourse. But we see 
by experience, that one man vnderstandeth and discourseth better than another” (75). Huarte thus concludes 
that the soul must think through the body when the two are conjoined.   
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anything it is necessarily aware of it along with an image.”198 When Crooke theorizes the 
imagination as that which “conceyueth, apprehendeth and retaineth the same Images or 
representations which the common sense receiued,” his claim affirms these precepts.199 Thus, 
for many early modern philosophers, what Hamlet refers to as the “mind’s eye” was 
considered to be the principle cognitive faculty (1.2.184). 
This claim of visual primacy, however, obscures the degree to which early modern 
cognition was figured in terms of other senses, most notably that of touch. Daniel Heller-
Roazen has argued persuasively that the common sense, as it came to be theorized in the late 
medieval and early modern periods, was understood to be a form of touching, in which 
sensory data was pressed into the materiality of the body.200 Crooke himself affirms this 
point in explaining that the humoral brain requires a certain softness: “The reason of the 
softnesse is because it is to receiue all of the species or representations of the outward senses, 
as also of the imagination and vnderstanding.”201 So, too, does Levinus Lemnius assert that 
the brain must be moist and soft enough to receive impression: “a dry Constitution of the 
Brayne maketh a very weake and ill memory; by reason, that it will not easely admit any 
impression.”202 Here, the spongy brain absorbs what the disparate sense organs have 
rendered as a unified object, and the fact that the brain can incorporate such 
                                                
198 Aristotle, On the Soul, 432a1.7-8. Shuger also notes that, for early modern writers indebted to Aristotle, 
“cognition is invariably conceived on the model of vision” (“The ‘I’ of the Beholder,” 33). 
199 Crooke, Mikrokosmographia, 502.  
200 Daniel Heller-Roazen, The Inner Touch: Archaeology of a Sensation (New York: Zone Books, 2007). 
201 Crooke, Mikrokosmographia, 455. 
202 Levinus Lemnius, The Touchstone of Complexions. Generallye appliable, expedient and profitable for all such, as be 
desirous and carefull of ther bodyly health (London, Thomas Marsh, 1581), sig. 120v. 
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“representations” from the imagination suggests the degree to which the common sense is a 
kind of an inner touch, intimately related to the sense of sight.203  
This inner touch is where Gloucester’s “see it feelingly” directs us. Certainly, as I 
initially suggested, the claim to “see it feelingly” implicates the hands with which Gloucester 
navigates the world in blindness. But it also expands to encompass the many other senses 
invoked to encourage his spatial apprehension. The imperatives to “look with” his “ears” 
and to “smell / His way to Dover” seem absurd, and indeed cruel in their absurdity. But 
these utterances rehearse and reframe something already articulated within early modern 
cognitive theory, that thought is deeply embodied and that the mind engages a complex 
layering of sensations to apprehend its immediate environment. Gloucester’s touching-sight 
stages this layering with incredible vividness, creating a strange and ultimately haunting 
allusion to early modern theories of the embodied mind.  
 If the proto-phenomenology of early modern period illuminates the peculiar, 
synesthetic production at the heart of Gloucester’s experience, then the referent of his “see it 
feelingly” – that is, the world itself – directs us towards the relationship between perception 
and place. Indeed, as Edward Casey has argued, “a phenomenological account” of the 
environment begins with the recognition that “the crux of matters of place is the role of 
perception.”204 For embodied subjects, perception represents the means by which we discern 
the contours of our location. Located within the world, in other words, the body provides a 
material connection between the mind and its environment; in Casey’s words, “the body is 
                                                
203 I have taken the phrase “spongy brains” from Sutton’s “Spongy Brains and Material Memories” in 
Environment and Embodiment in Early Modern England, ed. Mary Floyd-Wilson and Garrett A. Sullivan, Jr. (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 14-34. 
204 Edward S. Casey, “How to Get from Space to Place in a Fairly Short Stretch of Time: Phenomenological 
Prolegomena” in Senses of Place, ed. Steven Feld and Keith H. Basso (Santa Fe: School of American Research 
Press, 1996), 13-52, esp. 17. 
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the specific medium for experiencing a place-world.”205 Just as we saw in Crooke’s 
progression, places do not immediately appear before the mind; they must, in a sense, be 
assembled from disparate impressions. Speaking phenomenologically, we create an idea of 
place only out of the deeply corporeal experience of emplacement, of feeling specific aspects 
of the world around us. To claim that places preexist perception is to overlook the central 
contribution of phenomenology, the fact that ontology and epistemology are ultimately 
inseparable from one another.206 From the perspective of embodiment, the manner in which 
places reveal themselves is identical to the metaphysical nature of those things.  
In underscoring the importance of embodiment, then, phenomenology gives us 
critical purchase on the nature of space and place, both as these spheres were theorized in 
the early modern period and as we have come to conceptualize them today. While we might 
think of space as an imperceptible dimension, anticipating and containing specific 
environments or places, these definitions were far less operative in the early modern period. 
Indeed, as I suggested in chapter one, the concept of space as a dimension unto itself, 
existing within the world as well as beyond the firmament, came into being through 
theoretical and philosophical developments in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Prior 
to this, the dominant understanding of the extendedness of the physical world was mediated 
through the idea of place. For Aristotle, the idea that an empty space could exist within the 
world entailed a number of absurdities, not the least of which was the impossibility of having 
                                                
205 Ibid., 24. 
206 Here, I have in mind Martin Heidegger’s explanation of the etymology of “phenomenology” as the letting-
show (logos) of things as they show themselves (as phainomenon), in such a way that the being of things, ontology, 
is identical to this process of showing. As he notes in Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1996), “Ontology is possible only as phenomenology. The phenomenological concept of 
phenomenon, as self-showing, means the being of beings – its meaning, modifications, and derivatives” (31). 
Heidegger aligns ontology, or “the being of beings,” with the phenomenological showing of these beings to a 
subject, such that a phenomenological understanding of space depends upon the means by which one grasps 
the external perceptually and retains the contours of that space in cognition. 
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two bodies exist within one site at a time. Conceiving the expanse of the world as 
plenitudinal, that is, Aristotle assumed that a void would have a material presence and that it 
could not exist without the displacement of another materiality, much as a wooden cube 
placed within water displaces the liquid in equal measure of its volume. “Because the 
interpenetration of material medium and material cube is impossible,” the historian Edward 
Grant states in his reading of this paradox, “so also is it impossible for the dimensions of an 
alleged void space to interpenetrate with the dimensions of a material cube.”207 Where we 
might conceptualize space as an immaterial dimension, able to accommodate the eruptions 
of discrete materialities within it, Aristotle and his intellectual descendants aligned 
dimensionality with materiality, ensuring that place was coterminous with bodies and that 
space, therefore, had no place in the world. 
Although Aristotle’s philosophy of place was not the only means of conceptualizing 
locality in the premodern period, this rejection of the void became a central tenet of late 
medieval epistemology, best represented in the assertion “nature abhors a vacuum.”208 What 
Casey describes as the “fate of place,” that is, the diminution of place’s importance with 
regards to the concept of space, was both extended over the course of the early modern 
period and overdetermined, such that the motor of this epistemic shift cannot be localized in 
one individual, whether that individual be Galileo, Descartes, or Newton.209 Greek atomism, 
                                                
207 Edward Grant, Much Ado About Nothing: Theories of space and vacuum from the Middle Ages to the Scientific Revolution 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 5. 
208 Grant affirms the plurality of this idea at the same time as its ubiquity: “Few dicta are more inextricably 
linked with the Middle Ages than the declaration that ‘nature abhors a vacuum.’ Although the full significance 
of this famous principle would be described and explicated only in the fourteenth century, it had already 
emerged in the thirteenth, when expressions such as natura abhorret vacuum, horror vacui, and fuga vacui began to 
appear” (67). 
209 Casey, The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997). Although 
Casey focuses on these individuals, his work is invested in tracing a larger shift in the transformation of 
thinking about place. Max Jammer, in Concepts of Space: The History of Theories of Space in Physics, third edition (New 
York: Dover Publications, 1993), demonstrates somewhat more forcefully that a number of thinkers 
contributed to the shift in emphasis of space over place.  
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for example, had already offered a counter-narrative of spatial ontology, but the Christian 
aversion to the void proposed in this model, as distinct from comparative plenitude of 
natural philosophy, limited the efficacy of atomism in qualifying Aristotelian precepts. 
According to Grant, only when “Lucretius’ De rerum natura was published in 1473, after 
having been ‘rediscovered’ earlier in the fifteenth century by Gian Francesco Poggio, did 
natural philosophers once again pay serious attention to atoms and the void.”210 At the same 
time that atomism forced early modern philosophy to confront the possibility of a void 
within nature, the rise of Newtonian physics and Cartesian geometry asserted space as the 
very a priori horizon of potentiality that anticipates specific locations.211 
Prior to this conceptualization of space, in other words, environment and 
embodiment were understood to continually inform one another, and by reasserting the 
primacy of place over space, phenomenology sheds light on this relationship, this experience 
of emplacement. Suggesting that we come to an awareness of place as the medium around 
our own corporeality, phenomenology turns embodied location into the foundation for our 
knowledge and experience of larger environments. It intervenes within the critical history of 
space to excavate one of the foundational assumptions of the premodern period, that bodies 
and places were aligned with one another in ways that were as conceptual as they were 
material. As we saw in the Mikrokosmographia, acquiring a sense of the external environment 
is a complex process, and the distribution of this process across a vast cognitive ecology, 
spanning perceptual as well as conceptual faculties, gives us a foundation for theorizing how 
emplacement might have been understood in the early modern period.  
                                                
210 Grant, Much Ado About Nothing, 4. The importance of this discovery, as Grant notes elsewhere, was that 
“Lucretius offered a rigorous defense of the concept of innumerable worlds randomly dispersed throughout 
the endless extent of an infinite void” (183).  
211 See Casey, The Fate of Place and Casey “How to Get from Space to Place,” 20. 
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II. Phenomenology and the Space of Dover Cliff 
If theories of early modern emplacement suggest how embodiment and environment 
came to depend upon one another, it tells us comparatively little about the disruption, or 
temporary suspension, of that relationship, what happens when blindness or madness leads 
to a feeling of profound displacement within the world. For this understanding, we must 
return to Lear. In the approach to Dover cliff, Gloucester and Edgar struggle with one 
another in attempting to describe the feeling of the environment around them, with Edgar’s 
deceitful claims working to create a sense of place when the place itself is curiously absent. 
This contested negotiation between father and son effectively stages the phenomenological 
construction of place, the passage from an inchoate set of feelings about the environment to 
a unified, conceptual idea of what that environment is. But Gloucester’s experience also 
reveals something missing from Crooke’s proto-phenomenology: the fact that early modern 
subjectivity depends upon the very places that it creates. Gloucester’s fate within the play 
bears witness to this facet of early modern culture, as his tenuousness emplacement at Dover 
cliff gives way to a larger, conceptual displacement within the world of Lear, where 
embodied thought no longer furnishes a clear sense of its surroundings. In this regard, 
Gloucester’s uncertainty sheds light not only upon the relationship of embodiment to 
environment in Lear, but also upon Lear’s own oscillation between emplacement and 
disorientation in the scenes surrounding the approach to Dover cliff. 
As has often been noted, Edgar’s efforts to persuade Gloucester of their approach to 
Dover cliff have a metatheatrical quality to them, offering a complex allusion to the way that 
dramatic places were imagined and perceived in the English amphitheater. Jonathan 
Goldberg has neatly excavated the problem of the scene: that playgoers depend upon 
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Edgar’s description as much as Gloucester does, insofar as “Shakespeare’s stage would have 
no way of representing the event [of their arrival at the cliff] save in the language” of 
description; this language, of course, is reserved for Edgar here, because “only Edgar could 
report the evidence of sight.”212 For Goldberg, this problem lends the scene to a 
poststructuralist reading of the (in)ability of signifiers to render the signified. Although his 
arguments are persuasive, by turning from the linguistic implications of the scene to consider 
Dover cliff’s mediation of sensation and space, we find that the visual signifiers that 
Goldberg notes as integral to the scene are not the only means by which the arrival at Dover 
cliff is rendered. The scene, in fact, begins by staging a tension between Gloucester and 
Edgar with regards to their sensory experience: 
Gloucester When shall I come to th’top of that same hill? 
Edgar             You do climb up it now. Look how we labour. 
Gloucester Methinks the ground is even. 
Edgar      Horrible steep. 
              Hark, do you hear the sea? 
Gloucester    No, truly. (4.5.1-4) 
 
Father and son claim to feel the place differently, the divergence rendered here on the level 
of touch and sound. Taking issue with Goldberg’s argument that Edgar’s description is 
persuasive, Stephen Orgel has read this disjunction as gesturing us towards Gloucester’s 
position; for while, as playgoers in the Globe, we apprehend places through linguistic 
description, the bare stage confirms that “the ground is even” and that there is no sea to be 
heard.213 It is only with Edgar’s long description, essentially an ekphrasis of a painting that 
exists only in his imagination, that we, with Gloucester, arrive at the cliff: 
                                                
212 Jonathan Goldberg, “Dover Cliff and the Conditions of Representation: King Lear 4:6 in Perspective,” Poetics 
Today 5, no. 3 (1984): 537-547, esp. 539. 
213 Stephen Orgel, “Shakespeare Imagines a Theater” Poetics Today 5:3 (1984): 549-561, esp. 556. 
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Come on sir, here’s the place. Stand still. How fearful 
And dizzy ‘tis to cast one’s eyes so low! 
The crows and choughs that wing the midway air 
Show scarce so gross as beetles. Halfway down 
Hangs one that gathers samphire, dreadful trade! 
Methinks he seems no bigger than his head. 
The fishermen that walk upon the beach 
Appear like mice, and yon tall anchoring barque 
Diminished to her cock, her cock a buoy 
Almost too small for sight. The murmuring surge 
That on th’unnumbered idle pebble chafes 
Cannot be heard so high. I’ll look no more, 
Lest my brain turn and the deficient sight 
Topple down headlong. (4.5.11-24) 
 
This description, as Philip Armstrong and others have noted, owes much to perspective 
painting and appropriates much of the spatial politics implicit in such images to establish the 
cliff. With Edgar’s efforts to locate Gloucester at a particular point – “here’s the place. Stand 
still” – he places his father at what should function as a position of mastery, on the axis of 
the image’s vanishing point, where the perspective of that vision coheres. But Edgar offers 
his narration as a means of establishing the eye’s hegemony over the other senses and, in 
doing so, his gesture does less to lend Gloucester the agency that should accompany his 
position than to divest him of whatever remnants of certitude he possesses at this moment. 
In the fiction, Edgar’s eyes measure the space, noting the diminishment that marks the 
crows and choughs, as well as the samphire-gatherer, before asserting the very relationship 
between distance and apparent size that characterizes the techne of perspective: “yon tall 
anchoring barque / Diminished to her cock, her cock a buoy / Almost too small for sight.” 
This continual recession, in its reproduction of perspective, ultimately persuades Gloucester 
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to trust Edgar’s sight over his own sensations, and to enter into what appears onstage as 
another cruel manifestation of an absurd theatricality.214  
Significantly, however, the tension between Edgar’s deception and Gloucester’s 
growing credulity, between Goldberg’s affirmation and Orgel’s disbelief, rests on the register 
of perception. Within the drama, as well as within the playhouse, feeling has a constitutive 
power, making it impossible to separate the conception of the environment from the sensory 
means by which that conception is created. Indeed, the dramatic tension of the scene derives 
from this indissolubility. Gloucester’s feel of the ground and his experience of silence rather 
than the sea confirm our sight of the bare stage; and yet Edgar’s claim to vision and 
Gloucester’s aural assent to his description render the space of the cliff real, however 
temporarily. These fissures with regards to the place of the early modern stage, in other 
words, turn on the question of perception: do we “see” the cliff, or the stage itself? 
Obviously, uneasily, the answer is both. We reside within the paradox of “see[ing] it 
feelingly,” and our position within the synesthetic assemblage that constitutes 
phenomenology largely determines our sense of where we are. 
In this creation of the space of the cliff, Edgar’s ekphrastic description acquires its 
efficacy in part because it divests the blinded Gloucester of all other means by which he 
could discern his location. In echolocation, for example, sound provides a means of 
measuring distance. This method of navigating space through acoustic information offers an 
important alternative to modes of movement that require vision. As A. Roger Ekirch has 
                                                
214 Like Goldberg, Armstrong reads Edgar’s description in terms of perspective painting, adding that, in 
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suggested, echolocation was one of many inventive sensory-practices that helped individuals 
in preindustrial Europe find their way in the night, when the lack of a torch or a candle 
would deprive their environment of any visual signification.215 Gloucester, condemned to a 
world “All dark and comfortless,” might benefit from this acoustic approach to the world, 
and indeed his objection, that the sea in its putative proximity makes no sound, seems to rely 
on such an attention to the ambient environment (3.7.99). But when Edgar notes that “The 
murmuring surge / That on th’unnumbered idle pebble chafes / Cannot be heard so high,” 
he deprives Gloucester of the sensory foundation of such an objection. His effort to render 
Gloucester immobile with the imperative “Stand still,” moreover, contravenes the motility 
with which the father once recognized that the ground was even. Having informed his father 
that “your other senses grow imperfect / By your eyes’ anguish,” Edgar proceeds to enact 
this disabling assertion by depriving Gloucester of what senses he has left. Edgar’s 
persuasion of space, as it were, succeeds in part because visual discernment comes to 
dominate echolocation and proprioception as modes of knowing the environment. 
Gloucester’s blindness complicates the oscillation between space and place in Lear, 
underscoring how the scene at Dover cliff invokes competing notions of subjectivity and 
location to structure its dramatic work. There, Gloucester perceives space more readily than 
Edgar does, precisely because he perceives place imperfectly. As Turner puts it, “even as 
Gloucester’s blindness makes it impossible for him to perceive the specific location of the 
‘cliff’ …, this same blindness is precisely what will allow him to perceive ‘space’ while Edgar 
                                                
215 A. Roger Ekirch, At Day’s Close: Night in Times Past (New York: Norton, 2006). As an example of 
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cannot.”216 Rather poetically, Edgar knows that the place he describes is, in fact, no place. At 
the same time, he fails to grasp the limit of this fiction, the fact that a vast and terrifying 
openness threatens to overwhelm the place that his words have conjured. By contrast, 
precisely because he remains unaware of the precise contours of his location, Gloucester 
feels the space of the play as a kind of empty dimensionality.  
Thus, if phenomenology lends itself to the historiographic project of recovering the 
interlacement of embodiment and emplacement in the early modern period, then 
Gloucester’s place in this project of recovery remains highly paradoxical. Before his 
approach to Dover cliff, Gloucester claims that blindness diminishes his sense of the world, 
functioning as a kind of dislocation that Gloucester despairingly embraces moments before 
asking Edgar to lead him to his suicide: “I have no way, and therefore want no eyes” (4.1.18). 
Gloucester figures himself as displaced, moving through a sphere in which ideas of specific 
location are no longer operative. In other words, by interpreting his blindness as a weakening 
of embodiment as well as a diminishment of place, Gloucester finds himself condemned to 
recognize the void of space, even in advance of the approach to Dover cliff. 
What Edgar presents as a kind of spatial catharsis in his aside to the playgoers – 
“Why I do trifle thus with his despair / Is done to cure it” (4.5.33-34) – ultimately 
exacerbates his father’s loss of embodiment and emplacement, and this act of going through 
the fantasy of suicide, far from purging his father of despair, allows Gloucester’s sense of a 
void to become more expansive in its ontology. Through the violence inflicted upon the 
microcosm of his body, first at the hands of Cornwall and Regan and then through Edgar’s 
ekphrasis, Gloucester comes to doubt his orientation within the entire cosmos, no longer 
knowing which way to turn. When Edgar attempts to lead his father offstage after the defeat 
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of Lear’s army and is met with Gloucester’s refusal – “No further, sir; a man may rot even 
here” (5.2.8) – he responds by managing his father’s spatial and cognitive orientation 
concomitantly: “What, in ill thoughts again? Men must endure / Their going hence even as 
their coming hither. / Ripeness is all. Come on” (5.2.9-11). Edgar locates his father not 
where he originally left him, in the “shadow of this tree,” but “in” a melancholic mindset of 
“ill thoughts.” Privileging Gloucester’s mindset rather than his physical location, Edgar 
proffers what will become the Cartesian line well in advance of Descartes’ own writings: 
thought is its own “space,” with no real place in the world.217 But while Edger urges 
movement through the world, he also advises a Stoic passivity with regards to these 
peripatetic thoughts: one “must endure” their movement, traveling in body with the 
retreating army while remaining motionless in thought. At the moment of Edgar’s 
negotiation of this tension, Gloucester’s isolation as a thinking subject does not restore him 
to a position of (proto-Cartesian) certitude; rather, it signifies his ultimate disorientation 
within the world, a displacement that he implies in assenting to Edgar with “And that’s true 
too” (5.2.11). This claim does less to affirm one orientation among many possible directions 
than to accept an impossible, and ultimately directionless, plurality. Disembodied, and 
therefore displaced, cognition forces Gloucester into a void, and although nature abhors a 
vacuum, to quote the medieval dictum, Gloucester’s plight suggests the means by which 
such a void might be introduced into the world and assigned a tragic ontology. His fate, 
ultimately, is the fate of the play itself, in which the “nothing” that haunts the speeches of 
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Lear, Cordelia, the Fool, and other characters overwhelms Lear to place its dramatic action in 
an imperceptible space.   
In contrast to this horror, however, stands Gloucester’s initial recognition of 
synesthetic thought. To see the world feelingly, I have suggested, is to acknowledge that 
space is not an a priori sphere but an emergent entity, that it cannot be grasped by one sense 
but rather depends upon the assemblage of disparate perceptions. What Henri Lefebvre 
would term the “production of space,” King Lear presents as more of a performative 
constitution of place; it is an oscillation that occurs between the multiple, often overlapping 
faculties of perception and cognition, the interpenetrations of which ultimately establish the 
place, as well as our sense of it.218 The scene at Dover cliff stages precisely this 
performativity, and although its implications for the playhouse have long been established, 
its relationship to Gloucester’s spatial apprehension suggests that the production is not 
simply the plight of a blind father in the service of a fallen monarch; rather, in Gloucester’s 
imperfect placement between early modern phenomenology and Cartesian dualism, the 
scene reveals that to see feelingly locates us firmly in the gradual unfolding of place as 
experience. 
 
III. Cognition in the Wild: Lear’s Emplacement in the Storm 
Like Gloucester in his approach to Dover cliff, Lear struggles to locate himself after 
being thrust out of doors. The two figures are dim ciphers of one another, and among the 
multiple resonances that critics have noted between these patriarchs, it is significant to note 
that they follow the same spatial trajectory within the play: being thrust out of Gloucester’s 
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castle, both Lear and Gloucester undergo a disabling experience of disorientation, finding 
themselves utterly lost in their approach to Dover cliff. While their experiences differ from 
one another in significant ways – Gloucester must entreat Edgar to guide him to the cliff, 
but Lear moves in that direction barely aware that others desire him to do so – they 
nevertheless converge upon emplacement and its ultimate dissolution. In the strange 
perceptual environment of the storm, Lear becomes partially displaced. It is not simply that 
his grief and self-pity distract him from the shape of the world around him, but also that his 
exposure to the elements paradoxically renders him insensitive to their significance. As the 
duration of his exposure increases, Lear becomes numb to the cold and the rain, and his 
inability to apprehend these signifiers renders his temporarily displaced. Thus, whereas 
Gloucester evinces a partial disruption of the progression that Crooke describes, with his 
blindness qualifying the body’s sensory access to the contours of space, Lear’s madness 
represents a profound undoing of those very mechanisms. The king’s cognitive dysfunction 
thereby signifies a further extension of the play’s investment in questions of epistemology, 
embodiment, and location. 
By attending to Lear’s sense of emplacement, we might also gain a more nuanced 
understanding of where the storm might be said to occur. Somewhat ironically, the storm’s 
ability to dissolve all points of orientation has implications not only Lear and his followers, 
but also for those editors and critics who have attempted to place the scene upon “A Heath.” 
As F. T. Flahiff has shown, this scenic designation appears neither within the Quartos nor 
the Folio, but rather owes its origin to Nahum Tate, whose 1681 production of Lear claims 
“A Desert Heath” as the site of the storm.219 When Nicholas Rowe printed his 1709 collection 
of Shakespeare’s dramatic corpus, which Flahiff notes was “the first edition of Shakespeare’s 
                                                
219 F.T. Flahiff, “Lear’s Map” Cahiers elisabethains 30 (Octobre 1986): 17-33, esp. 22. 
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plays after the Folio edition,” he adopted Tate’s suggestion of “A Heath” as the storm’s place 
and thereby ensured the profound influence of this effort to combat the play’s resistance to 
cognitive mapping.220 These editorial decisions have the effect of extending the storm’s 
platial specificity; that is, they localize the scene more forcefully than the play’s own 
suggestion that the scenes occur near Gloucester’s castle, which is evidenced by Gloucester’s 
own ability to traverse the distance between his home and the encampment at the hovel (and 
by Kent’s claims that he will do the same).  
But this editorial amendment obscures the play’s more forceful investment in 
questions of space and location, as Turner has argued. In his efforts to remove the Heath 
from our conceptualization of Lear, Turner invokes the history of concepts of space to assert 
that “the ‘nothing’ of the storm could be said to perform the quasi-scientific space of the 
‘vacuum’ or ‘void’.”221 Turner’s gesture to the conceptual history of place and spatiality 
rightfully suggests that Lear stages a series of tensions within the early modern period’s effort 
to reimagine the ontology of the environment. Turner finds that the storm, and its 
invocation of theatrical space, performs “a moment of transition in spatial thinking that we 
can also see operating at the most rarified levels of Renaissance academic argument, between 
a neo-Aristotelian scholastic philosophy that could conceive only of container or ‘place’ and 
the emergence of a distinct notion of ‘space’ understood as a homogenous, extended 
medium that precedes and receives all bodies and their movements.”222 By contrast, I find 
history, and the play itself, to be more resistant, more readily characterized by eruptions of 
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alternative spatialities, and thus more accommodating to a genealogy of the loss of place 
than a clear “transition” would imply. Environment and embodiment continue to inform 
one another in the early modern period, making emplacement, rather than space as such, a 
more operative category for thinking about how location is understood and experienced. In 
the storm, Lear’s ability to suffer the chill and Kent’s profound attentiveness to the acoustics 
of the landscape belie their ejection into a vacuum; indeed, they remain deeply attentive to an 
environment that continually eludes their efforts to grasp it. One might say that the tragedy 
of Lear’s confusion in the storm is not that he finds himself within the vacuum, where there 
is no place to be felt, but rather that his growing insensitivity to the world around him makes 
him unable to know and to feel that place for what it is. 
 For Lear, the feeling of being outdoors comes principally through a sense of 
coldness. “How dost, my boy?” Lear asks the Fool, “Art cold? / I am cold myself” (3.2.67-
68). Before Lear’s madness takes hold, he remains sensitive both to the elements around him 
and to their effect upon other bodies. Indeed, Lear’s inquiry represents a rare moment of 
concern for the experience of others and seems designed to ward off his sense of isolation 
and psychic fragility. Turning inward, he declares that “My wits begin to turn,” as though 
sensing that his grief and his exposure are leading him towards cognitive dysfunction. Lear’s 
sudden transition from a dim apprehension of his coming madness – “My wits begin to turn” 
– to his meditation on the feeling of exposure – “How dost, my boy? Art cold? / I am cold 
myself” – implies an almost causal relationship, where the body’s sensitivity to cold renders 
the mind susceptible to cognitive malfunctioning. In The Anatomy of Melancholy, Robert 
Burton acknowledges precisely this susceptibility in including climatological threats among 
“the instrumentall causes of these our infirmities;” in particular, he cites the “Aire with his 
Meteors, Thunder and Lightning, intemperate heat and cold, mighty windes, tempests, 
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unseasonable weather” as elements responsible for the body’s suffering and the mind’s 
distraction in melancholy.223 According to Lemnius, one reason for this sympathy lies in the 
fact that the body is consubstantial with the cosmos, both being composed of the same 
elements; thus, “euen as heat being diffused into ech part of ye body imparteth his quality 
vnto ye humours & maketh ye body, & ye parts therof to be of colour ruddie: so cold 
imperteth his quality vnto ye members & humours, & maketh ye body of colour plate and 
vnsightly.”224 Lear’s transition acknowledges this relationship, however unconsciously. The 
context of his comments suggests that a heightened sensitivity to exposure – a profound 
feeling of one’s place – allows for a strangely disorientating incorporation of environment 
into embodiment. The paradox is that this sensitivity to temperature reminds Lear and the 
Fool of their exposure, of their emplacement out of doors, even as it threatens to render 
them insensitive to that very knowledge.  
 In his experience of the elements, the figure of Poor Tom shows precisely how the 
force of the external world can imprint itself destructively upon the self. Although Edgar’s 
performance of madness remains instrumental to a larger purpose, and suggests more about 
the early modern discursive construction of mental illness than about its etiology, his 
enactment of cognitive failure is significant precisely because it represents an imaginative 
figuration of insanity. His refrain of “Poor Tom’s a-cold,” repeated in some form or another 
throughout the scene, reasserts that place, experienced through the tactile medium of cold, 
can define the mind’s constitution. Indeed, the Fool reads Poor Tom’s madness as the effect 
of exposure, remarking, “This cold night will turn us all to fools and madmen” (3.4.72). 
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Edgar’s disguise thereby stages a link between corporeal suffering and cognitive dysfunction, 
one that would have been legible to early modern playgoers given its status as a 
commonplace in humoral theory. In repeatedly signifying cold as an effect of exposure, 
moreover, this link makes place a crucial factor in the mind’s preservation. 
 Gradually, Lear’s exposure to the elements renders him insensitive to the contours of 
the world around him. Like Gloucester, he becomes partially displaced, unable to locate 
himself within an increasing illegible environment. And the tragedy of this disorientation is 
the ease with which it compounds itself: as Lear and Poor Tom suggest, a heighted 
sensitivity to place can lead to madness, but that madness effects a more profound 
dislocation, as it shatters the very mechanisms by which a location comes to be known. The 
next time he appears onstage, Lear alludes to this insensitivity in asserting a sensory 
indifference to the storm. When Kent entreats him to enter the hovel, Lear resists, stating: 
Thou think’st ‘tis much that this contentious storm 
Invades us to the skin. So ‘tis to thee; 
But where the greater malady is fixed, 
The lesser is scarce felt. (3.4.6-9) 
 
Figuring embodiment as a tremulous enclosure, one that must protect an inwardness from 
the storm’s invasion, Lear claims to remain impermeable with regards to the external 
world.225 The reason for this seeming strength lies not in Lear’s ability to withstand suffering, 
but rather in his prior subjection to it; finding a “greater malady” within himself, what he 
glosses later as an apprehension of “filial ingratitude,” Lear’s soul becomes concentrated 
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upon this affect, and in lessening its distribution throughout the body, the anima leaves the 
flesh unfeeling. He explains: 
When the mind’s free, 
The body’s delicate. This tempest in my mind 
Doth from my senses take all feeling else 
Save what beats there: filial ingratitude. (3.4.11-14) 
 
For Lear, the soul extends into particular places within the body, directed there almost 
volitionally as the mind directs its attention to disparate sites of feeling. Given the soul’s 
bipartite function in enabling thought and sustaining sensation, Lear proposes a cognitive 
economy, an exchange between two points of the soul’s cathexis: the mind and the body. In 
fact, his comments describe the recalibration of an innersubjective ecology. The physicality 
of Lear’s sense of “filial ingratitude,” its introjection into his body, makes the affect acquire 
the characteristics of a heart, the thing that “beats there” and sustains a cognitive fixation, in 
what Lear actively figures as his “mind.” The affect that prompts this localization of the 
mind deep within the body pulls the soul’s faculties away from the extremities and renders 
the feeling flesh insensible to its surroundings: “senses,” or the organs themselves, lack the 
sensation that the soul should provide. In other words, as grief pulls the focus of Lear’s soul 
from his flesh toward his thoughts, his insentient body leaves the former monarch exposed 
and unaware of his place within the world. This displacement is less metaphorical than one 
might imagine; for although Lear’s “place” as monarch and as patriarch enables a certain 
fantasy of omnipotence that is irrevocably shattered in the storm, it is also his experience of 
emplacement through embodiment that suffers. Lear’s complementary displacements – his 
disorientation within geographic space, the placelessness of thought within his body – prove 
to be a final prompt to madness.  
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At the same time, these displacements give some stability to Lear’s madness and 
guarantee its continuation until the fallen monarch is reunited with Cordelia. Although 
exposure and grief make Lear insensitive to his emplacement, he retains a conceptual grasp 
of the importance of location; that is, Lear retains a purely cognitive understanding of place 
at the moment that his senses begin to fail him. Addressing the “Poor naked wretches, 
wheresoe’er you are, / That bide the pelting of this pitiless storm,” Lear looks to these 
individuals in a moment of failed identification, seeking to comprehend their tolerance of the 
inclement elements by asking “How shall your houseless heads and unfed sides, / Your 
looped and windowed raggedness, defend you / From seasons such as these?” (3.4.28-32). 
Recognizing the crucial difference between his temporary exposure to the elements and their 
more or less ceaseless placement out of doors, Lear undertakes to treat himself with 
exposure and so entreat his body to greater insensitivity: “Take physic, pomp, / Expose 
thyself to feel what wretches feel, / That thou mayest shake the superflux to them / And 
show the heavens more just” (3.4.33-36). This desire for greater insensitivity and its efficacy 
in leading Lear to praise the exposed Edgar only deepen Lear’s madness, however. Looking 
upon Edgar, Lear celebrates the bedlam beggar for his ability to withstand exposure: “Thou 
wert better in a grave than to answer with thy uncovered body this extremity of skies,” Lear 
begins, before determining that Edgar’s virtue lies in his exposure and attempting to mimic 
him: “Unaccommodated man is no more but such a poor, bare, forked animal as thou art. 
Off, off, you lendings! Come, unbutton here” (3.4.91-92, 95-98).  
 I have argued that the attenuation of a sense of place is both the beginning of Lear’s 
madness and the final thrust of grief. His distraction lies not simply on the level of affect, 
although the play often suggests excessive sorrow as the reason for Lear’s psychic 
fragmentation (when the disguised Kent informs Gloucester that Lear’s “wits begin 
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t’unsettle,” Gloucester justifies this turn by reasserting the reason for Lear’s affective state: 
“Canst thou blame him? / His daughters seek his death” [3.4.144-46]). Nor can Lear’s 
madness be imagined as a purely geohumoral disposition, a melancholia induced by exposure 
to the cold. Rather, embodiment and affective experience become elements within a larger 
system, in which a sensing and suffering corporeality becomes one element of a cognitive 
ecology required to establish a sense of place. The disruption of this ecology severs a sense 
of emplacement from the experience of embodiment and thereby ensures Lear’s profound 
displacement within the play. Although the play represents the role of grief and self-pity in 
fracturing Lear’s psyche, it also stages his displacement through madness. In doing so, these 
scenes underscore the intimate relationship of emplacement to embodiment in the early 
modern period. 
 That cognitive dysfunction effects a kind of displacement, and that this inability to 
perceive the contours of one’s location, in turn, sustains a sense of delirium, are crucial 
points for understanding the formation and maintenance of early modern subjectivity. 
Perhaps there is no more telling a testament to this relationship than in Michel de 
Montaigne’s letter to his father on the death of Estienne de la Boétie. One of the principal 
sites of inquiry in “De l’Amitié,” the friendship between la Boétie and Montaigne was of 
such intensity that Montaigne himself endeavors to explain its charge through the famous 
and cryptic utterance: “Because it was he, because it was I.”226 Recounting la Boétie’s final 
moments in the letter, however, Montaigne writes movingly of his friend’s ardent desire for 
assurance that he remained emplaced: 
Then, among other things, he began to entreat me again and 
again with extreme affection to give him a place; so that I was 
afraid that his judgment was shaken. Even when I had 
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remonstrated with him very gently that he was letting the 
illness carry him away and that these were not the words of a 
man in his sound mind, he did not give in at first and 
repeated even more strongly: ‘My brother, my brother, do you 
refuse me a place?’ This until he forced me to convince him 
by reason and tell him that since he was breathing and 
speaking and had a body, consequently he had his place.227 
 
This dialogue, the last that Montaigne records in his letter, is surprisingly philosophical for 
being the final exchange between two intimates, particularly friends whose souls, as 
Montaigne writes in “De L’Amitié,” “mingle and blend with each other so completely that 
they efface the seam that joined them, and cannot find it again.”228 But even acknowledging 
Montaigne’s reticence to such philosophy, specifically his implication that la Boétie’s 
infirmity was responsible for the tone (“he forced me to convince him by reason”), the scene 
demonstrates with great pathos the constitutive role of place in early modern personhood. 
La Boétie’s final thoughts concern a space of belonging, and his repeated demand for such a 
location implies the degree to which he has lost sense of his embodied place within the 
world. For Montaigne, these thoughts repeatedly signify a kind of cognitive dysfunction; la 
Boétie’s “judgment was shaken,” “he was letting the illness carry him away,” and his claims 
reveal that he is not “in his sound mind.” But Montaigne’s syllogistic proof of la Boétie’s 
emplacement within his body, even as it aims to restore cognitive probity to a dying man, 
ultimately misses the point of la Boétie’s terror. “‘True, true,’” la Boétie remarks in response 
to Montaigne’s argument, “‘I have one [that is, a place], but it is not the one I need; and then 
when all is said, I have no being left.’ ‘God will give you a better one very soon,’ said I. 
‘Would that I were there already,’ he replied. ‘For three days now I have been straining to 
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leave.’”229 Montaigne’s proof lies upon what I have argued is a foundational relationship in 
the early modern period, the emergence of place from an experience of embodiment. But la 
Boétie seeks to transition from that sense of embodied location to an experience of dwelling, 
a kind of early modern Dasein, which Montaigne himself seems unable to recognize. This 
tension between the two conceptualizations of place is nicely captured in the original text of 
Montaigne’s letter, where la Boétie repeatedly speaks of “vne place,” in contrast to 
Montaigne’s claim that his friend’s body is proof of “son lieu.”230 Although both terms 
designate a “part of space,” the former more readily implies a site “where one finds oneself,” 
and so easily slides into metaphors of location, in the sense of a “place of honor” or “being 
in one’s place.”231 For la Boétie, Montaigne’s figuration of emplacement through 
embodiment is accurate if inadequate, and he concludes their discourse by imagining a 
deeper sense of localization, marked by the social, spiritual, and affective experiences of 
belonging more so than questions of sensation and cognition.  
 Because la Boétie aligns this sense of belonging with death, Montaigne’s letter cannot 
follow its protagonist to discover the contours of some new and disembodied location, the 
“undiscovered country” of Hamlet’s musings, and so it concludes at the moment of la 
Boétie’s passing (3.1.81). After Lear’s consumption in grief and madness, however, Kent and 
Cordelia play Montaigne to his la Boétie and manage to persuade the fallen king of his 
emplacement, first within his body and then within the world by translating an ambient 
environment into a geography of discrete locations. Or rather, if Kent and Cordelia’s efforts 
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are as limited in their efficacy as Montaigne’s, they at least bear witness to Lear’s gradual 
recovery of his sense of location. Cordelia’s first entreaties of her father – “How does my 
royal lord? How fares your majesty?” – find Lear still unable to apprehend his place within 
the world (4.6.37). Like la Boétie, Lear finds himself hovering in the liminality between this 
world and the next, claiming that “You do wrong to take me out o’the grave,” and furthering 
this misprision in asking Cordelia: “You are a spirit, I know. Where did you die?” (4.6.38, 42). 
But Lear’s apparent certainty of his position gives way to confusion: “Where have I been? 
Where am I?” (4.6.45). Questions of location obsess Lear at this point, with this repetition of 
“Where.” As the recognition of his displacement begins to wash over him, questions of 
embodiment follow hard and fast upon this sense of dislocation: “I know now what to say. / 
I will not swear these are my hands,” Lear claims, before he attempts to quell doubt with 
experiential proof: “Let’s see: / I feel this pin prick” (4.6.47-49). I pause here at the 
semantics of Lear’s confusion, at the specific utterances he offers in the midst of his 
uncertainty, because these claims imply the substance of Lear’s struggle at this moment: 
coming to terms with his embodiment, recognizing his soul’s place within the body rather 
than its distribution into the ether at the moment of death, is a prerequisite to Lear’s 
understanding that he remains within his former kingdom and so to the dissipation of his 
distraction in grief. Indeed, in making the tremulous confession that “I fear I am not in my 
perfect mind,” Lear uses objects of platial importance as evidence for his continued 
infirmity:  
Methinks I should know you, and know this man; 
Yet I am doubtful for I am mainly ignorant 
What place this is; and all the skill I have 
Remembers not these garments; nor I know not 
Where I did lodge last night. (4.6.56-61. Emphasis added) 
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Neither endowed with the memory of his previous location nor fully able to apprehend his 
current emplacement, Lear claims these limitations as a sign of cognitive dysfunction. Even 
in the slow process of recovery, Lear distrusts his sense of place, and his doubt underscores 
his profound reliance upon the spatial awareness of others. His first question after 
recognizing Cordelia concerns his location – “Am I in France?” – but when Kent attempts 
to emplace Lear by supplementing his feeling of emplacement with an understanding of his 
current location, explaining that Lear is “In your own kingdom, sir,” Lear retains a kind of 
fearful skepticism towards this answer. He cries, “Do not abuse me,” emphasizing that in his 
imperfect cognitive state, he could be told anything, conceptually emplaced anywhere, and 
that his sense of location is firmly dependent upon Kent and Cordelia, just as Gloucester’s 
awareness was once grounded upon Edgar (4.6.69-71). 
 Lear’s displacement and gradual recovery underscore the role of embodied cognition 
in establishing the contours of a location. The perceptual elements that readily offer 
themselves up to a receiving body must be organized within the mind for a sense of the 
ambient environment to take hold. But these elements, too, must be linked with other, more 
conceptual signifiers of location in order to “place” that location in a wider sphere, as 
geographic coordinates or cardinal directions allow us to recognize this feeling as that space. 
For these reasons, Lear’s placement in the storm partially aligns with what Turner calls the 
“quasi-scientific space of the ‘vacuum’ or ‘void’,” to the degree that Lear’s inability to 
perceive the contours of place locates him in the interstices between different elements of 
matter.232 But Lear and his followers experience the spatiality of the storm, not as “nothing” 
but as a weakening or attenuation of embodied location. And the sense that this attenuation 
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unfolds as a fragmentation, as a repeated shattering of the self into smaller and smaller pieces, 
evinces the tragic dimension of the company’s displacement in the storm. 
Moreover, to claim that “Lear ends up in this space because he has suddenly become 
aware of it,” as Mary Thomas Crane asserts in an otherwise persuasive argument, is to 
mistake the nature of Lear’s displacement. Her claim makes the void an a priori dimension 
that anticipates our knowledge of it and thereby presumes that Lucretian physics was more 
successful in replacing a conceptualization of emplacement through embodiment than the 
experiences of Lear and la Boétie suggest.233 The terms of Lear’s madness and recovery 
suggests the opposite, in fact. Far from discovering the spatial dimension that subtends all 
perceptual experience of place, Lear becomes mad because he loses the capacity to know his 
location. 
For Gloucester and for Lear, achieving a sense of location depends upon the 
successful manipulation of a vast cognitive system. Their thoughts are distributed both 
through their bodies and across certain elements of the external world, including Edgar’s 
deceptive language, the cold and sound of the storm, and Cordelia’s repeated efforts to 
answer her father’s question of “Where?” The play thereby suggests how cognitive ecologies 
might be felt and understood experientially. Without sacrificing what Tribble and Sutton 
rightly view as one of the strengths of cognitive ecology – the explanatory power it brings to 
systems that exceed the individual – I want to emphasize that this model changes our view 
of individuals and environments in equal measure. Instead of imagining an “isolated, 
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unsullied individual,” whose “mind is then projected outward into the ecological system,” 
this approach forces us to recognize that cognition has an ecological foundation “from the 
start.”234 Thus, in Lear, we see how place functions as the scaffolding for thinking, 
remembering, and desiring. But the play also suggests that this act of thinking through the 
environment can actually establish, alter, or otherwise reconstitute that very entity. Neither 
upon a heath nor within a quasi-scientific void, Lear and his retinue find themselves in an 
ambient and peculiarly labile place, an effect of the fact that embodied thought largely 
determines our sense of where we are. 
Indeed, Lear’s refutation of a common space in which he and Kent suffer the storm 
together underscores the contested status of location in the play. The slow formation of an 
environment, by the very fact of its temporal drag, gives space and time for a struggle over 
the precise meaning of that place, and Lear’s experience suggests how readily this complex 
negotiation may occur within an individual’s conceptual and perceptual sense of being-in-
the-world. Thus, although cognitive ecology most often denotes a complex system exceeding 
and anticipating the individual, it is useful to imagine Lear’s distribution across faculties of 
cognition and perception as a manifestation “of the rich interconnectivity of brain, body and 
world” that Edwin Hutchins describes in his pioneering work on cognitive ecology.235 For 
Lear, as well as for Gloucester, this interconnectivity between environment and embodiment 
makes place a constitutive element of personhood, at the same time that it allows places to 
be created and reshaped through embodied thought. Lear thereby foregrounds what might 
be called the affective significance of place within early modern culture. In Lear’s madness, 
as well as in Gloucester’s blindness, the play meditates upon the profound fragility of 
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emplacement, the ease with which the perceptual and conceptual mechanisms for locating 
oneself might be disrupted. The result is a chaotic and cruel separation of space and 
subjectivity, where deracination leads to madness, despair, and ultimately death. 
 
IV. The Performativity of Space 
Reading King Lear through the framework of historical phenomenology and cognitive 
ecology foregrounds the play’s interest in emplacement and in the tragic consequences of its 
dissolution. But this approach might also shed light on our understanding of the places of 
early modern performance. As I previously suggested, Lear remains deeply metatheatrical in 
its consideration of the relationship between perception and place, and a critical approach 
that underscores this relationship should also encourage us to recall the importance of place 
on the early modern stage, a fact that otherwise historically attentive critics have sometimes 
overlooked. In Elizabethan Stage Conventions and Modern Interpreters, for example, Alan Dessen 
implies that an investment in the place of dramatic fiction represents a highly modern 
concern, the result of editorial decisions, like that of Nicholas Rowe to localize Lear’s 
encounter with the storm on “A Heath.” In Dessen’s words, “modern readers have thereby 
been conditioned to expect placement of a given scene (‘where’ does it occur?), regardless of 
the fluidity or placelessness of the original context or the potential distortion in the question 
‘where?’”236 Dessen’s critique extends and explicitly cites the work of Gerald Eades Bentley 
in his influential Shakespeare and His Theatre, where he asserts that “productions at the Globe 
were basically placeless, and Shakespeare composed all his plays with far less attention to the 
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place of the action than modern readers assume.”237 In evaluating the technologies of the 
early modern stage, then, Dessen and Bentley trace the opposite trajectory that Edward 
Casey notes in his study of philosophical treatments of space and place. Casey asserts that 
“place” came to be subordinated to “space” over the course of the early modern period, 
suggesting a historical tension between the two concepts that I have tried to foreground with 
the idea of emplacement.238 In contrast, Dessen and Bentley find in the decades following 
the early modern period an anachronistic fixation on locale, where Shakespeare’s editors 
placed greater emphasis on theatrical setting than Shakespeare himself ever did.239 
This tension between theory and praxis, between philosophical speculation and 
theatrical work, invites us to reconsider the Globe’s role in mediating between these 
different approaches to the environment. The opposition that Bentley notes – that 
Shakespeare “wrote a drama of persons, not a drama of places” – overlooks the degree to 
which persons and places were coterminous or consubstantial with one another in the early 
modern period.240 In Lear, this intersection is not simply a question of Edgar and Gloucester 
in a recently divided country, nor that of a fallen monarch contending with the elements; it 
also functions as a metatheatrical event, a consideration of the relationship between 
playgoers and their place in the Globe. Far from being uninterested in questions of locale, 
Shakespeare’s use of a proto-phenomenological approach to place in Lear suggests not only 
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that the stage was invested in spatial reconstitution, but that it strove with equal vehemence 
to perform this constitution through its playgoers. 
Indeed, if emplacement furthers our understanding of the relationship between 
environment and embodiment in Lear, then it also has the potential to illuminate the 
generation or representation of places within the playhouse. In a seminal work of spatial 
theory, Henri Lefebvre argues that what he calls “the production of space” depends upon 
the ability of subjects to apprehend and to signify particular places. Through a triad of the 
perceived, the conceived, and the lived, the physicality of a place becomes aligned with the 
praxis that makes a site meaningful: there is, in other words, “a close association, within 
perceived space, between daily reality (daily routine) and urban reality (the routes and 
networks which link up the places set aside for work, ‘private’ life and leisure).”241 The 
organization of space as the “urban reality” of a built environment constitutes and is 
reconstituted by the “daily reality” that is the practice of everyday life. Rather than a frame 
that contains quotidian experience, then, space emerges through an oscillation between the 
perceived physicality of a place and the practice of that physicality, of which perception and 
cognition are a part.  
Although Lefebvre’s interest lies with a Marxist understanding of practice as labor, 
his claim to an intersection of perception and praxis neatly parallels the production of space 
within theater, as Lefebvre himself briefly suggests. If “theatrical space” is marked by an 
“interplay between fictitious and real counterparts,” then “such theatrical interplay” means 
that “bodies are able to pass from a ‘real’, immediately experienced space (the pit, the stage) 
to a perceived space – a third space which is no longer either scenic or public.”242 The third 
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space of theater announces itself as the liminality between what playgoers perceive in the 
playhouse and the scene they imagine as an effect of the performance. Insofar as this 
imaginative work is a kind of practice, theatrical space emerges through the same 
intersection of the perceived, the conceived, and the lived that, for Lefebvre, produces social 
space; performance solicits a particular spatial practice from the playgoers, one of translating 
the perceived space of the playhouse into the conceived locus of the drama. In this way, the 
phenomenology of theatrical space parallels the production of space, suggesting that places 
within and beyond the early modern playhouse come into being through the same 
invocation of perception and cognition.  
While Lear foregrounds the role of experience in shaping the environment, it invokes 
this intimacy between place and personhood precisely in order to stage its dissolution. 
Throughout the play, disorientation within physical and social space is both tragic and the 
foundation for subsequent loss. In this manner, Lear extends its meditation on embodied 
thought in order to show the obverse of place’s dependence upon psychic production, 
namely the role of the environment in establishing and grounding subjectivity. As Martin 
Heidegger argues in Being and Time, fragmentation can actually bring the constitutive 
properties of a thing into focus, by defamiliarizing a particular object and forcing us to 
consider what makes it functional.243 So too does Lear’s dramatic insistence upon 
displacement allow it to affirm the psychic work, the perceptual and conceptual assemblage, 
that defines space as a phenomenological dimension. The claim that space is ultimately 
                                                
243 Heidegger makes this claim as part of a larger discussion of the phenomenological formation of things, of 
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into a materiality full of potential, ready to become a hammer again (if fixed) or to remain a handiness that we 
might use for something else. 
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phenomenological means both that places come into being through the body and that we, in 
our embodiment, rely upon this sense of emplacement. Lear transforms the precariousness 
of this experience into a kind of ecological thought, a haunting meditation on the 





Bartholomew Fair and the Performativity of Space 
Ben Jonson’s Bartholomew Fair begins with a debate about spatial representation. 
Given its title, the play will ostensibly stage the fair of St. Bartholomew, held annually in 
Smithfield. But “When’t comes to the fair once,” the Stage-keeper bemoans, “you were e’en 
as good go to Virginia for anything there is of Smithfield.”244 Jonson, it seems, has failed to 
capture the flavor of the festival: “He has not hit the humors; he does not know ‘em. He has 
not conversed with the Barthol’mew birds, as they say” (Induction. 12-13). In sharp contrast, 
the Scrivener argues for a certain similitude between Smithfield and the Hope Theater, 
claiming that “though the fair be not kept in the same region that some here perhaps would 
have it, yet think that therein the author hath observed a special decorum, the place being as 
dirty as Smithfield and as stinking every whit” (Induction.154-158). Between the Stage-
keeper and the Scrivener, then, the Induction articulates two forms of spatial representation, 
the one dependent upon the persons who populate a place, the jugglers and little Davies that 
one might expect to find at the fair, and the other tied to phenomenological experience. For 
the Scrivener, the feeling of a place aligns the Hope Theater with Smithfield more palpably 
than geographic region, and it is this feeling, I will argue, that Jonson’s play continually 
invokes in its efforts to stage Bartholomew Fair. 
                                                
244 Ben Jonson, Bartholomew Fair, in English Renaissance Drama, ed. David Bevington, Lars Engle, Katharine 
Eisaman Maus, and Eric Rasmussen (New York: Norton, 2002), Induction.10-11. All further citations are from 
this edition. 
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Bartholomew Fair poses a series of questions regarding theater’s ability to represent 
space, and the metathearical Induction establishes what will be a central concern in Jonson’s 
invocation of Smithfield. How can performance craft a particular space, when the bare 
stages of the public amphitheaters make mimetic representation impossible? Moreover, 
when a space like Smithfield is known to the playgoers, how does performance cite its spatial 
referent, coupling the theater’s methods for creating space – through description, signs, and 
the occasional prop – with the playgoers’ memories of that place? Through its Induction and 
through its representation of Smithfield, Bartholomew Fair stages what might be called a 
performative constitution of space, where thinking and feeling become the means of creating 
space in its full phenomenological force.  
 Theories of performativity, as Judith Butler has argued, trace the gradual formation 
of things, their slow coming into being through “reiterative and citational practice.”245 For 
certain ontological categories, most notably that of embodiment, Butler has shown that an 
assumed facticity, a belief in the immutable materiality of a thing, obscures the way that the 
constitutive elements of a particular entity are gradually formed. We must reconceptualize 
“the notion of matter, not as site or surface, but as a process of materialization that stabilizes over 
time to produce the effect of boundary, fixity, and surface we call matter,” and this materialization, 
Butler argues, is “a kind of citationality, the acquisition of being through the citing of 
power.”246 If performativity reminds us that matter must be materialized, then my interest 
here is that it might illuminate the ways in which spaces are made material and consequential. 
Acknowledging Butler’s own assertion that theatricality and performativity are 
distinct though sympathetic to one another, I first wish to establish a framework for 
                                                
245 Judith Butler, Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex” (New York: Routledge, 1993), 2. 
246 Ibid., 9, 15. 
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understanding the performativity of space on the early modern stage.247 As the Scrivener 
reminds us, early modern performance relied upon embodied experience as a means of 
creating space, of translating the bare stage of the public amphitheater into a dramatic setting. 
For this reason, I also argue for the importance of cognitive ecology in understanding 
Bartholomew Fair’s performance of space. As I suggested in the Introduction, cognitive 
ecology was an essential element within the early modern playhouse, where, as Evelyn 
Tribble has shown, acting companies transformed the built environment into “a vehicle of 
thought,” manipulating that space as part of a larger mnemonic system.248 The success of the 
performance, however, depended not only upon the players and their ability to harness the 
ecological nature of cognition. As the argument between the Stage-keeper and the Scrivener 
suggests, the playgoers also held a crucial role in shaping the performance, as their readiness 
(or refusal) to assemble the disparate elements of the play defined the success of Bartholomew 
Fair in staging Smithfield. 
Blending cognitive ecology and performativity helps us to understand how early 
modern drama reimagines and reconstitutes space. More specifically, it reveals the generative 
relationship between environment and embodiment within Bartholomew Fair, a relationship 
that criticism of the play has continually obscured. Insofar as critical studies of the play have 
considered space, they emphasize Jonson’s relationship to what Peter Stallybrass and Allon 
                                                
247 In “Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist Theory,” 
Theatre Journal 40:4 (December 1988), Butler suggests that theatrical performance and the performativity of 
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248 Evelyn B. Tribble, Cognition in the Globe: Attention and Memory in Shakespeare’s Theatre (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011), 3.  
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White have called the “symbolic domain of ‘authorship.’”249 This investment in authorship, 
in individual production, and in metaphorical space has obscured the play’s interest in 
reimagining the physicality of space through its representation of Smithfield. Thus, while 
Stallybrass and White rightly argue that Bartholomew Fair cannot be understood in terms of 
mimetic representation – “there can be no question of understanding that play either as a 
homology of the ‘real’ Bartholomew Fair, or as a mere thematic pillaging of popular custom 
by an aloof and appropriative high culture” – they overlook the play’s capacity to form a 
matrix, or cognitive system, wherein readers and playgoers think through the production of 
space.250 Rather, Stallybrass and White displace agency from the play to its author, 
concluding that Jonson “tried to define a new role in which authority was invested in 
authorship itself” and that this conceptual redefinition “was an act performed on and against 
the theatrical script, so as to efface its real conditions of production.”251 More recently, James 
Mardock has shown Bartholomew Fair’s investment in the relationship of space to subjectivity, 
noting that “place is intrinsic to identity and selfhood” within the play.252 But rather than 
examine the play’s investment in rethinking the materiality of space, Mardock follows 
Stallybrass and White in focusing on questions of authorial production. In doing so, he 
reimagines the play as a kind of rigged game: “Just as Epicoene and The Alchemist stage 
competitions between the playwright and his characters over interior theatrical spaces, 
Bartholomew Fair becomes an explicit contest of urban literacy, of how to read the city, and it 
is another contest that Jonson is guaranteed to win.”253 These accounts presume a 
metaphorical space within and around the play, a site in which discursive formulations of 
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authorship, theatricality, and literacy become organized in a new conceptual topography. As 
a result, they overlook the play’s engagement with the materiality of space, its effort to 
conceive and to reimagine the formation of space through the invocation of Smithfield. 
Bartholomew Fair imagines space as an emergent entity. By figuring Smithfield as a site 
in which individuals and ideologies repeatedly collide with one another, the play 
reconceptualizes space as an environment that stems from those interactions rather than 
anticipating and creating them. In doing so, Bartholomew Fair foregrounds the productive and 
generative potential of bodies within space. Like the atoms of the Lucretian universe, which 
shape the cosmos through continual swerving, the characters of Bartholomew Fair transform 
Smithfield through their collective movement. At a time when London itself was being 
transformed, its streets and suburbs being rebuilt to accommodate a growing population, 
Bartholomew Fair seems to direct itself at the philosophical problems latent within this urban 
transformation.254 Specifically, the play meditates on the relationship between mental and 
material reconceptualizations of space, asking how competing ideologies conflict with one 
another and, in conflicting, produce a new material domain? 
In what follows, I argue that Bartholomew Fair’s contribution to this debate lies in its 
interest in cognitive ecology. From the Induction to Leatherhead’s puppet play, Bartholomew 
Fair traces the relationship between conceptualizations of the environment and the material 
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transformation of that space. First, I show that the Induction attempts to codify certain 
cognitive practices, certain ways of imagining space within the playhouse, as part of the 
play’s larger meditation on captivation and emplacement. I then establish a set of 
connections between the Induction’s theorization of space and the play’s representation of 
Smithfield. Specifically, in the contrast between Cokes’s profound absorption into the fair 
and Busy’s disenchantment with the place, Bartholomew Fair envisions competing ideologies 
about the relationship of environment and embodiment in the early modern period. 
Locating these ideologies within Smithfield, the play shows they affirm, negotiate, and 
undermine other forms of spatial apprehension at the fair, colliding to produce new 
topographies. These interactions, between conception and navigation, between movement 
and the materiality of space, show Bartholomew Fair to be deeply invested what I have called 
the performative constitution of space. But perhaps more suggestively, Bartholomew Fair 
imagines the production of space through displacement and disorientation, a kind of 
negative ontology in which disruption actually brings space into being. 
 
I. “When’t comes to the fair once”: Performativity and the Theatrical Conception of 
Smithfield 
 
i. The Performative Constitution of Space 
 Performativity assumes a continual and mutually informative relationship between 
the materiality of a body and its signification. According to Butler, bodily morphology comes 
into being through the layering of matter and meaning, where the substance of the body has 
to be made to signify for it to be incorporated into a psychic and social framework. “The 
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materiality of the body is not to be taken for granted,” Butler notes, “for in some sense it is 
acquired, constituted, through the development of morphology,” with morphology 
representing the psyche’s distribution throughout the somatic structure.255 In this process of 
engendering the materiality of the body, signification plays an essential role in apprehending 
the shape and sensations of the flesh, incorporating those fragments into a coherent 
morphology. “Bodily contours and morphology are not merely implicated in an irreducible 
tension between the psychic and the material,” as Butler argues, “but are that tension.”256 
From this foundation, we can better understand Butler’s claim that the gendered body is the 
result of melancholia, the grief over a lost attachment that can neither be acknowledged nor 
relinquished in mourning; the materiality of the gendered body is very much shaped and 
stabilized in a particular morphology through this psychic signification.257 So too can we 
recognize the subversive potential of performativity, where the repetition of difference 
allows the gendered body to become other than what it was, to resist heteronormativity by 
refusing identification.258 
 In privileging the constitutive relationship of signification and materiality, 
performativity is uniquely poised to illuminate the ways in which space – social space as well 
as physical space – comes into being. The critical geographers Nicky Gregson and Gillian 
Rose have already argued for this illuminative potential, asserting that Butler’s “radical 
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257 See, in particular, Judith Butler, The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection (Stanford: Stanford University 
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antifoundationalism provides a crucial critical tool for denaturalising social categories and for 
destabilising dominant forms of social reproduction” with regard to social space.259 Indeed, 
because performativity reveals that materiality is not a given, but rather an accomplishment, 
it functions as a critical tool for tracing the continual renegotiations that produce social and 
physical space. As Rose asserts elsewhere, it is the fact “that space is also a doing, that it does 
not pre-exist its doing,” which makes performativity a useful means of examining the 
production of space.260 Gregson and Rose focus primarily on social space, tracing the 
disruption of “the hierarchies embedded in physical location” without demonstrating that 
physical location is itself transformed through citational practice.261 Building upon their work, 
then, I want to demonstrate that performativity can shed light upon the materialization of 
space. Specifically, performativity illuminates the means by which physical space is 
apprehended, signified, and produced as a material dimension.  
 Within the early modern playhouse, space represents a collusion between the 
materiality of the environment – the architectural features of the amphitheater, the stage 
properties, the language of the play, and so forth – and the signification that can be mapped 
onto that materiality. As I noted in the previous chapter, theatrical space is defined by 
“interplay between fictitious and real counterparts,” in the words of Henri Lefebvre.262 The 
success of this interplay depends upon the performance’s ability to continually resignify its 
environment, to make artifacts that would otherwise distract from the play a meaningful 
component of that fiction. Through this imaginative resignification, Lefebvre argues, the 
“bodies” of the playgoers “are able to pass from a ‘real’, immediately experienced space (the 
                                                
259 Nicky Gregson and Gillian Rose, “Taking Butler elsewhere: performativities, spatialities and subjectivities” 
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 18 (2000): 438. 
260 Gillian Rose, “Performing Space” in Human Geography Today, ed. Doreen Massey, John Alen, and Philip Sarre 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), 248. 
261 Gregson and Rose, “Taking Butler elsewhere,” 446. 
262 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Malden: Blackwell, 1991), 188. 
 190 
pit, the stage) to a perceived space – a third space which is no longer either scenic or 
public.”263 In this way, the third space of theater emerges from a series of oscillations: 
between perception and conception, between materiality and signification, and between the 
physicality of the playhouse and the imagined import of those environmental features. To 
see this process in terms of performativity is to bring these oscillations together, 
reinterpreting them as the repetitive acts that produce theatrical space. 
 The Scrivener’s seemingly offhand remark, that the playhouse is “as dirty as 
Smithfield and as stinking every whit,” thereby suggests that Bartholomew Fair is deeply 
invested in the performative constitution of space. The phenomenological contours of 
Smithfield are regularly invoked in the play as a means of establishing the shape and sense of 
that place. For instance, one of the “stinking” elements that helped to overlay the space of 
the play with the space of the fair was the residual presence of animals. Smithfield was 
known throughout the year as a market for livestock, and this practice was so integral to the 
identity of the place that trade of animals was allowed to continue even when the outbreak 
of plague brought all other activities to a halt. In 1593, for example, Elizabeth issued a 
proclamation forbidding the observance of St. Bartholomew’s Feast, owing to the concern 
that it might “increase and disperse the infection of the sicknesse;” but the pronouncement 
makes an explicit exception for the “sale of horses & cattell, & of stall wares.”264 One of the 
reasons that the playhouse was “as dirty as Smithfield and as stinking every whit,” then, 
seems to have been the lingering scent of animals in both locations.265 The Hope Theater, 
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where Bartholomew Fair was first performed on October 31, 1614, represented an architectural 
innovation as being “the first dual purpose arena” in early modern London, with a stage that 
could be removed to accommodate bear baiting.266 The Book-holder alludes to this dual 
purpose in the Induction, when he chastises the Stage-keeper for offering his judgment of 
the play to the audience: “Your judgment, rascal? For what? Sweeping the stage? Or 
gathering up the broken apples for the bears within?” (Induction.50-52). Even without this 
reference, the lingering odor of the animals would have been noticeable within the Hope, 
compounded by the fact that the bears were kept close to the amphitheater itself.267  
 The Scrivener’s reference to dirt furthers this sense of a phenomenological similitude 
between Smithfield and the Hope Theater. Dirt, or dust, seems to have been an essential 
part of Bartholomew Fair, cited in many of intriguing etymologies of the Piepowder Court, 
the ad hoc juridical system used to punish petty theft and other minor transgressions 
committed at the fair. The name derives from the French pied poudre, “so called from the 
dusty feet of the suitors” to the court, according to a nineteenth-century historian of the fair, 
or alternatively “because justice is done there as soon as dirt can fall from the foot.”268 The 
ostensible democracy of the court, its promise of swift and impartial justice, was thus 
embodied in the fairgoers, who could not have escaped being besmirched with dirt while 
navigating the unpaved space of Smithfield. In the Hope Theater, those playgoers standing 
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in the yard might have felt an immediate and tactile relationship to the space being evoked. 
For them, the Piepowder Court of Jonson’s play was strangely palpable, while for those 
playgoers in the upper tiers, the Scrivener’s comment offers a call to bear witness, to observe 
the “special decorum” of dirt that ties the playhouse to the fair. 
  Finally, certain architectural features further aligned the Hope Theater with the fair 
at Smithfield. As I have suggested, the playhouse had a removable stage to accommodate 
bear-baiting, and this kind of scaffolding strongly resembled the temporary structures used 
for the various spectacles at Bartholomew Fair. The two platforms visually reinforced one 
another, as Eugene Waith has noted in arguing that “the stage on which Smithfield is to be 
presented is also somewhat the kind of stage one might see at Smithfield.”269 The smell, feel, 
and appearance of space, then, become essential elements within what may be called the 
particular cognitive ecology of Bartholomew Fair. Synthesizing disparate sensations into a 
unified impression, the Induction creates this cognitive ecology in order to align Smithfield 
with the Hope Theater. In emphasizing this perceptual similitude, moreover, the play 
suggests that the embodied experience of space – what one might call a sense of 
emplacement – constitutes the real substance of a location. More so than any reference to 
the geographic “region” of Smithfield or of the Hope Theater, it is this sense of 
emplacement that enables Bartholomew Fair to translate the one into the other.   
 
ii. Performativity and the Displacement of Memory  
 In endeavoring to create new associations, however, the Induction must contend 
with the memories that playgoers already have of Smithfield. Once again, the Stage-keeper’s 
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resistance to the performance provides a means of thematizing this work. One of Jonson’s 
principal failures in the play, according to the Stage-keeper, is that some of the best sights of 
Bartholomew Fair are missing: “He has ne’er a sword-and-buckler man in his fair, nor a little 
Davy to take toll o’the bawds there, as in my time” (Induction.13-15). This reference to the 
past, to the fair as it was “in my time,” shows that the Stage-keeper’s memory of 
Bartholomew Fair provides the foundation for his critique of the play. In this metatheatrical 
moment, Jonson seems to be wrestling with a real problem of performance, the potential for 
memory to afford the playgoers a comparative perspective, through which they will 
determine his play to be lacking. Among the many clauses of his contract with the audience, 
the Scrivener devotes one to such remembrance, attempting to banish it from the playhouse: 
“It is further covenanted, concluded, and agreed that, how great soever the expectation be, 
no person here is to expect more than he knows or better ware than a fair will afford, neither 
to look back to the sword-and-buckler age of Smithfield, but content himself with the 
present” (Induction.112-116). The Scrivener initially mediates the relationship of the fair to 
the play in suggesting proper proportion; memory should afford no greater “expectation” of 
what the theater can stage than is strictly reasonable. But the Scrivener’s conclusion goes 
further and, in addressing the “sword-and-buckler age of Smithfield,” directs itself at the 
Stage-keeper’s complaint: playgoers must forget the fair that they know, divest themselves of 
particular memories, and embrace “the present” that is this particular performance.  
 In another instance, the Scrivener proposes a series of memorial exchanges, 
explaining that Jonson has replaced some of the fair’s attractions with specific dramatic 
figures: “Instead of a little Davy to take toll o’the bawds, the author doth promise a strutting 
horse-courser, with a leer drunkard, two or three to attend him in as good equipage as you 
would wish” (Induction.116-119). These substitutions bear a curious fidelity to the Stage-
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keeper’s comments regarding the “humors” of the fair, despite the fact that the Book-holder 
and the Scrivener are absent when the Stage-keeper offers his judgment to the playgoers. 
The similitude between the complaints and the contractual substitutions implies a deliberate 
strategy; rather than wait for playgoers to remember their favorite elements of Bartholomew 
Fair and then to bemoan their absence from the play, the play endeavors to prompt such 
memories with the Stage-keeper’s complaints and to resolve this disjunction between 
memory and performance before it manifests itself. Together, the Stage-keeper and the 
Scrivener form a cognitive system for managing memory within the playhouse, to the 
specific end of creating a theatrical Smithfield. 
 Discursively, then, the Induction relies upon a tension between experience and 
expectation. On the one hand, it encourages the playgoers to recall the specific contours of 
Smithfield, to remember the smell, feeling, and appearance of that place, in order to 
recognize the many affiliations between Bartholomew Fair and its performative counterpart 
in the Hope Theater. This “special decorum,” as the Scrivener calls it, depends upon 
memory, insofar as thought furnishes a material connection between a playgoer’s experience 
of the fair and their subsequent encounter with its representation in the Bankside playhouse. 
On the other hand, the Induction proscribes specific forms of remembrance from the 
playhouse. The Scrivener’s contract directs the playgoers to think on “the present,” to forget 
the fair as they have experienced it and to fixate, instead, upon the pleasures of the 
performance. In short, the Induction invokes an embodied and preconscious form of 
memory, in contrast to the spatial and episodic memory that sustains whatever cognitive 
map playgoers may have of Smithfield. The intimate relationship between remembrance and 
sensation becomes another means of merging the performance with its spatial referent.  
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 In its efforts to invoke and to reimagine the space of the fair, then, the Induction 
envisions a complex and strangely hierarchical cognitive ecology. Its valuation of embodied 
memory bears witness to the fact that thought processes are often “unevenly distributed 
across the physical, social, and cultural environments,” as Tribble and John Sutton have 
argued, and that “some systems will place more or less weight on central control, or on 
particular forms for cognitive artifacts and social systems.”270 While cognitive distribution is 
thus often uneven in practice, the Induction theorizes an asymmetry between types of 
memory – a memory of feelings, rather than of figures – in order to place the playgoers 
within a particular cognitive framework. That is to say, the Induction imagines the playgoers 
and the performance as elements within a wider cognitive system, elements that couple 
unevenly with one another in realizing the dramatic fiction of Bartholomew Fair. 
 Within this ecology, disruption has a strangely generative power. As I have argued, 
the play relies upon embodied thought to disrupt or displace whatever cognitive maps the 
playgoers might hold of Smithfield, substituting its own staging for those conceptual 
representations of space. It is not a question, then, of the performance’s mimetic fidelity to 
Bartholomew Fair, but rather of the play’s investment in disrupting a sense of the fair 
itself.271 If performativity helps us to recognize that locations are always saturated with 
signification, that memory continually invests the materiality of place with meaning, then it 
also suggests that these intersections transform space into a contested domain. Because 
spaces blend “the real and the imagined,” they become “the terrain for the generation of 
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‘counterspaces,’ spaces of resistance to the dominant order,” as the critical geographer 
Edward Soja has argued.272 Bartholomew Fair reimagines Smithfield as precisely such a terrain. 
Its topography is constituted through the complex layering of remembrance and repression, 
where certain memories are invoked and others displaced.  
 One of the reasons that performativity illuminates the generation of Bartholomew 
Fair is that the fair itself lacks a stable ontology. Although the Stage-keeper repeatedly insists 
that the play little resembles the fair, there is, of course, no “Bartholomew Fair” at all; rather, 
there are only different iterations, unique performances of the fair once a year, which 
coalesce to form a unified idea of what constitutes the feast of St. Bartholomew at Smithfield. 
Through the Induction, Bartholomew Fair engages this performative reconstitution. Invoking 
the memories of the playgoers, the performance inserts itself within the processual 
formation of the fair, becoming another memorial layer within the (re)signification of 
Smithfield. Again, Bartholomew Fair’s peculiar ontology lies in creating a Smithfield only 
through displacing and disrupting the Smithfield already known to playgoers. Turning to the 
staged fair, we will see how experiences of disorientation and disruption define the feel of 
Smithfield, in both Cokes’s enthrallment and Busy’s disenchantment with the space. 
 
II. “I’the heart o’the fair”: Thinking Smithfield 
 In its representation of Smithfield, Bartholomew Fair shows that the substance of space, 
the very ontology of location, lies in performativity, in sensory experience, and in cognitive 
mapping. Onstage, the fair is not simply created through physical spaces – through Ursula’s 
booth, Leatherhead’s puppet theater, the stocks, and so forth, which anchor the 
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performance within a particular section of Smithfield – but also through the physical 
movements of Bartholomew Cokes, Busy, Overdo, and several other characters through 
Smithfield. The passage of these figures across a staged terrain, and their continual 
resignification of the places in which they find themselves, encourages us to consider the 
relationship of thought to space. For if embodied cognition and mental mapping work 
together to define the phenomenological contours of space, then attending to this hybridity 
is essential for grasping how early modern drama stages and transforms spatial experience. It 
encourages us to think beyond the representational power of early modern drama, where 
“place-based dramatic narratives” produce space simply by showing them. While it is 
certainly true, as Jean Howard has argued, that “playwrights helped representationally to 
construct the practices associated with specific urban spaces,” these practices depend upon a 
second, cognitive system of work, which performance elicits at the same time as staging it.273 
It is essential, then, to think about thinking as its own kind of practice, with its own 
normative constraints.  
 In his study of insulaires, or atlases of islands, Frank Lestringant has remarked that 
“space, and more precisely topography, is a form of thought.”274 Space represents the 
material organization of information and knowledge, whether in architectural features, urban 
design, or in the preservation of an ostensibly natural environment. Because this 
organization extends across a time, it anticipates the individual actors who appear within a 
particular location, shaping their movements and their apprehensions in deeply subtle 
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ways.275 Thus, as Lestringant argues, our problem “is not that of thinking space,” since, on 
the contrary, “it’s space that thinks” in storing and deploying certain forms of knowledge, 
well in advance of our interactions with it.276 In Bartholomew Fair, the performativity of 
Smithfield is tied to the space’s ability to function as the medium of thought, to assert itself 
through and upon a vast cognitive system composed of individuals, elements of the built 
environment, and practices within space. In what follows, I trace the movements of two 
characters, Cokes and Busy, through the fair, in an effort to show how their agency is 
circumscribed by the spatiality of the fair. While both figures display a considerable amount 
of agency in their approach to the fair, and in doing so manifest antithetical attitudes towards 
the relationship of environment and embodiment, their movement is profoundly constrained 
by the space of the fair. This constraint, in turn, reshapes the space of the fair. Busy’s 
conceptual efforts to distinguish himself from his environment will eventually manifest 
themselves as a material gesture. He tears down Trash’s booth, upsetting her wares, and this 
spectacle of violence persuades Leatherhead to dismantle his own shop as a protective 
gesture. As we shall see, the disappearance of the booths leaves Cokes utterly disoriented 
within the fair. Through this interaction, Smithfield acquires agential power, as the booths 
mediate not only the relationship between Cokes and Busy but also their respective 
investments in the environment. Bartholomew Fair figures space as both an emergent entity 
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and a cognitive system, a site that shapes and is, in turn, reshaped by the thoughts of 
individual actors. 
 Performativity usefully theorizes agency at the intersection of the subject and social 
space. In Butler’s theorization, performativity continually concerns itself with the 
displacement or disruption of an external order, a medium like the Lacanian symbolic order, 
which reproduces itself within and through an individual psyche.277 Although Smithfield 
lacks the amorphous, and therefore insidious, constitutive power of the symbolic order, the 
agency in its performative (re)production lies at the intersection of the individual and the 
environment. As we shall see, Cokes’ captivation with the sites of Smithfield enables 
Bartholomew Fair to stage the cognitive ecology that binds environment and embodiment 
together. It also manifests the peculiar constitutive power latent within their dissolution, the 
degree to which space and subjectivity emerge in their full ontological clarity only in being 
severed from one another. Busy’s navigation of the fair bears further witness to this point.  
Through and around these characters, Smithfield realizes itself as a space. The fair’s 
self-generation, as it were, recalls the principle of emergence, wherein a “self-organizing 
system” establishes itself through “the interactions of multiple simple components without 
the benefit of a leader, controller, or orchestrator.”278 In some forms of emergence, the 
agency of such interactions shifts from the individual actors to the environment itself, where 
“these interactions,” in the words of Andy Clark, are “mediated by active and often quite 
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278 Andy Clark, Being There: Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1997), 73.  
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complex environmental structures.”279 Such structures might include a booth, which 
constitutes a particular environmental feature at the same time that it generates other 
features, such as the various pathways through the fair that characters trace in their search 
for that particular booth. The emergent properties of the fair, then, include the particular 
movements of Cokes and Busy, but they properly contextualize these individual efforts as 
constitutive of a larger entity, namely Smithfield itself. Early in The Politics and Poetics of 
Transgression, Stallybrass and White ask, “How does one ‘think’ a marketplace?” Their 
conclusion, that “Only hybrid notions are appropriate to such a hybrid place,” affirms the 
importance of turning from the subjective signification of a place to the emergent 
organization of those significations as the materiality of space, as the site that characters and 
playgoers readily recognize as Bartholomew Fair.280 Indeed, in understanding the fair as a 
kind of Thirdspace, or what Soja calls the layering of the real and the imagined within a 
particular environment, we can recognize how movement, attention, and disenchantment 
combine as a cognitive system to reshape Smithfield in Bartholomew Fair.281 
 
i. The Captivation of Bartholomew Cokes: The Fair as Umwelt 
 At the house of John Littlewit, Cokes and Busy anticipate their coming dissolution 
within the fair, the deterritorialization of their desires and their subjectivities within the space 
of Smithfield. Cokes, in a typically foolish assertion, suggests his intimate relationship to the 
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fair in calling it his own. The only purpose of his journey to Smithfield, he tells Littlewit and 
his guests, is “to show Mistress Grace my fair. I call’t my fair because of Barthol’mew: you 
know, my name is Barthol’mew, and Barthol’mew Fair” (1.5.63-65). Cokes’ flair for asserting 
an obvious parallel as though its discovery were innovative continually wears upon the 
characters of the play, most notably his ward Wasp. But while his utterance mistakes the 
relationship between self and space as one of ownership, Cokes rightly implies that he is, to 
an extent, coextensive with his environment. Wasp has already complained that Cokes’s utter 
captivation with his environment makes it impossible to journey with him: “Why, we could 
not meet that heathen thing all day but stayed him,” Wasp asserts, recalling a recent tour of 
London. “He would name you all the signs over, as he went, aloud,” as though the signs for 
taverns and shops called forth something from Cokes, unbidden and autonomic, “and where 
he spied a parrot or a monkey, there was he pitched, with all the little long coats about him, 
male and female; no getting him away!” (1.4.112-117). It is not simply that Cokes reads the 
signs aloud, externalizing what decorum demands remain internal apprehension, but his 
fascination also renders him immobile; he becomes “pitched,” like a tent, becoming, as it 
were, another feature of the environment that he should navigate.  
 Cokes’ captivation with the space of London is paradoxical, for his excessive 
enthusiasm continually risks arresting the very activity that his interest should inspire: namely, 
that of consumption. As Karen Newman has noted, navigating the early modern city was an 
act already imbued with proto-capitalist potential: “Walking the city was undertaken for 
myriad purposes – to carry on business, to shop and consume,” and thus, “in short, to 
absorb the social knowledge offered in streets, shops, by criers and street sellers, in outdoor 
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theaters, by passersby.”282 But Cokes’ overidentification with the ideal consumer threatens to 
render him immobile, contravening the very movement upon which commerce depends. 
This captivation is paradoxical, however, insofar it risks a profound and unproductive stasis. 
At the fair itself, Cokes finds himself enraptured with the wares of Leatherhead and Trash, 
and his interest is no impediment to consumption. Although Wasp complains that the group 
has become fixed within space – “Why the measles should you stand here with your train, 
cheaping of dogs, birds, and babies?” – Cokes demonstrates himself to be surprisingly 
diffuse within the space of Smithfield (3.4.27-28). When Joan Trash entices him, asking “Will 
Your Worship buy any gingerbread, very good bread, comfortable bread?,” the stage 
direction reads: “He runs to her shop” (3.4.92-93, s.d.). Cokes’s captivation, then, evinces a 
peculiar spatial logic. Whereas Wasp imagines a linear progression through space, governed 
by discrete and deliberative decisions about movement, Cokes’s approach is almost aleatoric. 
He passes from one site of consumption to another, as a bee passes from flower to flower, 
or in Wasp’s own metaphor, as a bird drawn into a trap: “He’s flown to another limebush; 
there he will flutter as long more, till he ha’ ne’er a feather left” (3.5.17-18).  
 Cokes’s profound investment in the landscape offers one way of understanding the 
emergence of space and spatiality from organism-environment relations. Captivation, as 
Giorgio Agamben has shown in The Open, concerns an animal’s utter absorption into its 
environment, an investment so profound that it dissolves the psychic and signifying 
differences between the animal and the landscape. At this moment, the animal does not exist 
within a world, but rather in what Agamben calls, drawing upon the work of Jakob von 
Uexküll, the Umwelt: “the environment-world that is constituted by a more or less broad 
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series of elements that [Uexküll] calls ‘carriers of significance’ (Bedeutungsträger) or of ‘marks’ 
(Merkmalträger), which are the only things that interest the animal.”283 Translating an 
environment into a set of signifying elements, the concept of the Umwelt effectively 
proliferates the number of spaces within a given place: “There does not exist a forest as an 
objectively fixed environment,” Agamben writes, but rather “there exists a forest-for-the-
park-ranger, a forest-for-the-hunter, a forest-for-the-botanist,” and so forth, until we reach 
the more radical, non-anthropocentric instance of the forest-for-the-tick.284 For that animal, 
the Umwelt of the forest is defined by odor, temperature, and a typology of surfaces. The 
tick’s investment in the warmth and scent of mammalian skin represents its captivation, its 
apprehension of these features to the exclusion of other signifying elements within space. 
This investment also suggests how perception and preconscious thought, as elements of 
captivation, can define the contours of space. 
 For Agamben, captivation distinguishes the animal from the human, the Umwelt from 
the environment. Insofar as boredom signals our disinterest in the world around us, this 
affect of inattention and listlessness becomes, in Agamben’s words, “the metaphysical 
operator in which the passage from poverty in world to world, from animal environment to 
human world, is realized; at issue here is nothing less than anthropogenesis, the becoming 
Da-sein of living man.”285 But Cokes never arrives at this state. A bird flitting to a limed bush, 
Cokes does not become bored with the space of Smithfield, but rather his captivation 
continues even when the signifying elements of his Umwelt no longer exist. After Busy’s 
outbursts prompt Leatherhead and Trash to leave their booths, Cokes finds himself unable 
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to locate these vendors, and this minor disorientation figures Cokes’s utter confusion within 
the space of the fair. “By this light,” he complains, “I cannot find my gingerbread-wife nor 
my hobbyhorse-man in all the fair, now, to ha’ my money again. And I do not know the way 
out on’t, to go home for more” (4.2.23-26). Without the booths, Cokes finds himself unable 
to navigate the fair; it is not simply that those architectural features provided landmarks 
within the vast and undifferentiated space of Smithfield, but also that the booths and the 
goods contained within them constitute the signifying elements of Cokes’s Umwelt. They are 
markers of his captivation, defining the environment and the individual simultaneously. 
Cokes himself figures this intimacy in revisiting the name he shares with the fair, 
complaining that “the fair should not have used me thus,” as it did in his recent cozening, if 
for no other reason than “for my name’s sake” (4.2.76-77).  
 More significantly, when Trash and Leatherhead disappear from the stage, effectively 
transforming the topography of the fair, Cokes claims to have lost himself as well as his 
bearings within Smithfield. “Friend, do you know who I am, or where I lie? I do not myself, 
I’ll be sworn,” he tells Troubleall, testifying to the intersection of space and subjectivity, of 
embodiment and emplacement, in the early modern period (4.2.79-80). Cokes’ inquiries 
invoke a foundational assumption of the early modern episteme – that knowing one’s place 
was a means of knowing one’s self – and hence he entreats Troubleall to lead him back to 
his estate: “Do but carry me home, and I’ll please thee; I ha’ money enough there” (4.2.80-
81). There, the familiarity of space coincides with the familiarity of a particular place in 
society, and Cokes’s ability to dispense money, as he has done so throughout the fair, 
becomes a means of guaranteeing his identity. Margaret Tudeau-Clayton has rightly noted 
that Cokes articulates the loss of himself through the loss of objects and other people, with 
his complaint – “I ha’ lost myself, and my cloak and my hat, and my fine sword, and my 
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sister, and Numps, and Mistress Grace” – showing a peculiar logic of accumulation, where 
“the only distinction made is to the loss of the bargain of hobby horses and gingerbread,” 
the very things that Cokes buys from Leatherhead and Trash, which “is prioritized as ‘the 
worst of all’” (4.2.81-83).286 Cokes’s readiness to define himself interrelationally, to ground 
his subjectivity upon a network of material, economic, and affective ties, shows both his 
continued captivation within the external world and the relationship of that captivation to an 
ecology of the self. These relationships, in other words, reveal that Cokes is inchoately aware 
that he is coextensive with the fair, an intersection of space and subjectivity that he 
continually misconstrues as proprietary (the name of Bartholomew implying ownership). 
 Although Cokes’s permeability figures a real ontological relationship, the intersection 
of space and subjectivity within the early modern period, it is continually signified within the 
play as a mark of idiocy, another indication that Cokes’s last name, meaning “fool” or 
“coxcomb,” is the perfect aptronym. In the midst of another plot to rob Cokes, Edgeworth 
remarks that “A man might cut out his kidneys, I think, and he never feel ‘em, he is so 
earnest at the sport,” to which Nightingale concurs in adding, “His soul is halfway out on’s 
body at the game” (4.2.44-46). Together, the thieves suggestively figure the soul as both 
contained and diffuse, material in its compactness and liquid in its flow. In his rejoinder to 
Edgeworth, Nightingale figures the equivalence of the kidneys to the soul; the one may be 
drawn out of the body with the same blend of distraction and invasion as the other, both 
being things that a thief can take and hold. But Nightingale’s jest also implies that the soul is 
a physical force, something that might be drawn out of the body with enticement or intense 
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concentration, and so his comments seem to rely upon a humoral understanding of 
embodiment, where corporeal fluids and animal spirits establish the soul’s immanence within 
the body and its immediate environment.287 Attention to the environment, in being “earnest” 
at what one finds there, can fixate the soul so firmly upon the space of its dwelling that it has 
no mechanisms left for sentience, for the “feel” of a thief’s knife in the back.  
 For Edgeworth and Nightingale, then, the ecological nature of Cokes’s cognition is a 
sign of his idiocy. Their rhetoric conflates the distribution of the soul with its dispersion. 
Indeed, Edgeworth goes further in his critique of Cokes’s cognitive capacities, rebuking 
Nightingale for the implication that their target has a mind at all:  
Talk of him to have a soul? Heart, if he have any more than a 
thing given him instead of salt, only to keep him from 
stinking, I’ll be hanged afore my time, presently. Where 
should it be, trow? In his blood? He has not so much to’ard it 
in his whole body as will maintain a good flea, and if he take 
this course, he will no ha’ so much land left as to rear a calf 
within this twelvemonth. (4.2.55-61) 
 
Edgeworth’s critique of Cokes first plays upon the soul as a bifurcated entity; at the same 
time that the embodied soul functions as the seat of reason, imagination, and memory, it 
sustains the body’s vital functions. Edgeworth radically suggests that this animating force has 
been supplanted within Cokes. In place of a soul, Cokes’s body is sustained, or preserved, by 
nothing more than the “salt” that keeps meat from rotting. But Edgeworth’s efforts to locate 
the soul – “Where should it be, trow? In his blood?” – more readily suggest the relationship 
of thought to space, and they mediate the abrupt transition in Edgeworth’s critique from 
Cokes’s idiocy to his land. Cokes’ inability to maintain his soul within his body, the fact that 
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he “has not so much to’ard it in his whole body as will maintain a good flea,” prefigures his 
eventual displacement: “if he take this course, he will no ha’ so much land left as to rear a 
calf within this twelvemonth,” being turned out of his estate for insolvency.  
 Edgeworth’s inquiry into the place of Cokes’s soul furthers the play’s interest in a 
spatial configuration of consciousness. More specifically, it builds upon Wasp’s prior claim 
that the mind of Cokes and the fair already contain one another:  
Would the fair, and all the drums and rattles in’t, were i’your 
belly for me! They are already i’your brain. He that had the 
means to travel your head, now, should meet finer sights than 
any are i’the fair, and make a finer voyage on’t, to see it all 
hung with cockleshells, pebbles, fine wheat straws, and here 
and there a chicken’s feather and a cobweb. (1.5.90-95) 
 
Wasp contrasts two forms of consumption here, wishing that the fair had been integrated 
into Cokes’s belly, where presumably, its nutrients being absorbed, the residua would be 
excreted. In contrast, Cokes has incorporated the fair into his mind, where there is no such 
process of digestion. That fair, defined primarily through objects and strange artifacts of 
Cokes’s imagination, mirrors the Bartholomew fair that Cokes himself will later navigate, in 
that both are constituted through tchotchke, through “drums and rattles” and similar 
ephemera. As Jonas Barish has noted, Wasp figures “the interior of Cokes’s head as a kind 
of idiot wasteland,” transforming the mind into an environment: “the void implies a physical 
space which might be filled with more substantial matter than it is.”288 The problem, for 
Wasp as well as Edgeworth, is that Cokes’s captivation produces its own economy of 
attention and absorption, where the soul ceases to be concentrated within the brain and 
becomes, instead, reconstituted through the artifacts that lie within and beyond the body. 
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 Cokes’s thoughts, then, are repeatedly figured in environmental terms. Either his 
mind represents a space unto itself, a kind of Wunderkammer of London commodities, or it 
does not exist, and the proof against its immanence within the body lies in Cokes’s continual 
captivation with the world. Through cognitive ecology, we can see how this captivation, this 
investment in the external, stages a real relationship between organism and environment, one 
that is continually overlooked or overwhelmed when we operate on the level of higher 
cognitive processes. “Biological cognition is highly selective,” according to Clark, “and it can 
sensitize an organism to whatever (often simple) parameters reliably specify states of affairs 
that matter to the specific life form.”289 In other words, as Clark later suggests, environments 
are always realized through complex cognitive processes, and the idea of the Umwelt readily 
illuminates the way that human perception and embodied thought interact with one another 
to produce a sense of the external world.290  
 In Bartholomew Fair, many characters resist this interaction. Preferring to imagine a 
stable distinction between the self and its immediate environment, these figures mock those 
individuals who, much like Cokes, find themselves constituted and redefined through their 
emplacement. But the play continually reveals the impossibility, or at least the 
unsustainability, of such a stance. In particular, as Busy’s absorption into the fair gives way to 
disenchantment and hypocritical disgust, the play satirically implies that environment and 
embodiment cannot be fully separated from one another. 
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ii. Zeal-of-the-land Busy and the Disenchantment with Space 
 Whereas Cokes is largely defined by this captivation, Zeal-of-the-land Busy figures 
himself and his identity as a Puritan against the seductive power of place. Seeking a kind of 
spiritual dispensation in advance of their arrival at the fair, Dame Purecraft entreats Busy to 
discourse at large about the sanctity of eating pig at the fair: “I would be satisfied from you, 
religiously-wise, whether a widow of the sanctified assembly, or a widow’s daughter, may 
commit the act without offense to the weaker sisters” (1.6.46-49). Busy’s response initially 
hinges upon the corrosive power of Bartholomew Fair as a particular space; while the pig 
“may be eaten, very exceeding well eaten,” outside of the fair, “in the fair, and as a 
Barthol’mew pig, it cannot be eaten; for the very calling it a Barthol’mew-pig, and to eat it so, 
is a spice of idolatry, and you made the fair no better than one of the high places” of idol 
worship (1.6.54-58). The place is the problem, as Busy quickly deduces. Smithfield renders a 
purified pig profane once more. But as Littlewit pushes him to relent, feebly punning that 
“in state of necessity, place should give place,” Busy diminishes the power of space over a 
particular subjectivity (1.6.60-61). He concludes that the “place is not much, not very much; 
we may be religious in the midst of the profane, so it be eaten with a reformed mouth, with 
sobriety and humbleness, not gorged in with gluttony or greediness” (1.6.74-77). Busy’s 
rhetoric subtly recalls Paul’s conclusion in the book of Titus, that “Unto the pure all things 
are pure,” but with a particular emphasis on the (im)purity of one’s environment.291  
 Within cognitive ecology, however, sensation and perception are generative 
processes with regrard to place. The belief that “perception is a form of action” encourages 
us, as Hutchins has argued, to “view organism-environment relations in terms of coupling, 
coordination, emergence, and self-organization rather than the transduction of information 
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across a barrier.”292 That is to say, neither the organism nor the environment is inactive or 
immutable at the moment of their encounter; perception, as an organizational process that 
selects and interprets features of the environment, shapes the subject and space at the same 
time. It is not surprising, then, that Busy’s concerns about the permeability of the self 
manifest themselves on a perceptual register, once he and his entourage arrive at the fair. His 
warnings translate the space of the fair into a veritable Umwelt of sensory temptation: “The 
place is Smithfield, or the field of smiths, the grove of hobbyhorses and trinkets; the wares 
are the wares of devils,” and these objects, which Cokes was so loath to ignore, are traps of 
sensory enthrallment: “They are hooks, and baits, very baits, that are hunt out on every side, 
to catch you and to hold you, as it were, by the gills and by the nostrils, as the fisher doth” 
(3.2.40-46). While the flourishes of rhetoric proliferate, Busy’s logic is in itself curiously 
reductive; space is reduced to objects, and those objects further reduced to their 
phenomenological unfolding, to the stimulation that they provide. For Busy, Smithfield 
functions less as a geographic site, a “region” in the words of the Scrivener, than as an 
ambient and strangely labile environment.  
 Navigating this environment, however, requires the very senses that Busy foreswears. 
Although Busy warns Littlewit to protect himself from the sounds of the fair, imitating 
Odysseus if necessary – “The heathen man could stop his ears with wax against the harlot 
o’the sea; do you the like, with your fingers against the bells of the Beast” – it is sound that 
soon leads Littlewit into temptation (3.2.47-49). Knockem first calls out to Purecraft and to 
Win, “Whither walk you?,” and encourages Littlewit, who has stopped with the women, to 
contemplate the sign advertising Ursula’s wares: “The best pig and bottle ale i’the fair, sir. 
Old Ursula is cook. There you may read: the pig’s head speaks it” (3.2.57, 60-62). Littlewit 
                                                
292 Hutchins, “Cognitive Ecology,” 709-710.  
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seems entranced by the sign, “gazing at” it, in the stage direction, and echoing Knockem’s 
interpretation of it: “Here be the best pigs, and she does roast ‘em as well as ever she did, the 
pig’s head says” (3.2.62.s.d., 69-71). For Littlewit, auditory and visual cues are the principal 
means of navigating the fair, of discerning within the open space of Smithfield the particular 
place that Purecraft, Win, and Sir John desire. To Purecraft’s protestations, that his 
contemplation of the sign is a “vanity of the eye,” Littlewit retorts by articulating the 
navigational significance of the senses: “Good mother, how shall we find a pig if we do look 
about for’t? Will it run off o’the spit into our mouths, think you, as in Lubberland, and cry 
‘Wee, wee’?” (3.2.76, 78-80). In a space less enchanted than Penshurst, where creatures so 
forcefully proffer themselves for consumption that eels “leap on land / Before the fisher, or 
into his hand,” Littlewit and his company must rely upon embodied cognition to locate 
themselves within space, to find the pig that Littlewit has previously suggested lies “I’the 
heart o’the fair, not at Pie Corner” (1.5.153).293 
 In his exploration of the fair, Busy eschews these senses, preferring a mode of 
perception he deems better suited to the particular place of Smithfield. He misinterprets 
Purecraft’s objection to mean that the pig “may offer itself by other means to the sense, as 
by the way of the steam, which I think it doth, here in this place” (3.2.81-83). Busy proceeds 
to enact this relationship between sensation and space, comically sniffing at the steam in an 
attempt to find the pig through its smell. The stage direction, “(Busy scents after it like a hound.),” 
recalls the earlier figuration of Cokes as a bird caught in a limed bush, using the trope of 
animality to imply a kind of captivation within the environment. Busy celebrates this sense as 
the ideal means of navigating Smithfield, first declaring that “it were a sin of obstinacy, great 
                                                
293 Ben Jonson, “To Penshurst,” in Seventeenth-Century British Poetry: 1603-1660, ed. John P. Rumrich and 
Gregory Chaplin (New York: Norton, 2006), 37-38. 
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obstinacy, high and horrible obstinacy, to decline or resist the good titillation of the famelic 
sense, which is the smell,” before entreating Littlewit to embrace the smell as a marker of the 
environment and a means of navigation: “Follow the scent” (3.2.84-88). Busy’s exhortations 
are undeniably comic, but they are equally fascinating for showing how the relationship 
between environment and embodiment might manifest itself on a particular sensory register. 
In early modern hierarchies of the senses, certain forms of perception were more readily 
located on a corporeal register and thus more embodied as modes of cognitive processing. 
Writing in the Neoplatonic tradition, for example, Marsilio Ficino names reason and the five 
senses as the “six powers of the soul,” before concluding that “three pertain more to the 
body and matter (touch, taste, and smell) whereas the other three (reason, sight, and hearing) 
pertain to the spirit.”294 The difference is tied to spatiality, insofar as “touch, taste, and smell 
perceive only things which are very near them,” while reason, sight, and hearing are more 
extensive in the scope of their apprehension.295 Busy and Littlewit both rely upon 
embodiment as a means of determining emplacement, using sensation to navigate the space 
of the fair. But within early modern discourse of the senses, Busy’s captivation occurs on a 
far more corporeal register, suggesting an intense – and, for a Puritan, inappropriate – 
absorption of the body within its environment. In Jonson’s innovation upon the trope of the 
hypocritical Puritan, captivation reveals that selves cannot be separated from space, that 
embodied thought is profoundly permeable with regards to its environment.  
 Busy thereby displays the same enthrallment as Cokes, the two mirroring each other 
in their absorption into the fair. But whereas Cokes becomes lost once the environment 
changes, Busy reasserts his identity through the transformation of Smithfield’s topography. 
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295 Ibid.  
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Having eaten well at Ursula’s booth – Knockem jokes that Busy “eats with his eyes, as well 
as his teeth” – he returns to his condemnation of Smithfield (3.6.48). Having declared that 
“Thou art the seat of the Beast, O Smithfield,” Busy begins to resignify the environment, 
translating the fair into an Umwelt of temptation (3.6.41-42). As he explains, Leatherhead’s 
drum “is the broken belly of the Beast, and thy bellows there are his lungs, and these pipes 
are his throats, those feathers are of his tail, and thy rattles the gnashing of his teeth,” 
whereas Trash’s gingerbread becomes the “provendor that pricks him up” (3.6.64-66, 68). 
Within this topographic imaginary, Busy reasserts his identity as a bombastic Puritan 
precisely through his denigration of the fair. In his own words, “I was moved in spirit to be 
here this day, in this fair, this wicked and foul fair – and fitter may it be a called a foul than a 
fair – to protest against the abuses of it”  (3.6.82-85). The irony, of course, is that Busy also 
claims to have no agency within this particular environment. At the moment that he 
attempts to dissever himself from space, in other words, Busy concludes that the 
environment of the fair generates an automatic and unbidden response within him: “The sin 
of the fair provokes me. I cannot be silent” (3.6.73). While this utterance evinces one of the 
central tropes in the play’s characterization of Busy, that of his hypocrisy, it also suggests the 
difficulty of defining the self without reference to its place. The very attempt to distinguish 
between the purity of the self and the profanity leads, in Busy’s convoluted rhetoric, to the 
realignment of environment and embodiment on another register. 
 Nevertheless, Busy’s disenchantment with Smithfield radically alters the topography 
of the fair. At the height of his passion, Busy “overthrows the gingerbread” at Trash’s booth, 
reasserting his identity through this act of destruction; his declaration, “In my zeal and glory 
to be thus exercised,” subtly alludes to his full name of Zeal-of-the-land Busy, compounding 
the sense that this moment figures a reemergence of the Puritan’s sense of self (3.6.96.s.d., 
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99). But more significantly, Busy’s outburst inspires Trash and Leatherhead to disappear 
from the fair. Since the beginning of the fair, the booths of Leatherhead and Trash have 
defined the topography of Smithfield, for both the fairgoers and those who observe the play. 
They provide a point of orientation within the vast and otherwise undifferentiated space of 
the fair. Within the playhouse, the booths enable the stage to “represent a piece of land in 
Smithfield about the same size as itself,” as Gabriel Egan has postulated.296 Within the 
dramatic fiction, these sites are no less significant in facilitating a kind of spatial 
apprehension. Although no character cites the booths as a way of navigating the fair, their 
disappearance directly contributes to Cokes’s disorientation: “By this light,” he bemoans, “I 
cannot find my gingerbread-wife nor my hobbyhorse-man in all the fair, now, to ha’ my 
money again. And I do not know the way out on’t, to go home for more” (4.2.23-26). Busy’s 
disengagement from the environment, in short, radically alters the shape of that space, and 
this alteration directly contributes to Cokes’s disorientation within the fair. Through these 
characters, Bartholomew Fair represents space as an emergent entity, as a sphere continually 
reconstituted through the movement of individual actors who have little, or no, knowledge 
of one another. In the passage from Busy’s disenchantment to Cokes’s confusion, in other 
words, the play shows how different cognitive ecologies collide with one another, 
transforming the environment through their interactions. At the very moment that Cokes, 
Busy, and other characters reconceptualize their relationship to space, Smithfield becomes a 
thinking topography in organizing and assimilating these disparate ideas into the fair.  
 
                                                
296 Egan, “The Use of Booths,” 47. 
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III. Emergence and Smithfield 
Bringing the insights of performativity and cognitive ecology together, I have argued 
that how we apprehend our environment may ultimately transform the very shape of that 
space. In Bartholomew Fair, characters locate themselves through a vast and complex ecology, 
where the booths of Ursula, Trash, and Leatherhead, and later the stocks and the puppet 
theater, provide points of orientation within an otherwise unmarked space. Cokes’s ultimate 
confusion functions as a humorous, if somewhat unnerving, testament to the importance of 
such architecture in defining the shape of Smithfield. But, as we saw with Littlewit, Busy, 
and Purecraft, navigation of the fair often requires movement through and around these 
sites, the reliance upon sight and smell to create a path where none exists. Within the 
playhouse, as well as within the fictional Smithfield, there is a complex interplay between the 
architectural features that anchor the space and the continual navigation of the gaps between 
those features. As Leo Salingar has argued, “the characters converge and affect each other 
because of an annual commercial attraction, the Fair; but they affect one another chiefly by 
contiguity, covertly or haphazardly, without any mark of collective order.”297 These 
interactions combine to form a collective enterprise with profound implications for the 
spatiality of Smithfield. One might imagine this collective enterprise like the creation of a 
path, where scores of pedestrians, ultimately unaware of one another, succeed in carving out 
a space by walking it into existence. In the fair, Cokes, Busy, and others repeatedly find 
themselves before the booths of Trash and Leatherhead, and this repetitive movement 
creates a number of grooves within the space of Smithfield, making it what it is. In other 
words, collective moment transforms the smooth space of Smithfield into the striated space 
of Bartholomew Fair.  
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As I have argued, this kind of emergence is tied to specific conceptualizations of the 
environment, suggested in Cokes’s captivation with the fair and Busy’s eventual 
disenchantment. Certainly, other characters in Bartholomew Fair bear witness to this 
relationship. Justice Overdo, for example, enters the fair precisely because he rejects a kind 
of distributed cognition within the legal system, citing the gap between himself and his 
informers as evidence of the finitude of knowledge: “For, alas, as we are public persons, 
what do we know? Nay, what can we know? We hear with other men’s ears; we see with 
other men’s eyes” (2.1.27-29). To a degree, Littlewit echoes Busy’s absorption into the fair, 
while his role in creating the puppet play makes his resignification of space far more 
complex than Busy’s outbursts (it should be noted, too, that the puppet play provides 
another site where Busy becomes captivated, continuing one of the dominant themes of 
Bartholomew Fair). And, of course, there is Ursula, whose booth provides the geographic and 
metaphysical center of the fair. But Cokes and Busy represent a nexus in the transformation 
of space. The stances that they embody effectively mirror one another before becoming 
divergent. They remain aligned with one another in the disruption of Trash’s booth and the 
alteration that this brings to the topography of Smithfield; for what one causes, the other 
feels.  
Bartholomew Fair is suffused with moments of captivation and disenchantment, with 
journeys disrupted and prolonged. As I suggested in the introduction, the play’s investment 
in embodied experience moves us past questions of realism and mimetic representation, of 
whether the play successfully reproduces Smithfield onstage. Rather, Bartholomew Fair 
reimagines Smithfield as a strangely flexible environment, a space continually reconstituted 
by movement, imaginative resignification, and disruption. The philosopher Edward Casey 
has rightly noted that places are often less spatial than temporal: “Rather than being one 
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definite sort of thing – for example, physical, spiritual, cultural, social – a given place takes 
on the qualities of its occupants, reflecting these qualities in its own constitution and 
description and expressing them in its occurrence as an event: places not only are, they 
happen.”298 The polychronicity of a given location, its ability to encode multiple temporalities 
within itself, is tied to what Casey calls the place’s “occupants,” those individuals who 
transform the very space that brings them together. In Bartholomew Fair, Smithfield is 
precisely such a space; at once real and imagined, the Smithfield of Jonson’s play exists 
through a complex matrix of materiality and signification, of perception and embodied 
thought.  
I have argued that merging performativity and cognitive ecology can illuminate the 
role of apprehension and experience in defining a particular location, but what Bartholomew 
Fair adds to this conclusion to twofold. First, after theorizing the relationship between 
environment and embodiment through the Induction, the play dramatically reveals how it 
feels to exist at the intersection of these two domains. Cokes’s boast, that his name of 
Bartholomew makes the fair his own, quickly gives way to despair and disorientation, as he 
fails to reassert his identity once the topography of the fair is transformed. But if Cokes’s 
captivation suggests the need to distance one’s self from space, to retreat from an ecological 
subjectivity into a proto-Cartesian cogito, then Busy’s attempt implies that such 
differentiations are doomed to failure. At the same time that captivation reconfigures the 
relationship between organism and environment, Bartholomew Fair also stages the allocentric 
effects of that new relationship. That it to say, the play registers the transformation of 
Smithfield, revealing that multiple actors, working independent of one another, collide to 
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alter the topography of the landscape. Far more than authorial space or mimetic 
representation, Bartholomew Fair invests itself in performativity and its implications for the 
environment, moving characters through Smithfield as a means of rethinking the ontology of 






The Poetics of Emplacement 
 
 On the early modern stage, emplacement was not simply about location. Because 
cognitive ecology foregrounds the transactional relationship between the environment and 
embodied thought, the concept of emplacement also suggests how subjects navigate this 
relationship, how they choose between different modes of spatial apprehension and thus 
orient themselves within a particular environment. In other words, emplacement is about 
being located, not simply within a particular space but also between space and place, 
between an environment and an Umwelt, or between a territory and a milieu. Although these 
terms may refer to the same location – Smithfield, I have argued, is both a space and an 
Umwelt in Bartholomew Fair – the ontology of that location changes to the degree that it has 
been reconstituted through a particular cognitive ecology. Memories, affective investments, 
cognitive maps, and imagined topographies can transform a given location into a place or a 
territory, at the same time that the suspension of these conceptual investments, or the 
recognition of their limits, can convert that place into space.299 As embodied thought 
becomes ecological, in other words, it changes the nature of the environment.  
                                                
299 In this phenomenological approach, space is not an a priori dimension. Rather, it comes into being through 
experiences of emplacement, when a subject recognizes the limit of his or her perceptions of the immediate 
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A Philosophical Topography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), where Malpas argues that “objective 
space can be grasped through the grasp of an allocentric (and so through a subjectively presented) framework” 
(60). Whereas “objective space” refers to a non-subjective domain, the elements of space that are not tied to 
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One of the central arguments of this project has been that early modern drama 
represents emplacement as the sense of being poised between different approaches to the 
environment, with specific plays staging the tragic consequences of inhabiting this liminality 
for too long. The works that I have discussed repeatedly figure moments of crisis with 
regard to emplacement, using disorientation within physical and conceptual space to shape 
the dramatic fiction. As I suggested in chapter one, Lyly’s play turns upon the difficulty of 
locating Endymion, once sleep qualifies the relationship of his soul to his body. As Cynthia, 
Eumenides, and others endeavor to return Endymion to embodiment and to emplacement 
within the world, the ambiguity of his location gives the play its dramatic arc. Moreover, this 
uncertainty becomes both a sign and a symptom of the strangeness that governs the play’s 
own setting, at once cosmological and courtly, while belonging to neither. In Dido, the spatial 
implications of Aeneas’s memory make emplacement central to the drama of Marlowe’s play. 
Insofar as Aeneas endeavors to remember Troy by reconstructing it, his memory instantiates 
a tension between his emplacement within Carthage and his destiny to sail to Italy. Through 
this tension, Dido situates its tragedy in the gap between places remembered and imagined.  
Whereas Dido focuses upon ecological memory, King Lear foregrounds the role of 
perception in creating a sense of emplacement. In the approach to Dover cliff, Gloucester 
continually shifts between trusting Edgar’s description of the terrain and his own sensory 
experience. This emplacement between two conceptualizations of the environment – the 
one perceptual, the other mediated through the experience of others – is both terrifying and 
destabilizing for Gloucester, furthering the very despair that Edgar endeavors to dispel. 
                                                                                                                                            
particular impressions, Malpas uses “allocentric” to denote a “space organised around a certain salient feature 
or features of the environment,” in such a way that our attention must directed away from our own embodied 
sense of location towards another element, out there (53-54). In other words, subjects begin with an embodied 
experience of place, what I have been calling emplacement, and move through a growing apprehension of 
allocentric features of the environment to a conceptualization of space.   
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Similarly, Lear’s disorientation within the storm turns upon his increasing inability to feel the 
world around him, and this attenuation of sensation poises Lear ambiguously between an 
embodied understanding of place and the madness of disembodied and displaced thought. 
In contrast, Bartholomew Fair stages the folly of absolute absorption within the environment. 
Cokes’s captivation with the fair transforms Smithfield into an Umwelt, a kind of affective 
topography both shaped and navigated through attention. But when Busy destroys Trash’s 
tent, and his threats persuade Leatherhead to dismantle his own, the markers of the Umwelt 
evanesce, and Cokes finds himself in a space without signification.  
In these moments, early modern drama engages the poetics of emplacement, in the 
etymological sense of poetics in poesis or making. That is to say, these works show how 
emplacement is achieved, experienced, and undermined in early modern culture, where the 
intimacy between place and personhood is so foundational that its constitutive properties are 
most often glimpsed when this relationship is frustrated. Through this frustration, early 
modern drama represents alternative configurations of the relationship between 
environment and embodied thought, part of a larger effort to reimagine the ontology of early 
modern space. As a Neoplatonic allegory, Endymion rehearses the same relationship between 
amatory cognition and the shape of the cosmos that we find in Marsilio Ficino’s De Amore. 
Like Ficino, in other words, Endymion reconceptualizes space as a bodiless dimension, an 
ethereal medium continually reshaped by the flows of divine thought and contemplative 
adoration. On a more immediate register, Dido suggests that mental topographies can 
transform material terrains, foregrounding the relationality of the two spheres in its 
consideration of ecological memory and empire. Similarly, Lear foregrounds a transactional 
relationship between environment and embodied thought. Within the play, place appears as 
the product of disparate perceptions, with space signifying the limit of those perceptions, not 
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so much an a priori dimension as an immensity that exists beyond the known. Staging a 
different ontology, Bartholomew Fair represents space as a domain constituted through 
collective action and apprehension. The play continually situates individual experience of the 
environment, as in Cokes’s captivation with the fair, within a larger matrix of movement and 
distraction. In other words, Bartholomew Fair reimagines space as an emergent entity. 
Using emplacement to reconceive the nature of location, early modern drama 
maintains an intimate relationship to chorography. Both practices endeavor to describe and 
define an environment through an embedded subject, whose experience provides the means 
of articulating the nature of the place. In contrast to cartography, which maps space from a 
distance – counting the space without occupying it, as Deleuze and Guattari would say – 
chorography represents a flâneur in movement, intertwining navigation with apprehension 
and description. Through this flâneur, readers becomes temporarily emplaced within the 
scene of chorography, enjoying a kind of conceptual voyage akin to what Bernhard Klein has 
identified as a predominant pleasure of early modern map-reading: in this regard, 
chorography, like cartography, “allows the hazards of travel to be replaced by the comfort of 
solitary contemplation.”300 Like these technologies of spatial representation, early modern 
drama enables its consumers to partake in imaginative re-emplacement.301 “Thus with 
imagined wing our swift scene flies / In motion of no less celerity / Than that of thought,” 
the Chorus of Henry V declares, suggesting that thought can relocate playgoers and 
performance in the same instant (3.0.1-3). Indeed, performance depends upon this re-
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emplacement. The Chorus will later encourage the playgoers to “Follow, follow! / Grapple 
your minds to sternage of this navy, / And leave your England” (3.0.17-19). The ambiguity 
of this entreaty nicely captures the relationship between performance and conceptual re-
emplacement: “Follow, follow” the language of the play, seeing with your mind’s eye the 
journey across the English Channel; “Follow, follow” the English navy, travelling with this 
fiction to find yourself imaginatively re-emplaced in France. 
To a degree, the pleasure of performance lies in this temporary emplacement. But 
what is perhaps more fascinating is the way that early modern drama stages the failure of this 
endeavor. Endymion’s desire, Aeneas’s memory, Gloucester’s blindness, Lear’s madness, 
Cokes’s captivation, and Zeal’s disenchantment each represent a moment of disorientation 
and displacement, where embodied thought falters in its apprehension of the environment. 
Because early modern cognition was ecological, thought relied upon different elements of 
the environment – whether that particular environment was defined through bodies, artifacts, 
spaces, or cultural systems – for its success. One could argue that this distribution made the 
ecological mind exceptionally vulnerable to disturbance and disorientation, a precariousness 
that early modern drama repeatedly registers as tragic. But in staging crises of emplacement, 
early modern drama ultimately reveals the constitutive elements of that experience. The plays 
identify the mechanisms and the processes by which early modern cognition achieved a 
sense of its location, paradoxically by staging their disruption or dissolution. Cognitive 
ecology thereby encourages us to reconceptualize the nature of emplacement on the early 
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